THE RE-ASCENDANCY OF JAPAN’S MILITARISM

80 YEARS AFTER THE WAR and Marcos Jr’s puppetry

Issue Analysis No. 08 Bobby M. Tuazon Director for Policy Studies CenPEG

Defense buildup and a more hawkish security posture: Such is Japan’s pivotal policy today amid escalating regional tensions under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.

China is put on notice as Takaichi’s recent policy action questions Beijing’s claim over its renegade island province Taiwan – through peaceful reunification or by means of force. This remains unsettled.

The Takaichi government’s 2026 defense white paper, “Defense of Japan 2026”, labels China's military modernization as Japan's "greatest and unprecedented strategic challenge".

The existential question is whether Philippine President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr.’s administration will be dragged into a war with Beijing – albeit hypothetically - in pursuit of the country’s defense alliance with Tokyo and the US.

In the 1972 Shanghai Communique’, the US acknowledged that “…there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." The US recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government of China and stated it would swap diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.

This denotes a policy of ambiguity, however, since the US promises to protect Taiwan in the event of a foreign invasion.

Takaichi’s threat was not unexpected coming from a prime minister whose regime is in the throes of the re-ascendance of militarism reminiscent of Japan’s imperialist and fascist past.

Like the US, Japan’s own military-industrial complex today dictates its foreign and defense policies – essentially corporate arms industries that amass profit by fomenting tensions and armed conflicts leading to the re-ascendance of militarism in the 21^st century.

Whether the tensions evolve into another war is a core issue.

Political catalyst: LDP internal dynamics

Takaichi’s path to the prime ministership in Oct. 2025 was forged by domestic political necessity within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Her selection as LDP leader was a strategic pivot by the party to consolidate its neo-conservative base and counter the rising popularity of right-wing populist factions like the Sanseito party.

The LDP has been in power almost continuously since 1955, the year it was founded.

Japan’s ruling LDP is largely led by the financial elite and maintains a deeply entrenched, symbiotic relationship with big business and corporate financing. The party champions pro-business policies and advocates for low corporate taxes, deregulation, and close cooperation with major economic federations like Keidanren. The top leadership and prime ministers emerging from the LDP are typically career politicians, descendants of political dynasties, or former bureaucrats.

Among the elite are the manufacturers of Toyota – the founding family and the vast corporate network of manufacturing companies that operate under the Toyota Group. The founders of Toyota established the Toyota Motor Corporation in 1937 as a spin-off to manufacture automobiles.

Following a disastrous electoral period and a leadership vacuum under former PM Shigeru Ishiba, the LDP leaned into Takaichi's firm, ideologically consistent "Japan First" branding to restore party stability. This later culminated in a decisive two-thirds parliamentary or National Diet (Kokkai 国会) supermajority in February 2026.

The renewed rise of militarism under Takaichi finds rationale as a strategic response to China’s sovereign claims over the South China Sea (SCS) and reunification with its island province of Taiwan either by peaceful or military means.

Conversely, Taiwan’s opposition party, the Kuomintang led by Cheng Li-wun, is friendly with China.

Under Takaichi, Japan explicitly views a Chinese takeover of Taiwan as an existential and "survival-threatening" strategic threat to Japan's national security. In the Japanese parliament Takaichi stated that a Chinese military attack or naval blockade on Taiwan could directly endanger Japan's survival. She warned that such a crisis will constitute a situation allowing Japan's Self-Defense Forces to use force in collective self-defense.

Tokyo also worries that a Chinese takeover of Taiwan will place Beijing in total control of critical sea lanes and dangerously close to Japan's southwestern islands, such as Yonaguni and the disputed Senkakus – otherwise claimed by China as Diaoyu Islands (or Diaoyu Dao 钓鱼岛).

Signaling the renewed rise of Japanese militarism is the fact that Takaichi has prioritized accelerating defense capability expansions and boosting defense spending. Japan's defense spending has climbed to two percent of its GDP, accelerating earlier goals.

Takaichi’s response to perceived Chinese assertiveness over Taiwan and its claim over the Diaoyu Islands has included Chinese travel warnings, trade disruptions, and export restrictions on rare earth materials. In truth, China holds about 44 million metric tons of rare earth reserves, which accounts for 40% of the world's total known rare earth reserves.

Takaichi’s administration has likewise eased restrictions on lethal arms exports and boosted military-industrial readiness. Overall, she follows a strong nationalist and conservative line inspired by past hawkish doctrines.

Philippines ties with Japan

President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. has agreed to deepen his government’s ties with Japan to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The result: Japanese forces have participated in the Balikatan (“should-to-shoulder”) military drills and launched surface-to-ship missiles from Philippine soil. Tokyo is also discussing supplying lethal equipment, such as destroyers, to help Manila improve maritime awareness.

Although implied, military agreements between the two countries do not explicitly mention China as the prime target.

An American enemy during World War 2, Japan normalized diplomatic relations with the Philippines in 1956. In truth, the US put heavy pressure on the Philippines to open diplomatic ties with Japan – more than 10 years after the Philippines was invaded by Japan under the latter’s “Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere plan”.

Japan invaded the Philippines in December 1941, just hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese knew the Philippines as a major US military base and a threat to Japanese supply lines in the Pacific. Japan also aimed to capture regional resources like rubber, sugar, and agricultural products while bypassing US oil embargoes.

Controlling the Philippine islands allowed Japan to secure its Greater East Asia scheme.

US pressure forced the Philippines to normalize ties with Japan

The United States strongly influenced the normalization of diplomatic relations between the Philippines – under the late President Ramon Magsaysay - and Japan - in 1956. After the massive destruction of the Philippines attended by massacres and rape incidents. the Philippine public and government were initially deeply reluctant to reconcile with Japan or settle war reparations.

Up to one million Filipinos died during the Japanese occupation and the fierce battles to liberate the Philippines in World War II, driven by massacres, forced labor, starvation, rape of women and children, and disease.

But the US had a different goal: To rebuild Japan as a strong, anti-communist economic and strategic bulwark in Asia during the Cold War. Thus, the US exerted intense diplomatic and economic pressure on Manila to soften its demands and sign a peace treaty with Tokyo.

Prompted partly by this US-led alignment and the need for regional stability – all for expanding US economic and security interests in Asia - the Philippines and Japan finalized the Reparations Agreement and Treaty of Peace in July 1956, officially normalizing bilateral diplomatic ties.

Backdrop: Sexual violence, murder and mayhem

Japanese atrocities during the war heavily included widespread sexual violence and mass rapes of Filipino women and girls. At least, 1,000 Filipinas were forced into military sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army, becoming part of the broader "comfort women" system across Asia.

Locations like the Bahay na Pula (Red House) in Bulacan province and specific commandeered buildings in Manila served as confinement and mass-rape centers where Japanese troops systematically assaulted local women and teenagers. Survivors, later organized as groups like the Malaya Lolas, spent decades fighting for formal recognition, apologies, and indemnification from the governments involved.

Historical records indicate Japanese planners considered using biological weapons (such as plague-infected fleas) against Filipino and American defenders on the Bataan Peninsula in 1942. While Japan committed massive atrocities in the Philippines -including executing prisoners of water/gasoline burnings at places like the Palawan Massacre and the destruction of Manila - these relied on conventional incendiary or mechanical methods.

Meanwhile, the US government has never formally apologized for the civilian deaths or property destruction caused by its military operations and strategic bombing campaigns in the Philippines during World War II.

Impact on China and East Asia

Chinese Japanese relations have hit seconds away from dead end following warnings from Tokyo over Taiwan. Beijing has responded with travel warnings and trade restrictions against Japanese goods. Neighboring countries are split, with China accusing Japan of reviving past militarism, while US allies in the region such as the Philippines coordinate closer security networks alongside Japan.

Expectedly, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s administration views Japan’s active defense posture not as militarism, but as a welcome strategic partnership to counter shared regional security threats and coercive maritime tactics – in particular, against China.

Manila and Tokyo elevated their diplomatic ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, committing to closer maritime security and defense cooperation.

The Marcos administration fully supports expanded bilateral defense mechanisms, including the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which allow Japanese “Self-Defense Forces” to conduct large-scale exercises and logistical swaps with the Philippine armed forces.

The Marcos administration is pursuing the acquisition of Japanese military hardware, including acquiring second-hand Abukuma-class destroyers, radar systems, and training aircraft to bolster the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

Clashing domestic and regional perspectives

While Manila sees Tokyo's stronger military profile as a stabilizing deterrent, regional powers like China criticize Japan’s departure from post-war pacifism as a dangerous revival of "neo-militarism". In the Philippines, national-democratic and leftist groups including the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan, New Patriotic Alliance) similarly voice concern over foreign troop deployments and lethal arms deals, arguing it risks entangling the country in major power conflicts.

Despite these criticisms, the Marcos administration argues that partnering with capable maritime democracies like Japan is necessary to protect national sovereignty and maintain a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

In exchange for Marcos Jr.’s support, Japan has significantly boosted its military assistance to the Philippines through equipment donations, Official Security Assistance (OSA) grants, and newly enabled defense procurement deals.

Among the deals, Japan agreed to fast-track the free transfer of up to six retired Abukuma-class destroyer escorts to the Philippine Navy. Tokyo also committed to supplying small patrol boats and drones under its OSA framework.

“White paper”

Takaishi’s white paper, Defense of Japan 2026, explicitly labels China as an "unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge" while positioning the Philippines as a vital partner in a networked regional security architecture. Tokyo warns that China is attempting to create a "new normal" with its military drills around Taiwan, posing an existential risk to vital semiconductor and energy supply chains passing near Japan's southwestern islands.

Reacting, Chinese officials state that Tokyo uses a farcical "China threat" narrative to justify rearming and that it is violating its pacifist post-war constitution and international agreements. Beijing applied economic sanctions and maintained bans on Japanese seafood.

China’s new type of world relations is completely anathema to Japan’s “cold war” paradigm. Conversely, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s new type of international relations is a foreign policy frame aimed at replacing traditional Cold War-style military alliances and Western-dominated global governance with a model based on partnerships, non-confrontation, and mutual economic benefit.

Above all, China in partnership with Russia agreed to work together to stop any revival of Japanese militarism. Chinese leaders frequently remind the public of Japan's past wartime crimes, including historical atrocities.

Beijing has urged Tokyo to respect its history and avoid actions that destabilize Asia.

Not viewed as “historical revisionism”, the Marcos Jr. administration's deepening alliance with Japan is seen rather as the continuation of a long-standing, 70-year process of post-war reconciliation. However, to reiterate, the alliance does draw criticism and differing perspectives from various groups in the Philippines.

Public awareness

Filipino awareness of Japan's expanding defense capabilities is characterized by a complex tension between deep historical trauma and modern geopolitical anxieties. While the atrocities of the World War II Japanese occupation - including the Manila massacre, the Bataan Death March, and the forced sexual slavery of "comfort women" - remain a permanent scar in the national consciousness, mainstream public sentiment today is largely defined, as claimed, by high levels of trust toward Japan as a vital security partner against regional aggression.

A minority of Filipinos as well as critical historians and geopolitical scientists view otherwise.

The contemporary threat landscape, specifically ongoing maritime standoffs in the South China Sea, has heavily reshaped how the majority of Filipinos view Japan. Specifically, the Philippine government and a significant portion of the public view Japan’s military modernization not as a threat, but as a necessary counterweight to regional assertiveness from China.

Contradictions between progressives and Marcos’s cabinet

From Marcos Jr.’s cabinet, Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, widely known as US-friendly, has publicly rejected claims that Japan is pursuing "new militarism," describing such labels as an "improper use of history" used to obscure current misbehavior in contested waters.

In broader public opinion polls, modern Japan consistently enjoys some of the highest favorability and trust ratings among Filipinos. Decades of postwar economic aid, investment, and diplomatic reconciliation have successfully built a "forgiving but not forgetting" relationship.

However, despite strong bilateral ties between Manila and Tokyo, awareness of past brutalities has not faded, and specific groups actively bridge the past with the present. Lila Pilipina and the Malaya Lolas (Free Grandmothers) continually protest Japan’s military expansion. Japan, they argue, has never issued a sufficiently binding, state-level formal apology or direct government compensation to the surviving victims of wartime rape.

Generational shift

A generational divide on how this awareness is processed is clear. Older generations and direct descendants of survivors carry the direct emotional weight of wartime memories. Conversely, younger Filipinos view Japan through a veneer - as a peaceful democracy, a major source of cultural and economic soft power, and a crucial ally for national survival in the Indo-Pacific.

Historical memory has faded. Young generations have lost track of Philippine history, especially its historical past. Japan’s “soft power” is succeeding.

Alignment

Former US national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, identifies Japan as America's critical "anchor" in the Far East, while viewing China as a rising regional power that requires careful, balanced accommodation rather than hostile containment. Brzezinski classifies Japan not as a global geostrategic player, but as a vital security-dependent anchor tied to US power.

Thus, Japanese leaders say their country plays a vital role in the South China Sea by supporting regional stability and maritime security, though it is far from being a direct military defense for Philippine sovereign claims.

Meantime, Japan and the Philippines are turning their islands into a new line of defense. From Okinawa to Batanes, military access, intelligence sharing, maritime surveillance, and joint exercises are linking two strategically vital regions. Their message is clear: China cannot change the regional balance through pressure alone; and deterrence has a price. Military infrastructure can transform local communities into frontline positions. If Manila and Tokyo want this strategy to last, they must win more than military battles. Meanwhile, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) – is funding and building the national underground line Metro Manila Subway Project (MMSP), which involves Japanese contractors like Shimizu, Fujita, Takenaka, and local partner EEI Corporation.

Is the Philippine’s political elite decisive in shaping foreign policy with Japan?

In this developing country, foreign policy has historically been characterized by elite capture and high personalism. Under the "class approach," foreign policy with Japan is dovetailed to secure advantages for this ruling class – the Marcoses and Dutertes included - specifically through Official Development Assistance (ODA), massive infrastructure loans, and foreign direct investment (FDI).

These projects directly enrich local elites who control major construction, real estate, and shipping monopolies.

For decades, the Philippine elite has viewed Japan as a vital cash cow and a stabilizing counterweight. Whether it was the Duterte administration utilizing Japanese funds for infrastructure alongside a pivot to China, or the current Marcos Jr. administration consolidating a tight trilateral alignment with Japan and the US, the fundamental mechanism remains the same: the political executive – in this case the foreign and defense apparatuses - dictates directions that preserve the economic and physical security of the dominant class.

Japan’s ulterior motive

While the Philippines seeks external validation and economic resources to support domestic elite structures, Japan’s foreign policy is dictated by systemic, long-term geopolitical and economic vulnerabilities.

As an island nation scarce in natural resources, Japan’s lifeline is maritime trade. Its policy toward the Philippines is designed to counter maritime expansionism from China and keep the South China Sea “open and rules-based” – the same archetype used by Washington.

Finally, Japan has an evolving domestic defense industrial base or military-industrial network composed of major industrial conglomerates and government agencies that increasingly shape national security and foreign affairs.

Japan became a de facto militarist state in the early 1930s when the military elite effectively overrode civilian government control. Japan began modernizing its military on a Prussian model under the slogan fukoku kyōhei ("Enrich the Country, Strengthen the Armed Forces"). The Meiji Constitution also gave the military direct access to the emperor, bypassing civilian oversight.

This is the foundation of Japan’s militarism. #