When the Floodgates Open: Corruption Scandal, Elite Conflict, and National Security Crisis in the Philippines

PHILIPPINE POLITICS

 November 2025 saw the government corruption scandal escalating even more dramatically. 

These have included arrests of officials of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) officials, travel bans on dozens of lawmakers and contractors, the filing of cases before the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan (anti-graft court), and declaration by investigators that up to 1,200 individuals may face charges. State efforts at investigation expanded through units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP), validation of ghost projects, and intensified field-level inquiries. These developments revealed a pattern of unprecedented breakdown in procurement processes and systemic corruption across many agencies.

Conflict between elite cliques have deepened even more, with the intense conflict between Marcos family members being made very public. The President Marcos Jr.’s sister, Senator Imee Marcos, accused him of illegal drug use during a mass rally by the Duterte-allied Iglesia ni Cristo (a large conservative Christian sect), triggering a fierce presidential office response framing the allegations as destabilization. 

After months of silence and hiding abroad, former Ako Bicol party-list representative Elizaldy “Zaldy” Co finally emerged. He stirred another major political controversy by releasing video statements in which he admits facilitating large budget insertions (reportedly around PhP 100 billion) in the 2025 national budget and directly implicates President Marcos Jr. and former House Speaker Martin Romualdez as having ordered the insertions, particularly for flood control and other infrastructure projects. 

Co claims that a portion of the funds ended up as kickbacks to Marcos (whom he alleges received about PhP 25 billion) and that the administration has sought to silence him, though critics have questioned aspects of his claims and House leaders deny the timeline and evidence of his allegations, prompting calls for independent investigation while the presidential office has refused to “dignify” the accusations.

Amid all these, the protest movement against corruption continues to mount large rallies. On November 30, two groups gathered tens of thousands – both calling for immediate prosecution of public officials involved in the systemic corruption of public funds for infrastructure projects. Some of the groups that joined the protest at Luneta Park even called for the resignation of both President Marcos Jr. and Vice President Duterte, and suggested that a transition council be formed to address the systemic corruption in government.

Meanwhile, the government’s management of the crisis was further shaken by the resignations of Executive Secretary Lucas Bersamin and Budget Secretary Amenah Pangandaman, as well as Rogelio Singson from the Independent Commission on Infrastructure (ICI). Bersamin and Pangandaman supposedly both stepped down after their offices were implicated in the flood control scandal – but Bersamin himself said he was asked to do so. In any case, these resignations indicate the administration’s desperate efforts to insulate the President from the burgeoning political scandal.

Bamban mayor sentenced and the economy

Elsewhere, a court sentenced former Bamban mayor Alice Guo to life imprisonment for qualified human trafficking linked to POGO operations, reinforcing concerns over the infiltration of transnational crime syndicates into local politics. 

The economy reflected these governance crises. Public spending slowed due to audits and case reviews, inflation figures remained low yet failed to ease public frustration over stagnant wages, and a controversial government statement asserting that a PhP 500 Noche Buena was sufficient fueled perceptions of official detachment from social realities.Maritime rifts

Externally, maritime tensions persisted, with government claims of sightings of 30 Chinese vessels, as well as continued shadowing of Philippine ships, and claims about possible Chinese installations on disputed features. ASEAN diplomacy intensified ahead of the Philippines’ 2026 chairmanship, even as Japan, Vietnam, and the United States continued to intensify their military and political influence on the Philippine government in the light of China’s continued presence in the South China Sea.

Worsening crisis of Philippine governance 

The corruption scandals that continued to hog the headlines were made even more intense by the series of strong typhoons and other climate disasters that the country experienced in November 2025. These series of severe climate and natural disasters compounded existing vulnerabilities, displacing millions and causing widespread destruction. Early in the month, Typhoon Kalmaegi (locally named “Tino”) made multiple landfalls across the Visayas, especially devastating Cebu and nearby provinces with torrential rains, flooding, and landslides, killing well over 100 people and forcing hundreds of thousands to evacuate as entire communities were submerged and infrastructure damaged. Shortly after, Super Typhoon Fung-wong (Uwan) struck Luzon with powerful winds and flooding, adding at least dozens more deaths and displacing over a million people while compounding damage to homes and agriculture. These back-to-back storms followed a powerful 6.9-magnitude earthquake in late September that had already stretched disaster response capacities, leaving many families still in recovery when the cyclones hit prompting continued relief efforts by both local and international agencies. Collectively, these events reflect escalating climate hazards affecting the Philippines.

Amid this backdrop was the continuing corruption revelations, especially the escalating flood control scandals that have entered a decisive phase. Government investigators have filed cases against lawmakers and contractors. Seven lawmakers became the subject of plunder, graft, bribery, and conflict-of-interest complaints, confirming the involvement of political elites in a nationwide contracting scheme. Pundits described the emergence of “cong-tractors,” or legislators whose families or firms cornered DPWH projects. The filing of the first case before the Sandiganbayan signaled momentum in corruption probes involving high-ranking officials – but these prosecutions continue to leave out the presidency.

Arrests continued throughout November. DPWH engineers implicated in Mindoro anomalies were nabbed in separate operations, while others surrendered following public statements from President Marcos confirming that several suspects were already in custody. Police reported that several accused individuals had gone missing, prompting speculation about deliberate evasion of law enforcement. Travel bans were sought for dozens of individuals under investigation, signaling an expectation of more indictments.

In an apparent effort to make them scapegoats as the scandals enter the presidential office, Executive Secretary Lucas Bersamin and DBM Secretary Amenah Pangandaman “resigned out of delicadeza” – though Bersamin himself said he was asked to resign. Their resignations suggested mounting internal pressure, a recognition that credibility had eroded, and a potential reshuffling of the administration’s inner circle. Cabinet-level turnover during a governance scandal highlighted the scale of political fallout and invited scrutiny of institutional accountability mechanisms.

Conflict between members of the ruling clique intensified. Senator Imee Marcos leveled allegations of illegal drug use against her brother, the President, delivered at a mass rally by the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) attended by hundreds of thousands. The presidential office dismissed the allegations as desperation and a destabilization attempt, further deepening intrafamilial tensions. Officials claimed Imee aimed to unseat the President to advance her own political interests. 

Meanwhile, fugitive lawmaker Elizaldy Co released videos accusing President Marcos, the First Lady, and House Speaker Martin Romualdez (the President’s first cousin) of complicity in large-scale budget insertions. He accused the administration of political profiling and revealed what he described as insider knowledge about kickback operations. The presidential office countered by alleging that Co’s lawyer attempted to blackmail the government into halting passport cancellation proceedings in exchange for stopping further video releases. 

The repartee’ demonstrated how digital platforms have become battlegrounds for political warfare during governance crises. It also suggests that Co’s claims must be approached with caution given his the former congressman’s own role in questionable funding practices. Even so, several of the officials and connections he mentioned had already been validated through independent reporting, while the unusually large allocations associated with presidential son and Rep. Sandro Marcos and Speaker Romualdez had earlier been reported by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ). Likewise, activist leaders such as Renato Reyes Jr., chairperson of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan or New Patriotic Alliance) and former Kabataan Rep. Raoul Manuel, already flagged discrepancies in some of the figures Co cited.

Former Budget Sec. Pangandaman’s name had also surfaced prior to Co’s statements, raised by economists and columnists who questioned anomalies in the National Expenditure Program (NEP). By the time Co released his videos, mainstream news organizations had already identified the NEP as problematic and had reported extensively on budget anomalies months before the President’s State of the Nation Address (SONA). 

Given this context, efforts to use Co’s compromised credibility to deflect from broader concerns about corruption are unlikely to be persuasive. While the government should hold Co accountable for any wrongdoing, the underlying issues the former congressman alluded to predate his disclosures and have been substantiated by independent investigations. The issue underscores the need for a thorough and transparent inquiry into budget processes and the networks surrounding them.

The public response to the massive corruption scandal continues to spill into the streets. Throughout November, and especially by November 30, tens of thousands protested what they viewed to be the Marcos administration’s lack of action in addressing the scandal. Two separate protest actions that day – one that called itself Trillion Peso March at EDSA, and another called “Baha sa Luneta 2.0” (Flood Luneta 2.0) – unite in a common call for more accountability across the country. 

Many groups in Manila’s Luneta, however, have called for more radical actions in addressing the scandal. More specifically, they have called for the resignation or ouster of both President Marcos Jr. and Vice President Sara Duterte. Some have also proposed the formation of a transition council that would address the systemic issues that made the massive corruption possible.

Meanwhile, in a recent ruling, the International Criminal Court’s Appeals Chamber in The Hague, The Netherlands denied former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s appeal for provisional or interim release while he awaits trial on crimes against humanity charges related to his war on drugs.The chamber concluded that his defense had failed to demonstrate sufficient grounds for release and that he remains a flight risk and could evade trial or interfere with proceedings. The judges unanimously upheld the lower chamber’s decision that continued detention was necessary to ensure Duterte’s appearance at trial and to protect the integrity of the process. Victims’ lawyers welcomed the decision as affirming the need for his detention to encourage witness safety, while Duterte’s family said they accepted the ruling and indicated plans to continue legal avenues, including another release request after a pending medical evaluation. The decision does not affect the main case on the merits, which continues independently of the interim release issue.

Amid these developments, the conviction of former Bamban mayor Alice Guo for qualified trafficking reaffirmed the reach of transnational criminal networks into Philippine governance. Senators celebrated the conviction as a victory against organized crime, citing years of investigative work into related abuses of Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators (POGOs). Guo’s legal maneuver to delay her transfer underscored the persistence of political and legal strategies used by implicated actors. 

Meanwhile, former presidential spokesperson and fugitive Harry Roque continues to assert his innocence on similar trafficking charges related to POGO operations during the Duterte presidency. Roque fled the Philippines before Guo’s arrest and reportedly used an irregular exit route similar to what was used by Guo.

He argues that his asylum status protects him under European law even as Philippine authorities pursue an Interpol Red Notice for his alleged involvement in human trafficking tied to POGO operations.

NATIONAL ECONOMY

Economic Landscape Amid the Crisis

The economy in November reflected the destabilizing effects of both the revelations of corruption, as well as the long-term neoliberal economic policies that progressive economists and think tanks have long critiqued. Economic data showed a slowdown in public spending and mixed indicators on consumer welfare, while public dissatisfaction over prices and wages grew louder.

The budget deficit remained controlled primarily because government spending slowed. This restraint, driven in part by flood control audits and procurement freezes, limited the state’s ability to stimulate the economy. Capital expenditures suffered, especially in infrastructure, due to project suspensions and compliance reviews.

Inflation remained moderately high which did not ease concerns on the ground. Wage stagnation persisted, while rising food and energy prices continued to strain household budgets. Public frustration intensified after statements of the Department of Trade and Industry Sec. Cristina Roque suggested that P500 was sufficient for a family’s Noche Buena. The claim was criticized widely as detached from economic reality and fueled perceptions of insensitivity to household struggles and justification for the failures of the government to uplift the economic well-being of struggling Filipinos.

Climate-related disasters added further economic pressure. Typhoon Tino triggered renewed demand for flood mitigation, including validation efforts for existing flood control systems. Investigations revealed widespread substandard or incomplete projects, further delaying rehabilitation efforts. The confluence of natural disaster costs and corruption-related delays strained local and national budgets.

Foreign investment

Foreign investment signals were mixed. Some large investors reaffirmed interest in Philippine renewable energy projects, a bright spot amid volatility. At the same time, investor confidence remained fragile due to political uncertainty and the ongoing flood control probe. Indeed, this situation only exposes the limitations of an economic policy of continued reliance on foreign investment, as well as remittance from Overseas Filipino Workers. 

This overreliance on foreign capital and remittances has been part and parcel of  “economic fundamentals” that the Marcos administration claims has been “strong”. Independent economic analysts like those from IBON Foundation criticize this, arguing that this narrative ignores the worsening hardships faced by ordinary Filipinos. The group pointed to slowing economic performance (with GDP growth dropping to 4% in the third quarter of 2025, the weakest in 14 years outside the pandemic) and declining household spending driven by stagnant incomes, job losses, and widespread informality. Key productive sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing have fallen to historic lows, contributing to weak job creation, rising unemployment, and wages that fall far below the living wage in every region. These economic pressures have coincided with rising poverty and hunger, with self-rated poor families increasing from 12.2 million in 2022 to 14.2 million in 2025, and hunger incidence nearly doubling.

While living conditions worsen for many, wealth continues to concentrate among the country’s richest individuals and corporations. From 2022 to 2025, the combined fortunes of the three wealthiest Filipinos surged by 56%, and the collective wealth of the top 50 richest rose by 25%, alongside a significant increase in corporate profits. IBON argued that these trends illustrate an economy benefiting the powerful while leaving the majority behind as destitute. To truly strengthen the economy, the group emphasized the need for governance that prioritizes ordinary Filipinos, combats systemic corruption, revitalizes domestic agriculture and industry, and, in the short term, supports incomes and livelihoods through wage subsidies and assistance for small businesses and producers.

Overreliance on western powers for national security

This dependence on foreign direct investment stems from the same overdependence on Western economic powers, primarily the United States (US), but also with other of its allies, supposedly for the country’s national security. 

In November, the Philippine Navy claimed that it detected the presence of 30 Chinese vessels, including warships, near contested areas. Shadowing incidents persisted around Scarborough Shoal, and the threat of a new monitoring station on Bajo de Masinloc raised fears of further militarization. These developments contributed to the narrative, supported of course by the United States, over possible territorial consolidation by China. Another encounter was a Chinese ship off Zambales that withdrew only after challenge operations by the Philippine Coast Guard. The Philippines said it continued to track not only warships but also militia and research vessels, all of which form part of China’s gray-zone strategy.

ASEAN

ASEAN dynamics took on new importance as the Philippines prepared for its 2026 chairmanship. Vietnamese officials stated that the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea remained the region’s core agenda. Manila sought to position itself as a proactive regional leader, despite its own internal political issues. Despite the US and Western allies’ conscious efforts to heighten confrontation with China, diplomatic approaches are on the table. Japan, for instance, signaled its intent to maintain dialogue with China amid rising Taiwan-related tensions. Meanwhile, reports of a call where China raised the Taiwan issue with former US President Donald Trump underscored the volatility of great-power relations and their potential spillover into Philippine maritime disputes.

Through it all, the US Trump administration’s approach to maintaining economic and political dominance appears to be shifting. This is seen in the release of the 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS) under President Trump. It provides the ideological and strategic backdrop for the US’ rapidly intensifying confrontation with its avowed competitors and “enemies”.The document marks a distinct departure from decades of post-World War II American foreign policy, embracing a sharply nationalist worldview rooted in Trump’s longstanding “America First” doctrine. European officials and former leaders have condemned the NSS for its confrontational tone, its civilizational rhetoric, and its alignment with far-right talking points. 

The strategy, in fact, portrays Europe as a continent facing demographic and cultural “erosion,” raising direct questions about the future reliability of NATO allies. While critics argue that these assessments are exaggerated and ideologically driven, the NSS nonetheless signals a fundamental reordering of US foreign priorities in which Europe is de-emphasized and the Western Hemisphere becomes the principal arena of American strategic ambition.

A central component of this reorientation is the document’s so-called “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. This updated doctrine asserts that the US must restore its preeminence in the Americas, counter migration and drug trafficking, and prevent rival powers from gaining strategic footholds. It proposes military redeployments, reciprocal trade agreements, and intensified enforcement across the hemisphere. Although framed in security terms, the corollary reflects a much broader intent: to consolidate US authority in Latin America and assert unilateral leverage in regional affairs. It is within this framework that the unfolding crisis with Venezuela appears not as an isolated episode but as an early test of the administration’s reasserted hemispheric dominance.

Events in the Caribbean in late 2025 reflect this strategic shift with growing clarity. The US has launched a series of lethal maritime strikes on vessels it claims were linked to drug trafficking networks associated with the Maduro government. These operations, which have killed several individuals and triggered international concern, coincide with a significant US military buildup in the region, including naval, aerial, and intelligence deployments. (Trump has reportedly deployed at least 20 CIA posts in Venezuela.)Washington has portrayed Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro as a “narco-terrorist regime” deeply intertwined with criminal networks. This framing justifies expanded sanctions, aggressive interdictions, and preparations for what some officials describe as a “new phase” of operations. While the administration maintains that its actions form part of a counter-narcotics mission, critics argue that the scale and political tone of the campaign suggest a much wider geopolitical effort aimed at isolating and weakening the Venezuelan state. (Trump’s motive in a regime change is to control the Caracas government’s oil industry which is said to be the world’s largest.)

For the Maduro government, the US shift is interpreted as outright hostility and a precursor to broader attempts at regime change. Caracas has mobilized thousands of troops, denounced US strikes as violations of sovereignty, and warned of escalating confrontation. Venezuelan officials also argue that Washington’s renewed Monroe Doctrine posture is designed to reassert control over the country’s vast oil resources, a claim echoed by some analysts who note the timing of increased US interest in Venezuela’s oil reserves. The broader region is feeling the effects as well. Caribbean and Latin American governments have been drawn into debates over whether to support or resist US initiatives, particularly as Washington seeks basing agreements and political backing for its operations. International actors, including the United Nations and the Vatican, have urged restraint and warned against military escalation. Observers note that the US approach risks triggering wider instability, especially if further strikes are carried out or if covert operations expand. The NSS’s emphasis on unilateral action and hemispheric dominance appears to leave little room for negotiated solutions, amplifying concerns among human rights advocates and regional organizations.

Indeed, the NSS and the unfolding US-Venezuela conflict, as well as its increasingly confrontational approach to the South China Sea disputes, demonstrate a profound ideological and strategic realignment in American foreign policy. The NSS’s nationalist framing, its revival of 19th-century doctrines, and its sharp critique of traditional allies underscore a shift away from the trappings of multilateralism and toward forceful assertion of US interests in the world. 

Conclusion

November 2025 saw the escalation of the Philippine political crisis, while economic strains continue to deepen, and national sovereignty issues continue to intensify. 

The flood control scandal exposed systemic corruption and forced the state to ramp up its investigation and prosecution of those involved within government. But massive protests have continued, with many calling on the resignation of both the President and Vice President, and for the formation of a transition council to address the power vacuum and introduce fundamental systemic changes. These proposals continue to be rejected by most sections of the elite, while conflicts between elite factions intensify and public accusations of impropriety and corruption within the ruling family surface. 

Economically, public spending slowdowns, wage stagnation, and widespread dissatisfaction over living costs revealed long-time systemic failures of the prevailing neoliberal economic model.  

Externally, the Philippines has continued its path towards greater dependency on the US and its allies in terms of defending its national sovereignty, putting it in a precarious strategic position despite the presence of diplomacy as a path to resolution. Meanwhile, the US appears to have shifted its foreign policy further towards the Right, towards more military confrontation towards its competitors (mainly China) and “enemies” (Venezuela, for example) as it navigates its own internal vulnerabilities and economic crises. #