Midterm of the Marcos Administration:Consolidating Power amid Crisis of Legitimacy

Synthesis

This paper seeks to explore and analyze the Marcos Jr. administration’s consolidation of power amid a deepening crisis of legitimacy. It argues that the regime’s trajectory reveals a governance model anchored in elite accommodation, technocratic spectacle, and the selective use of reformist discourse to obscure entrenched patronage and authoritarian tendencies. While early efforts at regime-building enabled the alignment of key institutions—the legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, and security sector—such consolidation was achieved at the expense of democratic accountability and institutional integrity.

PHILIPPINE POLITICS

As governance became increasingly weaponized to manage elite rivalries and suppress dissent, corruption scandals and budgetary manipulation exposed the hollowness of the administration’s “unity” narrative, triggering a legitimacy crisis unprecedented in the post-EDSA period. The resulting civic mobilizations and social resistance underscored both the exhaustion of elite politics and the reemergence of grassroots movements demanding systemic change. Ultimately, the midterm juncture of the Marcos presidency lays bare the enduring tension between performative governance and the public’s clamor for genuine reform, accountability, and social justice.

From the birth of his presidency, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. moved swiftly to consolidate political control and insulate his regime against foreseeable challenges. Recognizing the volatile coalition that brought him to power—the uneasy alliance of Marcos loyalists, Duterte supporters, and traditional elites—Marcos began constructing an architecture of governance premised on political preservation rather than institutional reform.

Buoyed by the unprecedented political machinery of the Uniteam coalition and the populist appeal of a restored Marcos legacy, the administration entered office in 2022 with one of the broadest electoral mandates in post-EDSA history. Yet even in its earliest months, the administration’s central thrust was less about fulfilling developmental promises than about reengineering state institutions to secure loyalty, contain rivals, and reassert the Marcos family’s long-term political foothold. Cabinet appointments, legislative alliances, and bureaucratic restructuring all reflected a conscious strategy: to neutralize potential centers of opposition and attempt to entrench a network of patronage that would outlast electoral cycles.

This regime-building strategy was executed through the instrumental use of populist and technocratic rhetoric, as well as weaponization of policy under the guise of championing decisive good governance , and reliance on U.S. support, elite-centered policymaking.

By mid-2025, the volatile political climate Marcos Jr. expected continues to unravel. The once formidable Uniteam alliance has fractured, public approval ratings have declined, and elite rivalries—most prominently between the Marcos and Duterte camps—now define the national political terrain. Yet despite efforts to swiftly consolidate power, the administration faces a crisis of legitimacy marked by declining public trust and growing disillusionment.

The government’s perpetuation of dynastic politics, tolerance of systemic corruption, erosion of institutional integrity, and deepening dependence on external powers have undercut the reformist promise of Bagong Pilipinas. These trends unfold amid worsening socioeconomic conditions—rising poverty, food insecurity, and unemployment—revealing a leadership increasingly detached from - otherwise, inimical to - the conditions of ordinary Filipinos.

Far from being the unifying figure of 2022, President Marcos Jr. now presides over a fragile political order characterized by instability, elite-centered policymaking, and an overreliance on U.S. support to maintain political control.

Regime-Building

From the earliest months of his administration, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. moved decisively to reconstruct a durable political base that could withstand shifting elite alliances and a volatile electorate. Conscious of the tenuous coalition that propelled him to power—the fragile union of Marcos loyalists, Duterte supporters, and traditional political dynasties—Marcos Jr. sought to rebuild the state apparatus as an instrument of regime preservation. His leadership has been defined less by coherent reform than by a pragmatic strategy of political survival, characterized by adaptive realignments, selective inclusion of allies, and the centralization of executive control.

The Marcos administration has continued the neoliberal orientation institutionalized under the elder Marcos and deepened by subsequent governments. Its economic policies prioritize the interests of local and foreign elites through corporate-friendly reforms, the preservation of political dynasties, and the entrenchment of crony patronage networks.

Securing U.S Support

Fully aware of the Duterte camp’s deep political, economic, and security linkages with China—spanning infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, preferential loan arrangements, and defense and intelligence cooperation—President Marcos Jr. recalibrated foreign policy to undermine the rival bloc’s geopolitical and financial leverage. This realignment was not merely a response to regional tensions but a strategic maneuver to insulate his administration from the lingering influence of the Duterte–China nexus, which had penetrated both the bureaucracy and segments of the security establishment.

By restoring and expanding U.S. military access through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and aligning the Philippines with Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy as well as the re-elected Trump administration’s protectionist policies, Marcos sought to secure dual benefits: external deterrence against Chinese aggression and political insurance through renewed U.S. patronage.

Complementing this was the administration’s facilitation of American and allied investments in critical infrastructure, energy, and defense manufacturing, effectively shifting the economic center of gravity back toward Western capital. Key economic decisions—efforts to amend or circumvent restrictive economic provisions of the 1987 Constitution, and the liberalization of strategic sectors—underscore the administration’s willingness to subordinate national policy to external interests, particularly those of the United States.

The pivot thus represented more than a diplomatic adjustment—it was a calculated reorientation of both foreign and domestic power structures. It allowed Marcos to reassert control over the military establishment historically tied to U.S. interests while reassuring domestic elites and technocrats who viewed American engagement as a stabilizing economic anchor (De Castro, 2023; Heydarian, 2023; Baviera, 2024). 

Securing Local Elite Support

The administration’s alignment with major business conglomerates—secured through privatization drives, regulatory concessions, and appointments of industry insiders—illustrates how the Marcos government leverages economic policy to anchor elite loyalty. According to IBON Foundation (2024), the majority of political parties represented in Congress are affiliated with large local business families and regional oligarchs, many of whom have direct stakes in industries benefiting from government privatization, infrastructure contracts, and fiscal incentives.

Political blocs tied to billionaires like Manny Villar, Enrique Razon, and Ramon Ang command significant sway in the administration’s policymaking. A salient example is the growing influence of Enrique Razon Jr., whose business empire spans ports, energy, water utilities, gaming, and infrastructure. As detailed by Rappler (De Castro, 2025), Razon’s corporate expansion has been enabled by sustained political access across administrations and, more recently, by his close alignment with the Marcos Jr. government. His companies—such as ICTSI, Prime Infra, and Bloomberry Resorts—have benefited from regulatory extensions and new infrastructure concessions approved. The appointment of Jose “Joey” Consing Jr., Razon’s long-time associate and former BPI president, as president and CEO of the Maharlika Investment Corporation, epitomizes this convergence between corporate and state power.

Marcos also established the Private Sector Advisory Council—dominated by corporate leaders—that offers guidance to the administration in supporting the achievement of the administration’s economic objectives.

Marcos’s control over these political coalitions—particularly within the UniTeam Alliance and associated blocs—allows him to translate economic concessions into political loyalty, ensuring smooth passage of key measures and shielding his administration from legislative resistance. In this context, policymaking operates as a currency of regime consolidation: fiscal incentives and privatization opportunities serve as transactional instruments binding business and political elites to the ruling coalition.

ECONOMIC POLICIES

The Marcos Jr. administration’s early economic agenda reflects a deliberate strategy to consolidate political stability through economic policymaking. Legislative priorities were advanced at a notably accelerated pace, signaling not only a drive for reform but also a calibrated effort to secure elite cooperation and institutional loyalty in anticipation of prolonged political contestation. By front-loading market-oriented legislation and executive measures, the administration effectively redefined the post-pandemic recovery narrative in terms favorable to major business interests and aligned local power blocs (Africa, 2024; Bello, 2023).  Unlike previous administrations—where major fiscal and investment policies typically underwent lengthy processes of public consultation, congressional scrutiny, and inter-agency deliberation—the current administration has relied on expedited legislative procedures and strong executive coordination to push key measures through.

Several major measures—such as the Maharlika Investment Fund, the CREATE More Law, and the Public–Private Partnership (PPP) Act—grant extensive fiscal incentives to large corporations while constraining state capacity to pursue redistributive policies. Analysts note that these initiatives effectively bypass constitutional safeguards designed to protect national patrimony, extending foreign and corporate control over critical sectors.

This unprecedented legislative velocity and executive centralization, reflects a leadership style that prizes expediency and elite consensus over participatory scrutiny.

Measure	Description / Key Features	Who Benefits	Foregone Revenues / Fiscal Impact
Maharlika Investment Fund (MIF)	Sovereign wealth fund using public funds, GFIs, and possible pension money for speculative investments	Political and business elites with access to fund management and contracts	No direct foregone revenue data, but risks of losses, fiscal exposure, and opportunity cost
Ease of Paying Taxes Act	Simplifies compliance, lowers penalties, harmonizes rules	Corporations and high-income taxpayers	Potential reduction in collections (no specific data yet)
Real Property Valuation Act	Standardizes property valuation for LGUs and national tax purposes	Real estate developers, property owners	No immediate revenue gain; could delay reforms that increase property-based revenues
CREATE More Law	the maximum duration of tax incentives availment is extended by 10 years to 27 years from 17 years reduced corporate income tax rate of 20 percent.	Big businesses and investors	₱5.9 billion in new deductions; ₱476.8 billion total foregone revenues
PPP Act	Strengthens PPP framework, allows more private sector participation in infrastructure and services	Private corporations, contractors, financiers	Part of a ₱101.1 billion privatization drive
Executive Order No. 62	Further reduction of tariffs imposed on imported rice from 30% to 15%.
Zero-tariff commitment	US raises tariffs on the Philippines from the pre-Trump 3.6% (simple average Most Favored Nation, or MFN, rate) to 19 percent. Meanwhile, the Philippines reduces its tariffs on the US from 6.2% (simple average MFN) to 0%,		P31-35 billion as estimated by IBON
99-Year Foreign Land Lease Act	Extension of the 75-Year Original Lease
Enhanced Fiscal Regime for the Mining Industry

This policy configuration indicates a deliberate centralization of economic decision-making within the executive. The government’s privatization plan—targeting ₱101.1 billion worth of state assets for sale by 2026—illustrates this trend: large-scale transactions are being framed as fiscal prudence measures but negotiated largely outside transparent public oversight (NEDA, 2025).

Marcos’s disregard for the social implications of his policies is further evident in his administration’s tariff reduction commitments with the United States and other trade partners, which have reignited debates on asymmetrical economic relations. Critics have drawn historical parallels to the Bell Trade Act (1946) and Laurel-Langley Agreement (1955), which entrenched dependency by granting U.S. firms disproportionate access to Philippine markets (De Dios, 2023).

The reduction of rice tariffs from 30% to 15%, alongside a new trade arrangement allowing zero tariffs for U.S. exports in exchange for modest tariff cuts on Philippine goods, mirrors these earlier patterns. While the government frames such liberalization as anti-inflationary and pro-consumer, the immediate effects disproportionately harm small producers and farmers, who face intensified import competition without structural support. The policy also erodes fiscal space for social programs, with an estimated ₱31–35 billion in foregone revenues (NEDA, 2025).

The cumulative impact of these policies underscores a persistent disregard for equity and social inclusion. The concentration of fiscal incentives, tariff exemptions, and privatization opportunities in elite hands has contributed to rising inequality, with the top 50 wealthiest Filipinos increasing their combined wealth by 6% in 2024, even as real wages stagnated and inflation eroded household purchasing power (World Bank, 2024; Africa, 2024).

Meanwhile, the tax system’s regressive tilt—where consumption-based taxes now account for 37% of total revenues while corporate contributions have declined to 22%—further shifts the burden toward the working class (IBON Foundation, 2024).

Alignment and Coalition Management

The Marcos administration’s coalition management demonstrates a deliberate exercise in realpolitik, characterized by a calibrated blend of political accommodation and selective exclusion. From the outset, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. sought to project continuity and stability by retaining key Duterte-era officials in strategic posts—such as Defense, Finance, and Foreign Affairs—thereby reassuring both domestic elites and international actors of policy predictability. This initial pragmatism, however, gradually gave way to a more assertive consolidation strategy centered on loyalty, familial networks, and elite co-optation (Mangahas, 2024; Heydarian, 2023).

By mid-2023, Marcos Jr. began to restructure the bureaucracy through targeted purges and reshuffles, particularly in politically sensitive agencies such as the Department of National Defense (DND), the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). These moves were framed as part of an “institutional reform” agenda but were, in essence, mechanisms to tighten control over the coercive apparatus of the state.

The reorganizations in the AFP and PNP, including the relief or reassignment of officers associated with the “Davao bloc,” further underscored a deliberate attempt to dismantle the remnants of Duterte’s influence in the security sector. These bureaucratic realignments, often justified as “professionalization,” echo earlier authoritarian techniques of regime consolidation through personnel rotation and command reshuffling—ensuring that no single power center outside the President’s immediate circle can independently mobilize (Curato, 2022; De Guzman, 2024).

Within the legislature, the Marcos administration has engineered an unusually cohesive supermajority coalition across both chambers of Congress. This was achieved by strategically distributing leadership posts among close allies and family members—such as House Speaker Martin Romualdez, a first cousin of the President—thereby consolidating political and fiscal leverage. The result is a form of legislative centralization rarely seen in post-EDSA politics, where the executive branch enjoys near-automatic passage of priority measures, including the controversial Maharlika Investment Fund and expanded confidential fund allocations (ABS-CBN News, 2024; Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2024).

Meanwhile, within the executive, Marcos Jr. has pursued a model of technocratic populism, blending loyalist appointments with the rhetoric of modernization and reform. Key posts in the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT), Department of Energy (DoE), and Department of Transportation (DOTr) have been entrusted to corporate allies and technocrats linked to influential business families, ensuring both elite buy-in and regime financing. This mirrors what political scientists term a “bureaucratic patronage network”—where loyalty, rather than merit or expertise, remains the ultimate currency for advancement (Teehankee & Thompson, 2023).

It should also be noted that Marcos’s recent judicial appointments appear calibrated to safeguard his family’s political and legal interests. On 7 January 2025, he appointed Geraldine Faith Econg as Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, a move widely interpreted as politically strategic rather than purely merit-based. Justice Econg previously figured in several high-profile rulings favorable to the Marcoses and their allies: she was part of the Special Division that acquitted former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile of plunder in 2024, and earlier, she authored the decision dismissing the final of six coconut levy cases involving the Marcos family. Notably, Econg also participated in the acquittal of former Senator Ramon “Bong” Revilla in his own plunder case, a decision criticized for weakening the state’s anti-corruption jurisprudence. Taken together, these judicial outcomes and appointments reinforce perceptions that Marcos is entrenching familial and political protection networks within key accountability institutions, consolidating impunity under the guise of institutional continuity.

One of the most defining features of the Marcos administration’s governance is the recurring cycle of purges, courtesy resignations, and abrupt leadership changes—often coinciding with moments of political vulnerability. These cycles are not merely bureaucratic procedures but strategic acts of political choreography. The May 2025 episode, when Marcos Jr. demanded the “courtesy resignations” of all Cabinet secretaries, agency heads, and presidential advisers following the administration’s poor showing in the midterm elections, served as a dramatic reassertion of control over a fractious coalition.

Such reshuffles operate as instruments of regime preservation, neutralizing potential rivals while projecting an image of decisive leadership. They serve dual purposes: (1) to refresh public perception by symbolically “renewing” the administration, and (2) to signal to the political and business elite that access to state patronage remains contingent upon loyalty. This climate of perpetual flux thus transforms personnel management into a subtle form of coercion—reminding coalition partners of their dependence on presidential favor.

Marcos Jr. has surrounded himself with seasoned realpolitik advisers, foremost among them Juan Ponce Enrile, who despite his advanced age continues to wield considerable political influence. The Marcos–Enrile relationship traces its roots to the elder Marcos’s dictatorship, when Enrile, as Defense Minister, was instrumental in the design and enforcement of Martial Law. Under Marcos Jr., Enrile now serves as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC), tasked with reviewing all legal orders and overseeing investigations involving high-ranking officials—a role that allows him to operationalize Marcos’s political objectives within the legal domain. Similarly, the appointment of former Chief Justice Lucas Bersamin to senior advisory positions further consolidates the regime’s legal flank, ensuring that the administration’s consolidation strategy extends deep into the judiciary and bureaucratic hierarchy.

Ensuring Centralized Decision – Making and Control over LGU:The Case of the delayed implementation of the Full Devolution Policy

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s approach to intergovernmental relations reflects a strategic reassertion of central authority over local government units (LGUs). While the Mandanas-Garcia ruling and Executive Order (EO) No. 138 on Full Devolution aimed to enhance local autonomy, their implementation under Marcos Jr. reveals a politically managed and selective form of decentralization.

The Mandanas-Garcia ruling expanded the tax base for LGUs’ income share from internal revenue taxes to all national taxes, raising local allocations by 39% (from ₱695.5 billion in 2021 to ₱959 billion in 2022). To operationalize this shift, EO 138 provided the framework for devolving select national functions and required LGUs to prepare Devolution Transition Plans (DTPs). Complementary reforms strengthened fiscal management through the creation of the Property Valuation Office and the adoption of electronic systems for the Local Development Investment Program (LDIP) and Goal Achievement Matrix, which improved transparency and data integration.

These reforms produced measurable results: LGUs’ own-source revenues grew by 35% from the 2017 baseline, 86% of LGUs complied with Gender and Development (GAD) budgeting requirements, and budget execution rates reached 84% (COA, 2021; DILG, 2022).

However, the Marcos administration’s decision to review and delay EO 138’s implementation effectively recentralized control over which functions and funds would be transferred. This selective devolution restored the center’s gatekeeping role, allowing the presidential office to dictate the pace and scope of decentralization. In doing so, the administration preserved vertical accountability, compelling local leaders to align politically with the presidential office to secure continued access to national subsidies, infrastructure funds, and development programs (Capuno, 2023; World Bank, 2024).

Thus, rather than fully empowering LGUs, the devolution process under Marcos Jr. has served as an instrument of political discipline and patronage. By controlling fiscal flows and administrative authority, the presidency sustains local dependence on the center—maintaining the long-standing pattern of patron-client networks that privileges loyalty over autonomy.

Weaponizing Governance and Policymaking: A Protracted Struggle for Power

The contest for dominance between the Marcos and Duterte dynasties represents a pivotal development in post-EDSA Philippine politics. What began as a tactical alliance under the Uniteam coalition has evolved into open political warfare, redefining the country’s governing institutions. For President Marcos Jr., policymaking has evolved beyond governance—it functions as a strategic mechanism for consolidating power, neutralizing rivals, and preempting the Duterte bloc’s return to political relevance under the guise of championing good governance. Conversely, the Dutertes have sought to leverage their residual influence—particularly in Mindanao and among security institutions—to resist marginalization and preserve their base for a future comeback.

This rivalry has blurred the boundaries between governance and partisan maneuvering. As state resources, legal mechanisms, and bureaucratic institutions are instrumentalized for political ends, the state itself has become an arena of elite competition. This dynamic echoes what political sociologist Paul Hutchcroft (1998) termed “patrimonial oligarchic politics,” wherein power is mediated through personal alliances, factional control, and rent-seeking rather than institutionalized policy processes.

With its vast political machinery and control over fiscal resources, the Marcos administration appeared well-positioned to eclipse the Duterte camp. Yet the real challenge lay not in capacity but in public perception. Social Weather Stations (SWS) surveys from late 2024 to mid-2025 showed a steady decline in Marcos Jr.’s net satisfaction rating—from +56 in September 2023 to +32 in June 2025—signaling rising public disillusionment (SWS, 2025).

While Vice President Sara Duterte’s ratings likewise declined, this has only leveled the political playing field, creating openings for dark horse contenders to capitalize on the weakening of both camps. In this context, a heavy-handed offensive against the Dutertes could backfire—either by provoking sympathy for the Dutertes or by proving a futile target, one that allows emerging rivals to expand their political foothold amid elite fragmentation.

Marcos’s consolidation strategy, therefore, demands careful calibration—to project strength without deepening instability, and to assert dominance without eroding his own regime’s legitimacy.

Congress as the Administration’s Principal Political Arm

Congress has emerged as the central instrument of political control in the Marcos administration’s strategy to consolidate power. Through a combination of leadership engineering, committee manipulation, and budgetary realignment, Marcos has effectively transformed the legislature into an extension of executive strategy.

Early in his term, Marcos Jr. secured supermajorities in both chambers—garnering the support of 285 out of 316 House members and 21 of 24 senators for his legislative priorities (House of Representatives, 2023). Key family members and trusted allies occupied strategic positions: Speaker Martin Romualdez (Marcos’s cousin) in the House, and Senate President Juan Miguel Zubiri—later replaced by Francis Escudero following executive pressure—in the Senate. This alignment ensured the swift passage of flagship measures such as the Maharlika Investment Fund Act (RA 11954) and the 2024 General Appropriations Act, both of which embedded discretionary allocations favorable to the executive.

However, Congress’s role has extended well beyond policymaking. It has been systematically weaponized as a tool of political coercion—deploying hearings, oversight inquiries, and selective budget scrutiny to weaken opposition figures. Investigations into Vice President Duterte’s confidential funds, the “flood control scam,” and alleged smuggling networks have coincided with moments of heightened tension between the Marcos and Duterte camps, suggesting coordinated political timing rather than pure legislative oversight.

As the main political arm, Congress has to ensure the integrity and legitimacy of Marcos, even at the expense of sacrificing the President’s inner circle to manage political risks. The ouster of Senate President Escudero, followed by the forced resignation of Speaker Romualdez in mid-2025, following a period of declining public approval and growing instability within the Marcos coalition, exemplified how power within Congress remains fluid and subordinated to presidential imperatives. This reshuffling not only consolidated the President’s immediate control but also signaled that loyalty within the Marcos bloc is contingent and transactional—subject to recalibration in the face of shifting political risk.

Impeachment of Vice President Sara Duterte

The campaign to impeach Vice President Sara Duterte in late 2024 symbolized the final collapse of the Uniteam alliance and formalized the Marcos–Duterte schism. The impeachment complaint, endorsed by 215 House members, cited multiple grounds: alleged misuse of confidential funds, threats against ranking officials—including the President—and conduct unbecoming of a vice president.

While legally framed as an accountability measure, the process carried unmistakable political overtones. It followed a series of sustained offensives targeting the Duterte camp: the investigation into confidential fund misuse, congressional inquiries into drug war abuses, the arrest of Pastor Apollo Quiboloy, and the crackdown on Philippine Offshore Gaming Operations (POGOs) allegedly linked to Duterte allies.

However, the administration’s attempt to remove Sara Duterte failed. The Senate, citing constitutional and procedural concerns, delayed the impeachment trial, and later, the Supreme Court voided the complaint as unconstitutional. The move not only spared Duterte from removal but also exposed fissures in Marcos’s control over the upper chamber. Analysts interpreted this outcome as both a tactical retreat and a recognition that an overextended political assault risked destabilizing the administration’s own legitimacy.

Rodrigo Duterte’s ICC Arrest

For many Filipinos, particularly the victims and families devastated by the drug war, Rodrigo Duterte’s arrest marked a long-awaited step toward accountability. Human rights advocates and opposition figures hailed it as historic, framing the development as a long-delayed recognition of the thousands of lives lost under Duterte’s brutal campaign. For them, justice had finally begun to catch up with the former president.

The case before the International Criminal Court (ICC) was long initiated by victims’ families and human rights lawyers, who sought international intervention after Philippine courts failed to pursue accountability for the killings under Duterte’s war on drugs.

However, critics pointed out how the Marcos administration later politically capitalized on its progression, subtly framing the ICC probe as part of a broader strategy to accelerate the political weakening of the Duterte camp. By isolating Sara Duterte and undermining the patriarch’s enduring influence, the move was interpreted as an attempt to tilt the balance of power ahead of the 2025 midterm elections, where control of Congress and local governments will be crucial for both camps.

The midterm election results, however, showed that President Marcos Jr.’s attempt for political dominance remains far from settled. While some imply that the results are part of a calculated move by the ruling coalition to accommodate several opposition candidates in an attempt to avert backlash, especially by the Duterte camp, this is an implicit move by the Marcos camp that outright confronting the Dutertes still carry political risks with significant implications.

Civil society groups, victims’ families, and members of the opposition urged the Marcos administration to prove its sincerity by rejoining the International Criminal Court (ICC), underscoring that true accountability required structural change rather than selective justice. President Marcos Jr., however, distanced himself from the political interpretations, insisting that Duterte’s arrest was simply a matter of the Philippines fulfilling its international obligations under the court’s processes.

The Duterte camp, meanwhile, portrayed the arrest as a politically motivated maneuver designed to erase its patriarch from the national stage. They argued that Duterte’s continued popularity threatened Marcos’ consolidation of power, and thus the arrest was a calculated move to neutralize him. Leveraging this narrative, Duterte’s allies sought to rally support by casting him as a victim of political persecution at the hands of the Marcoses. In June, they petitioned the ICC for his interim release, claiming he posed no flight risk and framing his detention as unjust.

The 2025 Midterm Elections: Keeping Your Friends Close, Your Enemies Closer

The 2025 midterm elections, widely regarded as one of the most controversial in Philippine history, were marred by widespread reports of disenfranchisement and allegations of systematic fraud. Far from consolidating power, the elections produced a highly polarized outcome: the Duterte bloc and the liberal opposition dominated the results, while President Marcos Jr.’s Alyansa coalition fell short of securing a majority. To many observers, this was a stinging rebuke that signified a further erosion of Marcos’ political capital just three years into his term.

Critics pointed out glaring irregularities in the conduct of the elections. Despite mounting calls from civil society, election watchdogs, and political groups to restore the manual voting system, the Commission on Elections pressed ahead with the automated system under a new and controversial contractor. Concerns heightened when COMELEC implemented a last-minute software upgrade during the Final Testing and Sealing process, raising alarms about compromised system integrity.  Media outlets, independent watchdogs, and voters themselves reported numerous cases of ballots not being accurately reflected in the counting machines, fueling accusations of large-scale manipulation.  For many, these controversies cast a long shadow over the results. While the Duterteand opposition blocs made notable gains, the fragmented and polarized outcome paradoxically gave Marcos room to maneuver. Political analysts argued that this scenario reflected a deliberate strategy: rather than allowing one opposition camp to decisively dominate; the elections produced a divided playing field that Marcos could exploit. By ensuring neither the Dutertes nor the liberals could fully consolidate, the administration preserved space to recalibrate alliances and prevent a unified front against him.

This was most evident in the shifting stance of the liberal bloc. Once staunchly anti-Marcos, some opposition forces adopted a more cautious policy of non-engagement following their victory in the elections. A telling example was Akbayan Partylist’s statement that calling for Marcos Jr.’s resignation could inadvertently pave the way for a Sara Duterte presidency—an outcome they considered more dangerous. This repositioning underscored how Marcos benefited from the polarized results: his adversaries were effectively kept in check, forced to calculate their moves in light of the Duterte factor.

Thus, while the midterm elections appeared to weaken Marcos on paper, they also revealed his capacity to apply the principle of “keeping your friends close, but your enemies closer.” By leveraging a questionable electoral process that produced division rather than unity, the Marcos administration managed to maintain control over a fractured political field. The result was not outright strength, but survival—anchored less on legitimacy than on the careful management of rivalries that keep his opponents from closing ranks.

State forces and the anti-communist task force

At the core of any attempt to retain or consolidate power lies the imperative to secure control over the armed forces. Aware of the residual influence that former President Duterte continues to wield within the military and police, the Marcos administration has sought to tighten its grip over the state’s coercive institutions.

Barely a year into his term, reports of destabilization allegedly instigated by the Duterte-Arroyo camp began circulating. Then–Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr. confirmed the existence of destabilization moves by retired generals opposed to the Marcos administration. Around the same time, former Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Benjamin Acorda Jr. filed a complaint against retired Army Brig. Gen. John Macanas Sr. for spreading false claims on social media that both the AFP and PNP chiefs had withdrawn their support for the President. These rumors surfaced amid the intensifying rift between the Marcos and Duterte camps over Charter Change. Lawmakers were reportedly preparing to brief PNP officials on the matter, but the meeting was abruptly canceled for reasons that remain undisclosed.

Interestingly, the destabilization issue coincided with the renewed talk of resuming peace negotiations with the armed Left—an apparent attempt by the administration either to project stability and inclusiveness, or to solicit the extent of loyalty of the armed forces.

In the face of these rumblings, President Marcos approved a staggering ₱2-trillion military modernization “wishlist” under the updated acquisition plan known as Re-Horizon 3. The plan—covering weapons systems, naval assets, and air defense capabilities—was seen both as a gesture of appeasement to the military and as a strategic investment to secure its loyalty.

All while assuring that Duterte’s bloc could not wield any remaining influence over the armed forces. In July 2024, Then-Chief PNP Rommel Francisco Marbil ordered the relieving of 75 Police Security and Protection Group personnel assigned to the Vice President, included from which are the so-called ‘Davao policemen’ who were long-time trusted escorts of the Dutertes. On October 7, 2025, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) relieved Col. Raymund Dante Lachica, longtime chief of Vice President Sara Duterte’s security detail, as the Ombudsman continues its investigation into the alleged misuse of her confidential funds.

However, unrest within the ranks were regularly recurring, and again resurfaced in October, when AFP Chief Gen. Brawner admitted that some retired officers had called on the military to withdraw its support from President Marcos amid mounting corruption scandals and public protests. This admission stood in stark contrast to the public statements of support issued by several retired and active military and police officers, who had earlier declared solidarity with Marcos in his anti-corruption drive. It remains unclear whether the President had prior knowledge of these alleged plots, but the revelation underscored the uneasy balance between loyalty and discontent within the armed forces.

While the military leadership has so far refused to heed calls for withdrawal of support, the recurring rumors of coup plots and internal dissent reflect a simmering divide within the security establishment—one shaped by competing loyalties, political alignments, and the lingering influence of past regimes, specifically the Duterte regime.

In response, the presidential office threatened sedition and treason charges against alleged plotters involved in the September 2025 anti-corruption protests. At the same time, Marcos sought to reaffirm the military’s loyalty through the reinforcement of the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC), repackaged under the National Action Plan for Unity, Peace, and Development. This continuity suggests that counterinsurgency remains a convenient framework for legitimizing military spending and consolidating political control under the guise of national security.

The Floodgates of Corruption: Erosion of Legitimacy and the Administration’s Political Isolation

The exposé on anomalous flood control projects—hailed by watchdogs as one of the gravest corruption scandals in post-EDSA history—has deepened the Marcos administration’s legitimacy crisis. Investigations by the Commission on Audit (COA) and the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ, 2025) revealed that billions of pesos in flood control allocations under the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) were funneled into nonexistent or grossly overpriced projects, many traced to congressional insertions and contractors linked to political allies. COA flagged ₱331 billion in “irregular, unnecessary, and unsupported disbursements” from 2022–2024, with ₱95 billion specifically tied to infrastructure projects in regions represented by pro-administration lawmakers.

The controversy also exposed patronage networks spanning the DPWH, Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and Congress, highlighting how public works budgets were routinely manipulated through backdoor negotiations and so-called “realignments.” These revelations cut against Marcos Jr.’s campaign narrative of “transformational governance,” underscoring the continuity of rent-seeking practices that have long plagued the Philippine bureaucracy.

This scandal is not isolated. Early in his term, Marcos faced backlash over the 2022 sugar importation controversy, which erupted when the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) authorized the importation of 300,000 metric tons of sugar without presidential approval. The President, who at the time concurrently served as Agriculture Secretary, later distanced himself from the decision—an act critics saw as emblematic of blurred lines of accountability between the executive and technocratic agencies (Inquirer, 2023; ABS-CBN News, 2023).

More structurally consequential, however, is the manipulation of the national budget to entrench new forms of pork-barrel politics under technocratic guise. Analysts from the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and Ibon Foundation (2025) documented the unprecedented expansion of “unprogrammed appropriations”, which ballooned from ₱281 billion in 2023 to ₱549 billion in the 2025 national budget—a 95% increase. These funds, technically contingent on “excess revenue collections,” have in practice served as a discretionary reservoir for the executive, enabling off-budget spending and selective disbursements to congressional allies. In 2025 alone, ₱214 billion in infrastructure projects were financed through these channels—many corresponding to districts controlled by key administration figures (Rappler, 2025; BusinessWorld, 2025).

This system has effectively reconstituted the pork barrel mechanism declared unconstitutional in 2013. As one House insider admitted in a Philippine Daily Inquirer report (2025), “projects are the new loyalty checks.” Lawmakers who support the administration’s agenda receive expedited releases and additional project funding, while opposition figures face budgetary retaliation through delayed notices of cash allocation (NCAs) or project cancellations.

The public outrage that followed the flood control exposé—exacerbated by widespread flooding across Central Luzon and Metro Manila in late 2024—pushed the Marcos administration to the brink of political isolation. The scandal not only eroded public trust but also threatened to unravel the ruling coalition’s legitimacy amid mounting perceptions of elite impunity and administrative decay. In response, President Marcos Jr. sought to recast himself as an anti-corruption crusader, transforming the fight against graft into a political instrument for damage control and factional management.

Marcos established the Independent Commission on Infrastructure (ICI) in September 2-25 and launched the “Isumbong sa Pangulo” hotline, publicly framed as mechanisms to “restore integrity” in public procurement. The ICI quickly filed corruption cases against prominent figures—Senators Jinggoy Estrada and Joel Villanueva, and AKO Bicol Partylist Representative Elizaldy Co, among others—accusing them of involvement in anomalous flood control and infrastructure projects (Philippine Star, 2025; PCIJ, 2025). These prosecutions, however, were widely interpreted as selective enforcement, targeting rivals and expendable allies while sparing legislators and contractors aligned with the President’s inner circle.

Many critics believe that Marcos Jr. is primarily accountable with the widespread corruption plaguing his administration. The national budget—including over ₱1 trillion allocated for flood control and other questionable programs—originates from and is approved by Marcos himself. He also controls the largest pork barrel, in the form of special purpose funds, confidential and intelligence funds, and other lump-sum allocations, over which he alone dictates how the money is spent.

Civil society groups, including Transparency International Philippines (2025) and Bantau

Kita, described the administration’s anti-corruption initiatives as “political theatre masquerading as reform.” Critics noted that the campaign’s timing—coinciding with intensifying factional struggles and declining approval ratings—suggested an attempt to reclaim moral authority while diverting scrutiny from the presidential office’s own patronage networks and budgetary irregularities. In effect, Marcos weaponized anti-corruption discourse as a dual-purpose strategy: to placate public anger and to legitimize the selective purging of political rivals, which critics compare to the Duterte administration’s “ narco-politicians”.

By transforming accountability mechanisms into instruments of elite containment, the administration reinforced a familiar pattern of “performative governance” (Thompson, 2010)—where anti-corruption rhetoric is mobilized not to dismantle systemic graft, but to restructure political loyalties and consolidate executive control. This approach, while momentarily restoring the appearance of leadership resolve, further entrenched the perception that corruption in the Philippines remains not an aberration of governance, but its very logic.

Societal Response and Alternative Policy Initiatives

With the political crisis intensifying, an increasingly disillusioned public has begun to take to the streets, signaling the deep erosion of trust in traditional institutions. The widening gap between the government’s rhetoric and its performance—amid corruption exposés, inflationary pressures, and authoritarian tendencies—has rekindled a wave of civic activism reminiscent of past democratic upsurges. Labor unions, farmers’ federations, youth organizations, church groups, and professional associations have converged in mass protests demanding accountability, wage increases, food security, and genuine democratic reforms. Civil society networks have also revived calls for transparency in government spending and the protection of fundamental rights under what many view as a regime of selective justice and political repression.

Inspired by Gen Z-led protest movements across Asia (really? We’ve been doing since the 60s with JMS’ SCAUP), the series of massive protests that have erupted nationwide—spearheaded largely by youth and student movements—reflect a growing wave of political awakening and public dissent. University campuses across the country have become centers of resistance, with coordinated walkout campaigns demanding accountability, transparency, and systemic reform. These mobilizations culminated in the September 21 Anti-Corruption Rallies at Luneta and across the country, a symbolic date marking the anniversary of Martial Law, where tens of thousands of demonstrators from various sectors—students, workers, teachers, religious groups, and civil society organizations—gathered to denounce corruption, rising authoritarianism, and worsening economic inequality.

These mobilizations also reflect a collective search for alternative governance models grounded in people’s participation and social justice. Policy-oriented movements have begun advancing comprehensive frameworks for reform—ranging from national industrialization and genuine agrarian reform, to community-based flood control and renewable energy systems, independent foreign policy, and participatory budgeting mechanisms. Many advocates also call for community-based citizen assemblies and a national people’s initiative to enact long-delayed measures such as the Anti-Dynasty Bill.

These efforts signify not only a rejection of elite-driven politics but also a deepening awareness that systemic change must arise from the grassroots—anchored in public accountability, social equity, and democratic participation. As the crisis of governance persists, the streets have once again become both a site of protest and a laboratory for imagining a more just and inclusive political order.

State Response to Growing People’s Movement

Critics have increasingly cautioned that, amid escalating public dissent and nationwide mobilizations, the Marcos administration may resort to martial law–style measures or the invocation of emergency powers to preserve its political hold. As opposition to corruption, repression, and worsening economic hardship intensifies, the administration’s rhetoric of “unity and order” has begun to assume a distinctly coercive character. Central to this emerging strategy is the implementation of the National Action Plan for Unity, Peace, and Development (NAP-UPD)—a framework that further operationalizes the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC). Though presented as a peace and development initiative, the NAP-UPD effectively extends the reach of the security apparatus into civilian life, transforming local governance, social welfare programs, and even academic institutions into instruments of surveillance, political control, and counterinsurgency.

The violent dispersals and mass arrests that marked the September 21, 2025 anti-corruption protests, including reported cases of police brutality and possible extrajudicial killings, underscore the administration’s willingness and capacity to employ coercive force against public demonstrations. Rights monitors described the police response as “disproportionate and deliberate intimidation,” reflecting a broader pattern of securitization in the face of civic dissent. Despite government pronouncements that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) would shift its focus toward external defense modernization, the NAP-UPD’s operational thrust remains anchored in internal security and “peace-building” initiatives. Originally concentrated in rural areas under the banner of counterinsurgency, these campaigns have since expanded into urban centers, targeting labor unions, student groups, and advocacy organizations under the pretext of maintaining public order.

According to Karapatan’s 2025 Human Rights Report, from July 2022 to mid-2025, there have been at least 129 cases of extrajudicial killings, over 600 incidents of illegal arrest and detention, more than 10,000 cases of threats, harassment, and intimidation, and over 51,000 recorded incidents of indiscriminate aerial bombings and artillery shelling—a scale of militarized operations reminiscent of previous counterinsurgency drives under Duterte’s “whole-of-nation approach.” Human rights groups argue that these figures reflect not isolated excesses but a systematic campaign of political repression, made legitimate through the institutional framework of the NTF-ELCAC and its civilian fronts.

Urgent Policy Reforms

Amid efforts to preserve and consolidate power, the Marcos Jr. administration continues to confront mounting demands for deep and structural policy reforms. The persistence of corruption, inequality, and elite domination underscores the urgent need for comprehensive transformation across political, economic, and institutional domains.

Politics and Governance

In the sphere of politics and governance, dismantling political dynasties remains the foremost priority. The persistence of dynastic rule—long identified as a root cause of inequality and weak institutions—continues to undermine meritocracy and electoral competition. A study by poll watchdog Kontra Daya revealed that over half of the party-list groups contesting the May 2025 elections are connected to political dynasties, large business interests, and members of the police or military. The report also noted that several of these groups face pending corruption cases, espouse questionable advocacies, or fail to disclose sufficient information about their organizations to the public. Governance experts have repeatedly stressed that true democratic reform cannot take place without curbing dynastic control, which perpetuates patronage politics and policy capture. Legislative measures must therefore prohibit family members within a defined degree of consanguinity from holding elective office simultaneously or consecutively, while enforcing campaign finance transparency and internal party democracy (PhilStar, 2025).

Complementing this is the need to strengthen auditing and accountability mechanisms. Recent corruption scandals—particularly in flood control projects and infrastructure—underscore the urgency of enhancing the Commission on Audit’s (COA) independence, digital capability, and real-time monitoring of public expenditures. The Philippines ranked 114th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index with a score of 33, significantly below the regional average of 44, reflecting systemic weaknesses in public financial oversight (Transparency International, 2025).

Parallel to these governance measures, the adoption of a hybrid election system that integrates both digital and manual verification mechanisms is necessary to restore electoral integrity. With persistent concerns about vote buying, machine vulnerabilities, and campaign overspending, reforms in electoral automation and transparency in political financing are indispensable to rebuilding public confidence in the democratic process.

B. Socio-Economic Reform

Socio-economic reform is equally urgent. An increase in wages has become a central demand amid widening income inequality and persistent inflation. The national minimum wage, averaging around ₱441 per day as of 2024, barely covers one-third of the estimated living wage of ₱1,208 for a family of five. Establishing a national living-wage framework tied to inflation and cost-of-living indices would help address structural underpayment and protect workers from economic volatility.

Ensuring food security and price stability must also be treated as a cornerstone of inclusive growth. With hunger and malnutrition rates rising alongside climate-induced agricultural shocks, the government must reinvest in irrigation, post-harvest facilities, storage, and logistics systems while supporting small farmers through credit access and extension services. Central to this is the implementation of genuine agrarian reform—not merely land distribution, but the provision of long-term support services, rural infrastructure, and equitable land ownership. To complement this, the development of downstream agricultural industries—such as food processing, fertilizer production, and farm machinery manufacturing—should be prioritized to generate employment, raise farmer incomes, and reduce dependence on imported goods (FAO, 2024).

Moreover, achieving sustainable and inclusive growth requires a strategic program for national industrialization. With unemployment at 4.5% and underemployment at 11.8% in 2024 (PSA, 2025), the Philippines remains heavily reliant on low-value services and overseas remittances. National industrialization would focus on building domestic manufacturing capacities, promoting linkages between agriculture and industry, and ensuring the wise and value-adding use of the country’s natural resources. By processing minerals, agricultural goods, and energy resources locally, the economy could transition from raw material dependence toward higher-value production, strengthening resilience and national sovereignty (IBON Foundation, 2025).

Furthermore, halting the plunder of natural resources and ensuring equitable benefit-sharing from their exploitation are vital to environmental and economic sustainability. Strengthening environmental regulation, enforcing mining transparency, and involving local communities in decision-making would ensure that development does not come at the cost of ecological degradation or elite enrichment.

C. Independent Foreign Policy

Lastly, an independent foreign policy must be pursued to safeguard national sovereignty amid escalating regional tensions. The government alongside congressional oversight committees should review whether maintaining strategic alliances with the United States, Japan, and other US allies promote the country’s national interests while strengthening our partnership with ASEAN countries. At the same time the Philippines should simultaneously engage China through sustained diplomatic dialogue to reduce hostilities and explore joint development of contested maritime areas. Analysts emphasize that economic and security independence can only be achieved through a diversified foreign policy that places national interest and regional stability at its core (CenPEG, 2024).

In sum

In sum, political and economic renewal in the Philippines requires more than piecemeal reform—it calls for a holistic transformation that dismantles elite control, ensures accountability, uplifts workers and farmers, and asserts genuine independence in foreign affairs. Without decisive action on these fronts, the country risks perpetuating the same cycle of corruption, inequality, and dependency that has long stunted its democratic and developmental aspirations. #

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