PHILIPPINE FOREIGN POLICY UNDER FERDINAND MARCOS, JR.

Challenges and missed opportunities

Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG)

Published on 05 November 2025

 Philippine President Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. is leading the country into a deeper alliance with the US that can thrust the country into a potential unwinnable confrontation with China. Under him, diplomacy has taken a backseat whether in relation to China or the US. In the new multipolar world, Marcos should prudently steer the country away from a policy of confrontation that only makes the Philippines a US pawn in a proxy war with China and exert more effort to take the diplomatic track of securing peace.

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In principle, independent foreign policy refers to the Philippines' path to international relations that engages its national interests and sovereignty for peace and economic growth, without being influenced by or dependent on any foreign power, particularly the United States or China. This concept accentuates the value of self-determination in foreign affairs, allowing the Philippines to engage with multiple countries and international organizations based on its own strategic goals, values and interests.

Among states, self-determination is the ability of a people-centered government to make its own choices and determine its own life and destiny without being controlled or influenced by others.

Moreover, the Philippine government needs to keep abreast of the impact of today’s shifting global environment by securing a favorable latitude, and flexibility for itself and its broader region.

One formula is for the country to forge a strategic non-alignment to guide its sovereign pathway ahead.For countries assessing their foreign policy options, the choice between non-alignment and alliances is mosaic, with neither path being inherently superior. A country's preference depends on its specific geopolitical context, economic priorities, and security needs. During the Cold War, many developing nations favored non-alignment to preserve their independence from superpowers, a legacy that continues to inform modern foreign policy. 

This independent course of action should foster a collaboratively peaceful regional agenda and setting, one that is autonomous from great powers. It is imperative for Manila to advance a progressive Philippine foreign policy framework and track whose goals align with the principles of cooperative peace. It should practice self-reliance but should build friendly cooperation with other countries for its own development guided by the principles of sovereignty, mutual interest and being aboveboard.

The overarching goal of Philippine foreign policy is to express, promote and defend the sovereign will and national interests of the Filipino people.

Reality check

President Marcos Jr. pledged that his government binds itself to pursuing an independent foreign policy carved by the principle of “a friend to all, an enemy to none”. This code as articulated in his inaugural address in 2022 needs to stand an acid test.Marcos Jr.’s realpolitik is ambiguously “independent” because, since his election in 2022, he has tied the country’s security to maintaining a close defense relationship with the US with all its geopolitical implications.

Foreign policy should be clear, predictable, and consistent with the country projecting its own independent identity thus enabling it to maintain normal and friendly relations with many countries.

The America that Marcos Jr. identifies with

Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy in relation with the US, however, does not resonate with a policy that is sovereign and independent.

Steered by a neo-conservative, jingoist worldview, American foreign policy seeks to expand its global economic and security interests and mobilizing its traditional allies including weak countries like the Philippines to support Washington’s world hegemony buttressed by a grid of 128 military bases outside its own territory.

In America’s theater of operations run by plutocrats, diplomats, generals and spy agencies the pursuit of its ruling political class’s global corporate interests has been governed by American primacy, geostrategic imperatives, bullying and launching endless economic wars and military buildup against so-called adversaries – China, Russia, North Korea, and others - particularly in key flashpoints in Asia such as South China Sea as well as Europe, the Middle East, and other regions.The Marcos government should be cognizant of revelations that behind the Trump administration lurks the specter of a “Deep State” conspiracy-administrators threatening to thwart the will of the people and undercut the constitutional authority of the president they elected to lead them.“Deep State” suggests that unelected government officials, particularly within the intelligence community (like the CIA, NSA and FBI), law enforcement, and the military-industrial complex, secretly manipulate or direct national policy in the US and work to undermine elected leaders or shape policy in ways that contradict democratic governance.

Although the term is associated with conspiracy theories, it is exemplified by the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy which until today remains a mystery amid many investigations pointing to a CIA plot whose execution is attributed to the Mafia gang. (Reports indicated that Kennedy was aiming to negotiate peace with Cuba’s Fidel Castro enraging the CIA, the collective military-industrial complex, and other powerful agencies.)

The overall goal is to make governments “friendly” to the US while plotting covert and overt operations against those that are diametrically opposed to its hegemonic interests whom it brands as “rogue regimes” or “terrorists”. At the moment, the US government considers 14 states as unfriendly including China, Russia, North Korea, Mexico, Iran, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Myanmar and recently, oil-rich Venezuela. Accusing Venezuela as a major drug runner, the Trump military is hatching a plan to invade it; the main plot, however, is to seize the country’s oil industry.

By keeping close and long-term defense partnership with – and solely for - the security interests of America, Marcos Jr. virtually submits the country to supporting the US and its western allies wherever they are engaged in armed conflicts against America’s adversarial states thus opening wide the country to potential external attacks by Washington’s enemies.

Marcos Jr.’s “independent foreign policy” is farcical since he expressed his government’s strong commitment to a defense alliance with the US sculpted by bilateral defense agendas, increasing the two allies’ arms drills and other activities. His pro-US stance practically puts the Philippines squarely antagonistic to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (Asean) policy of non-alignment or neutrality.

Long after being granted independence 80 years ago, the neo-colonial ties between the US and the Philippines are as alive as ever.

 EDCA

The deal by the Philippines and the US to implement the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) under which five of the Philippines’ military facilities will be opened for US forward force deployment has been expanded under Marcos Jr. by a commitment to open five more military bases.

The nine Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites in the Philippines as of 2025 are: Cesar Basa Air Base (Pampanga), Fort Magsaysay (Nueva Ecija), Lumbia Airport (Cagayan de Oro), Antonio Bautista Air Base (Palawan), Benito Ebuen Air Base (Cebu), Naval Base Camilo Osias (Cagayan), Lal-lo Airport (Cagayan), Camp Melchor Dela Cruz (Isabela), and Balabac Island (Palawan). These are composed of the original five sites and the four that were added in 2023 under Marcos Jr.

The number of EDCAs for the use of US armed personnel and ammunition far outstrips those established by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA).

The Philippines is bound to comply with these war-driven commitments which, as far as the US is concerned, primarily support the latter’s encirclement and containment strategy on China which began after the latter gained independence in 1949 - and which US President Donald Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden, singled out as an existential threat to American supremacy.

But these bases also operate to keep the Philippines, a former colony, as a US-friendly and neo-colonial country. Responding to the US’ strategic agenda China has strengthened its military operations in the turbulent South China Sea which Beijing considers as a core security interest.

Architectural shift

The 2010s and early 2020s saw an architectural shift in America's China policy. US military presence in the region and the Obama administration's 2010 "Pivot to Asia" strategy for increased American involvement in the western Pacific. It dovetails with a policy aimed at countering China's growing economic clout and military power. Current US military presence in the region includes military alliances and bases with South Korea, Japan, and  the Philippines.Then as now Indo-Pacific region has become the focus of conflict between the two powers.The Philippines is in a strategic location as an anchor for American power in the region of Southeast Asia and beyond, a fact that will stay until a new government asserts the country’s sovereignty and prohibits the basing of a foreign military power.

US intervention or its coaxing to the Philippines to serve as a pawn in its proxy war against China is the primary ground for fueling tensions in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea. Otherwise, the burning issue should have been settled by the two countries sans a third-party intervention using the bilateral consultative mechanism (BCM) established in 2017 in Beijing.

From Beijing’s view, the South China Sea (3.5 million square kilometers) is critical to China's security because it is a vital maritime corridor for international trade, a source of crucial energy and natural resources, and a strategic zone for military power projection. Beijing views control over the sea as essential for its long-term economic prosperity, energy independence, and regional role. On the other hand, Marcos Jr.’s pivot to the US rests solely on concerns about China’s aggressive operations in the South China Sea / West Philippine Sea. The US has seen this as an opportunity for the Marcos government to deepen its alignment with Washington with the former highly expecting that the latter will come to the succor of the Philippines in a scenario of direct conflict with Beijing. The US position likewise justifies its Freedom of Navigation and Operations (FONOPs) in the SCS waters as part of its strategy of containment and encirclement of China.FONOP was set up in 1979 to address challenges that the new international legal regime might pose to the global free access of US forces and to maintain the mobility of US forces and commerce. 

US activities are backed by the 1951 Mutual Defense Pact, Visiting Forces Agreement, expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and frequent joint military drills in the heart of the SCS.

Balancing with a web of alliances

Marcos Jr. is using a balancing strategy of engaging traditional allies such as the US, Japan, and Australia to keep China at bay while keeping traditional trade and investment ties with Beijing.

Moreover, the Philippine president is an active partner of US-led network of alliances in the Indo-Pacific including trilateral cooperation with Japan and Australia – and lately, the UK.To be clear, Marcos’s balancing strategy tilts in favor of the US.

Family: ties that bind

The Marcos family dynasty has had long-standing ties with the US including the “protective exile” of Marcos Sr. in Hawaii - after the 1986 people’s uprising that ousted him - and projects a western-friendly image. To a fault, Marcos’s alignment with the US appears to be politically-viable domestically. In surveys, most Filipinos support the country’s friendly ties with the US and dread reports of Chinese provocations particularly in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea.

 Pivot to China

US President Donald Trump has asked China. to help settle the Russian-Ukraine war which has been raging since 2022.The US and Europe-backed Dictator Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s forces face Russian troops in a losing war. Russia mounted special military operations (SMOs) in February 2022 on Ukraine, which is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) bridgehead to Russia.The roots of the war date back to a post-cold war strategy of the US-led NATO to expand eastward crossing Russia’s red line in order to harass and bring about regime change and territorial redivision.Throughout its history, Russia has been invaded by various powers, including the Mongols, the French under Napoleon, the Japanese, and Nazi Germany. These invasions have come from different directions, involving large-scale military campaigns with a significant impact on Russia's history. These external threats have compelled Russian leaders to consolidate as a nation and build a strong state with a superior military power. But Russia is winning the war of attrition in Ukraine. As of 2024, it has taken control of at least 20 percent of Ukraine’s territory with about eight million of its people fleeing. Months after the Kremlin leader ordered “Special Military Operations” in Ukraine in February 2022, Russia annexed the Russian-speaking regions of Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson although some areas remain unconsolidated. (Ukraine used to be part of the Soviet Union until the latter’s dissolution in 1991 which ended the bipolar cold war.)

Russia’s goal is not to occupy Ukraine but to guarantee its neutrality, demilitarization, and non-NATO membership – a redefinition of Europe’s security architecture and bring about peace in the continent.

Furthermore, Ukraine is under threat by the US president’s refusal to give more military aid particularly Tomahawk missiles to the unelected and dictator Zelenskyy on account of the latter’s corruption and lack of capability to resist Russian attacks as its economy is a shambles. US allies in Europe like the UK, France, and Germany still support Ukraine sending ground advisers and weapons operators in the battlefield.

Displeased by Zellenskyy’s poor performance, US President Trump is holding peace talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Budapest. But the flip-flopping Trump has canceled this too and threatened to impose additional economic sanctions on Moscow. Trump had proposed an unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine which the Russian leader rejected since the proposal was a ploy to rearm Ukraine. Besides, Russia is pushing for a permanent solution to the war through a negotiated peace that addresses the roots of the war.

Keeping watch

On the other hand, China keeps close watch on Japan – a major US ally - in the East China Sea - the body of water that separates the two Asian countries. It is a marginal sea of the Pacific Ocean that lies between China to the west, Japan's islands of Kyushu and Ryukyu to the east, and Taiwan to the south. 

As Asia-Pacific nations grapple with an increasingly complex security environment, Japan and China find themselves locked in what can be described as “stable instability” – a relationship characterized by sustained economic engagement alongside persistent political mistrust and security tensions. This paradoxical state has become the defining feature of bilateral relations between Asia’s two largest economies, particularly as Beijing commemorates the 80th anniversary of the conclusion of World War II in 2025.

Despite strong economic ties, with bilateral trade reaching $292.6 billion in 2024, China-Japan relations remain strained by geopolitical disputes, wartime history, and territorial issues. This economic interdependence coexists uneasily with deep-seated public mistrust and strategic competition, creating a relationship that defies simple categorization as either cooperative or adversarial.

Taiwan

Beijing also navigates the Straits of Taiwan, a renegade island province supported by the US in violation of the China-US “One-China policy”. Beijing aims to reunify with Taiwan peacefully. But an official declaration of independence by the latter will be a tipping point that will compel China to take its island province by force. Progressive forces within Taiwan are taking steps toward reunification with mainland China.From the perspective of the Communist Party of China, the reunification of Taiwan is the final piece to rectify the historical injustices of the "century of humiliation," which is the period from the mid-19th century to 1949 when foreign powers and Japan exploited China. 

Compliance

Meanwhile, the Philippine president’s full-scale cooperation with the US is in compliance with onerous defense treaties that had been signed by his predecessors including the mother treaty, 1951 Mutual Defense Pact, which guaranteed the defense by one party to the other in case of external aggression. But the treaty stipulates it is subject to the constitutional provisions of the signatory partners in such extraordinary crisis situations.

Marcos Jr., just the same, should be made to account for making hasty commitments to the treaty ally without the benefit of subjecting the treaties under review by Congress whose oversight role has long been disregarded, ironically.

Relations with China

For years, relations between the Philippines and China have been soured by a maritime row on the South China Sea / West Philippine Sea involving ownership and sovereignty claims on the vast sea. In 2016, the Hague-based arbitral tribunal adjudicating the Philippines’ case against China in the South China Sea resolved in favor of the Philippines, determining that major elements of China’s claim - including its nine-dash line, recent land reclamation activities, and other activities in Philippine waters - were unlawful.

Conversely, China's claim to the entire South China Sea means it asserts historical sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters, islands, and seabed, based on a map known as the "nine-dash line". Its claim, China says, is based on historical and customary law arguments, but is legally challenged by other nations and the 2016 Hague arbitral international tribunal that ruled the nine-dash line has no basis in international law. The claim, critics say, is also driven by strategic and economic interests, including control over vital shipping lanes, potential oil and gas reserves, and fishing grounds. The tribunal ruled in favor of the main complainant, Philippines. With either the tribunal or the UN bereft of effective powers to enforce the resolution, enforcement has been in a state of uncertainty.

International law

International law no longer grants ownership to an island solely based on discovery; instead, it requires the establishment of sovereignty through effective occupation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines an island as a "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," and established norms for acquiring sovereignty, though the specific legal framework has evolved over time. The key principle is not first discovery but the long-term and effective exercise of jurisdiction over the territory, as illustrated in cases like the Island of Palmas case.

The Island of Palmas Case (Scott, Hague Court Reports 2d 83 (1932), (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928), 2 U.N. Rep. Intl. Arb. Awards 829) was a territorial dispute over the Island of Palmas (or Miangas) between the Netherlands and the United States which was heard at the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Palmas (Indonesian: Pulau Miangas) was declared to be a part of the Netherlands East Indies and is now part of Indonesia. Palmas Island became part of Indonesia due to a 1928 arbitration ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which awarded the island to the Netherlands. At the time, the Netherlands East Indies was the colonial entity, and when Indonesia gained independence, it inherited this territory, now officially known as Pulau Miangas. The United States had a claim based on Spain's cession of the Philippines to the US, but the arbitrator favored the Netherlands' argument of long-standing effective sovereignty. 

Territorial disputes

Of note, not all of China's disputed territories have been resolved. China has settled land border issues with 12 of its 15 neighbors – in some cases with China bending backward by 60/40 in favor of the other claimant party - including Russia, Vietnam, and Myanmar, primarily through treaties and diplomatic negotiations. However, significant disputes remain, particularly with India over the Sino-Indian border and over maritime territories in the South China Sea. 

Conciliatory

Like many of its predecessors, the Marcos government has reaffirmed the country’s sovereign rights over the habitable territories, islands/islets and rocks in the South China Sea based on the resolution of the 2016 arbitral tribunal.Mollifying China’s possible reactions, the Marcos, Jr. government offered conciliatory statements to the Beijing government.

Then Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo (July 1, 2022 to July 1, 2025) reiterated that the South China Sea / West Philippine Sea maritime disputes are not the “sum total” of Philippine-China relations. The two countries’ differences – “differences between friends” – will continue to be handled with a friendly approach, Manalo assured.

Economic relations

Amid the territorial differences, trade relations between the Philippines and China – opened in the 1975 establishment of diplomatic relations – continue to grow. Economic gains reaped from friendly relations with China – as illustrated during the Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010) and Duterte (2016-2022) presidencies – continue to drive Philippine foreign policy on China.

During the Duterte administration, the two countries continued to collaborate on China-funded infrastructure projects and other areas. This report has been disputed given that many of the projects have been mothballed under Marcos Jr.

Voice of restraint, pragmatism

Marcos Jr. is maintaining a fragile balancing or hedging strategy of pursuing trade and investment relations with China and avoiding open hostility while securing guarantees from US for defense. The goal is to maximize national benefits and minimize risks amid great power competition.

This poses the question whether Marcos Jr. is also playing the US card in dealing with China over the maritime row in South China Sea? It is yet to be proven that the US – despite promises guaranteeing an “iron-clad” defense - will come to the succor of the Philippines expediently in a scenario of an asymmetrical armed confrontation between Manila and Beijing.

Marcos Jr.’s “balancing strategy” faces a dilemma as the US expands its military footprint in the SCS that could provoke China. His claimed balancing strategy should have a solid footing in his independent foreign policy that also requires independent decision-making.

A pragmatic paradigm warrants a litmus test. The playbook of pragmatism depends on its focus on practical outcomes and usefulness, rather than abstract theories or rigid ideology. Pragmatism is a philosophical approach where the truth or value of an idea is determined by its real-world consequences and its effectiveness in solving problems or achieving goals.One analytical view is that Marcos Jr.’s pro-US foreign policy is driven by a pragmatic reassessment of perceived regional security threats, economic opportunities, and historical alliance structures. It represents a strategic recalibration rather than a complete break with previous policies – aiming to balance ties with the two powers.

But will the US go to war against China in defense of the Philippines?

The view of this paper is that the hawkish Trump administration will not be dragged into a war with China – especially if it would mean using not just conventional but also nuclear weapons. Both countries are economically interdependent but such relationship has been swept under the rug by growing tensions. China has maintained that issues should be resolved by peaceful means, but it will go to war to defend its endangered core interests – whether in the SCS or over Taiwan.

However, latest US surveys show 60 percent of the US public thinks a major US-China military conflict is possible but not likely; 26 percent believe that conflict is likely; and 11 percent think it is inevitable.

Trade spat

The US under Donald Trump has unleashed a trade war with China increasing by nearly 150 percent tariffs on its exports. Initially, China had responded with a matching tariff of 50 percent, bringing its baseline tariff on American goods to 84 percent. The US then raised its tariffs to 145 percent, and China responded by raising its tariffs to 125 percent. Anticipating a tariff war, China has expanded trade with Europe, Asia and the rest of the world.

With economic influence as Beijing's strongest card in Southeast Asia, China is the region's leading export market - taking around 20 percent of all exports, compared to 16 percent going to the US - and is responsible for around 26 percent of the region's imports.In the same vein, Trump together with his European allies has imposed bone-crashing economic sanctions on Russia. Trump’s latest sanctions were on Russia’s two biggest oil companies. Moscow is fighting the threat off by expanding its oil exports to China and other major economies. In fact, the Russian economy – the fourth largest in the world – continues to grow despite the US and European sanctions.

Russia exports a significant portion of its oil and gas, making it a major global supplier, but a large amount also remains within the country. In 2024, Russia was the second-largest exporter of crude oil, representing 11 percent of world exports, and the second-largest producer of natural gas. While some exports go to Europe, Asia, particularly China and India, has become a major customer for Russian crude oil, and China is a massive buyer of its coal. 

National and security interests

Under Marcos Jr., national interest as conventionally conceived, is the pursuit of policies and actions that protect and promote the country’s sovereignty, economic growth, security, and overall welfare of its citizens – particularly in a complex and shifting regional and global environment. Among others, this concept is informed by the Philippines’ claim of sovereign rights especially in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea).

Under him, however, security – framed generally as military protection – is driven by maintaining a tight defense relationship with the US.

In principle, the Marcos government adopts the 2024 National Security Strategy (NSS) which is seen to enhance the country’s ability to tackle complex security challenges both locally and globally.

Eduardo M. Año, a former armed forces chief now Marcos’s national security adviser, emphasized the NSS's role in addressing both local and global threats, from territorial disputes to economic challenges. (Año came under investigation by human rights groups for the extra-judicial execution and disappearance of national democratic activists.)

Pressed against the wall

Conversely, China has unveiled a huge potential of economic opportunities for the Philippines but this is highly remote now as far its security relations with the US are concerned. In Philippine trade, the United States is the top export market, while China is the largest source of imports. In August 2025, exports to the US accounted for 15.4 percent of total exports, compared to 12.0 percent for China. For imports in the same month, China made up a much larger share (30.1 percent), followed by South Korea and Indonesia. The trade deficit between China and the Philippines for 2024 stood at about $23.39 billion, with China being the top source of imports for the Philippines and the Philippines' fourth-largest export destination. This indicates a significant imbalance, as Philippine imports from China in 2024 were valued at about $52.27 billion, while its exports to the same country were around $19 billion. Meanwhile, by locking itself to deeper security alliance with the US which is clearly targeted against China the Philippines finds itself embroiled militarily and diplomatically in tensions and potential wars involving the US against China in the South China Sea, as well as against Russia in Ukraine and other locations.Tying the country’s strategic security future to a closer defense alliance with the US is not only ill-advised but creates instability as well. By now, the Marcos, Jr. government should realize that the world is in extremely precarious crossroads as the US takes more aggressive and hostile policies in its desperate effort to arrest its economic slide which is critical to maintaining global hegemony.

With a retrogressive economy, however, the US is devoid of a stable economic base to sustain its incessant wars of aggression across the world.The more the US loses its wars of aggression as has been happening in recent decades whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other Middle East and African countries the more it relies on force.

 US-China war

Hypothetically, a US congressional report reveals that the US will lose a war with China.The United States would largely exhaust its munitions inventories in as few as three to four weeks, with some important munitions (e.g., anti-ship missiles) lasting only a few days. Once expended, replacing these munitions would take years, the report states.

Conversely, China has a large industrial base and its capability to produce weapons is growing. Furthermore, the growing collaboration between China and Russia – and also North Korea - makes it nearly inevitable that both powers will coordinate against the United States in an armed conflict with one or the other. American allies in Europe will unlikely intervene. 

A redefinition

The basic lesson here is the need to redefine the Philippines’ national interests which are best served by pursuing a real independent foreign policy. As Marcos Jr. himself broadcast, the country will be “a friend to all and enemy to none”.

But Marcos has either a weak grasp of – or ignores - the tectonic shifts the world has undergone. His policy of keeping close ties with the US runs smack into the wave where the world system has transitioned from the post-cold war unipolarity – which was dominated by US power – to multipolarity which has replaced the US-centric world system with a parity of major powers including China, Russia, India, Brazil, Iran, and other states.

Multipolarity is the way forward

Multipolarity, the distribution of power between many powers and countries, is an offshoot of the failure of economic neoliberalism and the rejection of military superiority which, if unchecked, only leads to more armed conflicts and the destruction of hard-earned development headways. Marcos Jr. and his team lack the cognitive ability to discern the seismic shifts in power relations, with his government staking the country’s future to bankrupt neoliberal policies and its national security locked into a deepening war-driven defense alliance with its former colonial master.

The world has long undergone a sea-change and is now peopled largely by self-determining and sovereign-loving nations.

Impact on the Philippines

Despite its maritime rift with China over the West Philippine Sea a disputed section of the South China Sea adjacent to the Philippines eastern coast, in 2015 the Philippines signed on as the last founding member of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which serves as the funding source for the BRI. The Philippines, in need of funding for domestic infrastructure projects, was incentivized to join by the AIIB’s promise to address the Philippines’ investment needs and close financial gaps among participating countries. The following year, AIIB co-financed two projects in transportation and flood-control projects in Metro Manila with ADB and World Bank, respectively.

The Philippines became a partner of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in November 2018. The agreement solidified cooperation between the two countries on strategic sectors like infrastructure, trade, and telecommunications.  

As of March 2022, 146 countries and 32 international organizations had signed cooperation agreements with China, and the number of BRI participants has grown since then. While a full list is extensive, key participating regions and countries include Central Asia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and many countries in Africa and Latin America

 The Philippines’ BRI experience

There is conflicting data regarding the actual number of BRI projects that were being implemented in the Philippines before withdrawal. The IISS China Connects website identified 46 BRI-related projects in the Philippines. Many of them (20) were advanced infrastructure connectivity (e.g., bridges, railways, airport), followed by ICT-related (12) projects (e.g., 5G connectivity, cybersecurity), and the remaining projects focused on health, trade, and power generation.

However, the Philippines won’t be among the recipients of China’s largesse or shared future as Marcos Jr’s administration swerved decidedly away from China’s infra program. Then in a major development with geopolitical implications, the Philippine Department of Transportation walked away from a series of big-ticket infrastructure projects with China in favor of Japanese and Western rivals.

According to the Philippine Senate, nearly all of China’s key investment initiatives in the country are now in doubt due to economic and political reasons.

In 2023, Marcos Jr. withdrew Philippine membership with BRI. The president’s unilateral decision was rooted in deep bilateral grievances over contested territories in the South China Sea. Marcos Jr. also expressed outrage over China’s reported harassment of Philippine resupply and patrol missions on and around the Second Thomas Shoal  (Rén'ài Jiāo (仁爱礁)  where Manila maintains troops on a grounded ship.

Aside from BRI, the Philippines is a non-member of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Besides the original five members BRICS has added Nigeria, Affica’s most populous country. Today BRICS has 10 members and nine partners making up nearly 55 percent of the global population and 42.2 percent of global GDP or Purchasing Power Parity or (PPP).

BRICS today lists the following members: Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and UAE. The nine BRICS partners, which are on the path to full membership, include Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria. Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.

BRICS offers a plate of advantages including a collective platform for shaping the global agenda, increased economic cooperation, and challenges to western-dominated institutions. Member countries can benefit from financial stability through initiatives like the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, improved market access for investments, and enhanced political and technological collaboration. 

Dawdler

Reliance on the US makes the Philippines a dawdler in the multipolar wave.

Months back, a proposal by Philippine senator Aquilino Pimintel, Jr. for Manila to apply for BRICS membership sparked debate, with opponents expressing concern that such a move could "alienate the US without yielding clear benefits"! This angst highlights the dilemma of the Marcos government's pro-US policy: Excessive reliance on the US has not only constrained its strategic options but also caused it to miss out on significant opportunities in the era of multipolarity.Pimentel said, "The march to a multipolar world is inevitable as such is consistent with human nature," arguing that joining BRICS would help the Philippines "embrace a balanced foreign policy."

Philippine-US alliance

Under Marcos Jr., however, the Philippines-United States alliance has been kinetically reinvigorated since his term began in June 2022. Marcos Jr.’s US policy radically departs from his predecessor’s – Rodrigo R. Duterte - given his appreciation of the Philippines’ perceived security vulnerabilities in the South China Sea / West Philippine Sea and intensified US-China tug-of-war in the Indo-Pacific region.Since Marcos took office, the two countries have increased the tempo of high-level interactions and military engagements. The US has pledged to increase its support for the modernization of the Philippine armed forces – an oft-repeated claim since the ‘60s. After all, the Philippine armed forces is a surrogate army that fights the American war against China. 

With no indication of conducting a policy review, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. pursued his foreign policy of pivoting to the US comprehensively and strategically underpinned by a decades-long defense alliance and made concrete through war drills largely in the South China Sea / West Philippine Sea sometimes along with US-Philippine allies like Australia and Japan. Marcos Jr.’s US pivot reversed his predecessor’s (Rodrigo Duterte) close ties with China which was attended by increased trade and capital investments particularly in Mindanao.

Subic reopening

Now, by tying his foreign and security policies to the heap of the US, Marcos Jr. has reaped a different basket of commitments - war drills and arms donations. Logically, in September 2025, Marcos Jr. reopened the Subic naval base which was previously dismantled in 1991 following a massive patriotic, anti-bases movement in the wake of which the Philippine Senate voted to abrogate the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA). The US acquired the MBA in exchange for “granting” independence to the Philippines after almost 50 years of colonial occupation.

(In September 1991, 12 senators made history by taking the controversial decision to end years of foreign military presence in the Philippines. A proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace would have given Washington 10 more years at Subic Naval Base, once the largest US military naval base in Asia.)

As part of the continuing alliance – and in contempt for the historic vote in 1991 - the Marcos government reopened the Subic Bay to the US military in Olongapo City for the establishment of an ammunition depot. The huge giveaway gives the US a strategic location for projecting its naval power in the SCS against China onward to the Korean Peninsula where China and Russia maintain friendly ties with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea).

The new installations in the Subic-Olongapo zone aim to preposition US Marines and military equipment for enhanced military readiness and rapid response capabilities, supporting the broader strategic goal of strengthening partnerships between the United States and the Philippines. This builds upon the established infrastructure of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), which provides a strategic and tax-incentivized location for such activities.  

Subic Bay’s location makes it a vital strategic asset for the Philippines but more so for the US. The Bay is found in the western coast of Luzon in Zambales province, roughly 100 kms northwest of Manila. It opens into the South China Sea. More importantly, it is a deep natural harbor, making it historically significant as a naval base. Its calm waters are protected from strong ocean currents and storms, making it ideal for anchorage.

The Bay is also ringed by mountains and hills, hiding what were suspected to be nuclear missiles in the 1960s-1990s.

Paradigm shift

The new Subic project marks a paradigmatic shift in the Philippines’ stance, from acquiring rotational training from the US to reinstating its substantial presence in the archipelago particularly in the South China Sea. The region has potential oil and hydrocarbon deposits, thus raising the possibility of joint US-Philippines exploration, antithetical to China’s interests. The deposits have prompted the US to rekindle its presence in the western Philippines.

 2026

The new US Subic installation will begin operations in 2026. It is envisioned likewise as a manufacturing hub for arms and ammunition. Under agreements like the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), the structures provide the framework for allowing US personnel and families to access Philippine bases. Part of the US strategy to contain and encircle China is to build more robust, forward-leaning capabilities in key allies such as the Philippines.

Subic Bay as a strategic missile hub

Moreover, the plan to turn Subic Bay into the world’s largest weapons manufacturing hub follows Washington’s deployment of advanced missile systems to the Philippines. It also underscores a deepening security partnership between the two countries under President Marcos Jr.

At the same time, earlier in July 2025 the US Embassy in Manila announced that the US Navy plans to build a new boat maintenance facility to help repair Philippine military vessels at the Naval Detachment Oyster Base in Ulugan Bay, Palawan, a Philippine province facing the South China Sea. Project documents highlighted the site's strategic location in the South China Sea as one of the key objectives.Chinese sources countered that building such facilities targeting the South China Sea carries "obvious military implications" and will serve as a platform for expanding US military presence in the region. The moves could embolden Philippine military adventurism and escalate confrontations with China in the South China Sea, they added.

RAND’s projection

Will the Philippines be dragged into a hypothetical war between China and the US?In a simulated war scenario designed in February 2025, the US think tank RAND (which had ties with the US Army) foresaw at least one out of four scenarios. The US and China fight indirectly through proxies, expending materiel, capital, and other (e.g., political) resources to support their surrogates. Being more proximate to China, the Philippines under its treaty commitment with the US will serve as an American pawn in a proxy war with Beijing, RAND said.

Graham Allison, founding dean of Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and a geopolitical scholar, warned that war between China and the United States, while not inevitable, was probable, but their interdependence in areas such as the economy and climate could help them avoid conflict.

Allison is known for popularizing the phrase “Thucydides trap” which theorizes that a rising power and an established hegemon are destined for war. The term is named after the ancient Greek historian who chronicled the war between Athens and Sparta.

Broadening alliance under Marcos Jr.

Under Marcos Jr. Washington pressed for a deeper Philippine multilateral alliance with the US, Japan and Australia; and a supporting role in the US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy IPS). The Philippines' multilateral alliance with the three countries has been an emerging security grouping known as "The Squad “- a four-way counterbalance to China amid escalating tensions between China and the Philippines over territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

“Squad” is focused on enhancing “regional stability and promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific through joint military activities, especially maritime security, and defense diplomacy.” This partnership involves regular joint exercises, such as the Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activities (MCAs) within the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone, and defense leader meetings to address common challenges and build a rules-based order in the region.

The term is different from “Quad” - the quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), an international strategic forum of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, or the quadriceps muscle (quad) at the front of the thigh. In September 2024, the leaders of the US, Japan, India and Australia met for the Quad Leaders’ Summit in the US.

The White House denied that the Quad mechanism is merely a tool for the US to limit China in the Indo-Pacific region. Independent observers knew however that the new formation was aimed at China.

The “Squad”’s primary goal is to strengthen the defense and security collaboration among the member-countries; and is a response to Chinese operations in the region. "The Squad" is sometimes referred to as the "Asia-Pacific Quad" and is distinct from the US, Japan, Australia, and India-based Quad, as it includes the Philippines and has a more narrowly focused security and defense objective. 

Marcos vs Sara Duterte on foreign policy

While Marcos Jr. is unabashedly pro-US, Vice President Sara Duterte takes a two-track policy on China amid allegations that she, like her father former President Duterte, is China-leaning. She avers that the country’s relationship with the US and that with China “should be two separate engagements” – “we should not lean towards the US for our problems with China, particularly our issues in the West Philippine Sea.”Assuming that she runs successfully for the presidency in 2028 it remains premature today to speculate whether she will continue her father’s China-friendly diplomacy while holding a 10-foot pole in dealing with the US. 

Domestic politics

Even as Marcos takes a belligerent foreign policy in dealing with China and strong defense alliance with the US, the reality is that such stance cannot be sustained by weak domestic conditions and low trust rating. The Marcos administration’s failure to address the rising costs of living is reflected in the decline of the president’s public support, with Marcos Jr.’s approval rating declining from 45 to 30 per cent between September 2024 and February 2025. The decrease in domestic support has coincided with heightened tensions between him and the now-impeached vice president, Sara Duterte, daughter of Marcos Jr.’s predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte (2016-22).

Dueling foreign policy visions

Both President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Vice President Sara Duterte saw their trust ratings drop between June and September 2025, according to a Social Weather Stations (SWS) survey commissioned by research consultancy firm Stratbase. 

Marcos had a trust rating of 43%, a 5-percentage-point drop from the 48% he registered in June 2025. With a + or – 3% margin of error, it’s a minor drop compared to the dramatic 13-percentage-point drop in trust Marcos suffered between January and February 2025. 

36% of respondents said they had little trust in the President, while 21% said they were undecided. 

Duterte, Marcos’ erstwhile ally, meanwhile, had a trust rating of 53% in September 2025, eight-percentage points down from her trust rating in June 2025.

Marcos’s claimed Machiavellian beliefs

A belief in Machiavellianism – this is what Marcos claims.Machiavellian principles, derived from Niccolò Machiavelli's political philosophy and the related personality trait, emphasize amoral pragmatism, self-interest, and the manipulative acquisition and maintenance of power through deceit and strategic action, even if it means appearing virtuous while acting otherwise when necessary for success and state stability. Key aspects include the belief that the ends justify the means, a preference for being feared over loved, and the importance of controlling appearances to manage public perception.  The Machiavellian main doctrine centers on moral expediency, where a ruler can and should use any means necessary, including unscrupulous or immoral actions, to achieve and maintain political power for the good and stability of the state. Key tenets include the belief that politics is separate from private morality, the importance of a strong military, the justification of fear over love, and the strategic manipulation of appearances to serve the state's interests above all else. 

Core Principles of the Machiavellian Doctrine

The acid test of Marcos’s claim to Machiavellian principles should consider the following: First, pragmatism over morality where the fundamental principle is that the ends justify the means; the good of the state is paramount, and conventional moral constraints are secondary. Second, the primary goal is to acquire and preserve political power and ensure the survival and prosperity of the state. 

In Marcos, Machiavellianism dictates that a strong alliance with the US favors Philippine interests even if it means entering into a losing war against China.

However, a psycho-social analysis of Marcos Jr’s leadership suggests some caution since public figures often project a curated image; one can only infer motivations and traits based on behavior, rhetoric, and patterns of actions.

Marcos’s psychological leadership profile

Marcos Jr. grew up in the shadow of his father, Ferdinand Sr. whose authoritarian regime marked a critical and traumatic period in Philippine politics. His father’s personality may have shaped his international standards – especially regarding power control and public image.But the son’s image appears to be more image-focused than visionary, with a tendency to avoid ideological depth. This could stem from a defensive mechanism – idealization of the past and denial of the regime’s historical crimes.

Rehabilitating the Marcos name was a central theme of his political campaign. Although his communication style emphasizes unity it often lacks policy substance – suggesting a tendency to be liked rather than challenged. He appears to avoid direct confrontation with historical criticism, opting for vagueness or redirection (reminiscent of his avoidance of debates during the campaign).

He - like Trump - shows signs of narcissistic leadership albeit defensive. Instead of meritocratic appeal he relies on legacy and entitlement. His leadership image is more bureaucratic and managerial than transformative. There is a possible dependency on loyalists and family networks to avoid threats to his legitimacy. And he taps into Filipino nostalgia especially for a romanticized version of his father’s era (“Golden Age” myth).

In the final analysis, the social realities of slow growth, unemployment, chronic poverty and high prices are boldly written on the wall and no amount of image-building can trade fiction with truth. Marcos has three more years before he steps down.

Likewise, it is domestic issues rather than foreign policy topics that will define Marcos’s place in the country’s history:

Domestic and foreign policies

Now the question is do these mean that foreign policy is a mere extension of domestic policy, as is often said? Although this may not be entirely the case, domestic politics certainly matters. The failure to properly manage the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy potentially has serious consequences for the Philippines.For the Philippines, a weak domestic economy and fractious relations between family dynasties and their allies – a fact which covers a century – will inevitably lead to a weak foreign policy against being strong and cohesive – a policy that is toothless. Among some small and developing nations, non-alignment is the norm with a mastery of playing one power against another.Alliance with a powerful country like the US to the extent that it will be drawn into tensions with, for instance, China will only fuel armed conflicts from which the Philippines will only drain its resources and lose.The people’s basic interests are food, jobs, housing and, above all, peace. Wars are not their cup of tea.For both the Philippines and China, understanding the other side’s domestic constraints (apart from one’s own) may help develop greater sensitivity to the motivations and driving forces behind certain policy choices. Although this heightened sensitivity may not necessarily lead to a different set of foreign policies altogether, it may contribute to more measured and calibrated responses that can help avoid further fueling the tensions.

Because perceptions clearly matter, efforts to better understand the other side, to clarify the reasons behind one’s own actions and pronouncements, as well as to calm down counter-productive public opinion, will all play an important role in any future initiatives at conflict management.Diplomacy plays a critical role in managing tensions in the South China Sea to avoid deterioration into an open confrontation.

Managing conflict requires keeping the doors to dialogue regularly open, suspending the urge to react in a knee-jerk fashion to every perceived provocation, avoiding sending mixed or provocative signals, and ensuring responsible reporting by media.For the longer-term improvement of Philippines–China relations, each side also needs to deepen multidisciplinary expertise on the other’s government and people and promote close links among their think tanks, opinion leaders, analysts, and scholars.

What is to be done

Maritime issues with China should lead to a revisit of the 1988 summit meeting between Philippine President Corazon C. Aquino and China’s core leader Deng Xiaoping and the fundamental agreement they forged to bring about peace between the two countries.

Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy on China – as well as with the US – should be reviewed regularly by Congress’ oversight committees on foreign relations in consonance with yearly developments and accordingly submit bipartisan recommendations to the presidential office. Public and expert opinion should be tapped by Congress. This will help only if the president listens not to politicians but more importantly the people.   

The door to diplomacy should remain open especially to reduce tensions and deter armed conflicts.