HOME ALONE: THE PHILIPPINES IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

Marcos’s administration is out of step on global changes

After 80 years of independence, the Philippines is struggling with economic growth and security challenges. Today, the country is trapped in a multipolar world. It is caught between colliding global and regional powers - primarily the United States and China, alongside rising middle powers and shifting economic blocs, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) bloc.

Bobby M. Tuazon

Director for Political Studies

Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG)

20 October 2026

Instead of a neat, single-superpower frame, Manila must navigate a fragmented global order where it risks becoming a battleground, e.g., between the US and China, rather than an independent player. It is locked between having a vibrant trade relations, or rather, trade dependency, with China, on one hand, and maintaining strong defense ties with its traditional ally, the United States - which sees China as an “existential threat” - a principal ally in fighting the Beijing government over its claimed maritime rights in the South China Sea / West Philippine Sea (SCS/WPS).

Yet, whether the US will lend support to a third world country and former colony against China is a chronic question. It remains to be tested.

The US is legally bound by the cold-war 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, which Washington has repeatedly declared "ironclad" to cover armed attacks on Philippine forces, public vessels, and aircraft anywhere in the South China Sea.

However, complete certainty is complicated by "grey-zone" tactics, domestic political shifts in the US shortage of weapons such as missile systems (most were lost in the failed war against Iran), and the risk of escalation into a broader conflict.

Sixty percent of Americans oppose or disapprove of any war and military actions.

The Philippines hosts nine Enhanced Defense Cooperation Act (EDCA) bases and hundreds of annual joint military activities with US and other foreign forces, tightening operational integration.

In addition, the country is a critical pillar of Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy, sitting near vital shipping lanes and the Taiwan Strait. Abandoning the alliance would severely damage US credibility with other global and regional partners.

Both Philippines and US authorities say that the EDCA bases serve as a deterrent against claimed China aggression in the SCS/WPS and Taiwan Strait, while simultaneously advancing US strategic interests and expanding Washington's rotational military footprint in the region.

However, patriotic critics and progressive groups (such as Bayan and the Makabayan bloc) argue that EDCA primarily serves US geopolitical and containment strategies against China, locking the Philippines into Washington's global security architecture.

Critics argue that allowing US forces rent-free access, pre-positioned weapons depots, and exclusive operational use in designated areas amounts to establishing de facto permanent US military bases, bypassing constitutional prohibitions against foreign military bases. They also warn that hosting infrastructure close to Taiwan and the West Philippine Sea makes the Philippines a prime target or a frontline proxy in a potential US-China conflict, raising risks that extend far beyond core Philippine security interests.

A war will pit the US against China and if it breaks out a nuclear war may erupt with the Philippines ending up a loser. But the US will not dare fight China not only because both countries have strong trade relations but also because China is the most powerful country on earth based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and second in armed strength.

With a weak economic base, the Philippines alone cannot sustain and will lose an armed conflict with Beijing – in just one hour, according to former President Fidel. V. Ramos. Alliance support will be illusory.

Instead of engaging in conflicts, the government should look inward and save a sinking ship. With a population of 119 million, the Philippines has a self-rated poverty affecting 55% of families due to living costs, high inflation, and a significant number of unemployed. Worse, the top 1% of earners capture 17% the national income while the bottom 50% share only 14%; the wealthiest 10% controls 60% of the country’s wealth.

Social and economic conditions are getting worse day in and out.

The Philippines has a strategic, frontline dilemma: It sits at the epicenter of South China Sea (SCS) territorial disputes and potential flashpoints like Taiwan. Under the Marcos Jr. administration, the Philippines has strongly asserted its toothless and unenforceable 2016 Arbitral Award and used global media initiatives to call out Chinese maritime actions.

This, however, has spawned a dangerous "war of words" and high-stakes friction with Beijing, making diplomacy a tightrope walk between standing firm on sovereignty and avoiding accidental military escalation. Traditional regional bodies like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) are often deadlocked or divided by consensus rules, forcing Manila to look beyond the bloc.

And looking beyond the bloc means leaning on the US for defense – a highly, unreliable approach. To iterate, the Philippines has heavily reinforced its security partnership with Washington, expanding the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and hosting US deterrent assets. But this tact raises the risk of overdependence.

National democratic groups and other critics and regional observers warn that blind or excessive alignment with the US reduces Manila’s strategic autonomy, turning the country into an extension of American containment and encirclement strategy against China. Aside from this. It significantly reduces Manila’s capability of flexibility and runs the risk of downgrading bilateral dispute settlement which is the principle reached during a summit in Beijing in 1997. That summit was followed by sub-ministerial meetings.

The sub-ministerial agreements and frameworks established between the Philippines and China in 1997 have evolved into the Foreign Ministry Consultations (FMS) and eventually the formalized Bilateral Consultative Mechanisms on the South China Sea.

The truth, however, is that these mechanisms face severe operational bottlenecks. The core issues behind these bottlenecks, include a) The Philippines consistently anchors its positions on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling. China continues to reject the 2016 arbitral award as illegal and invalid, aside from being a non-party to the tribunal.

This creates a fundamental gridlock because the two nations cannot agree on the basic baseline legal rules governing the disputed maritime features.

Frictions have included the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) swarming or using water cannons and batons against Philippine replenishment missions at features like Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas Shoal or Rén'ài Jiāo  仁爱礁).

Both China and the Philippines harbor divergent multilateral vs bilateral strategies. Beijing heavily pushes for a purely bilateral track, repeatedly demanding that Manila stop raising South China Sea issues in multilateral spaces like the UN or Asean forums. China has accused Manila of allowing US interference – with the US at its back during negotiations and maritime tensions.

The Beijing government also accuses Manila of “internationalizing the issue”: leveraging its alliances and using multilateral pressure to demand a legally binding Asean-China Code of Conduct. Beijing views this internationalization as outside interference or "grandstanding," stalling sub-ministerial consensus.

To break out of a strict two-camp binary, the Philippines is building "minilateral" networks - forging tighter security, maritime, and defense ties with like-minded middle powers such as Japan, Australia, India, and Vietnam. Except for Japan, at the moment, China has friendly relations with other Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam as well as Australia, and India.

Moreover, the Philippines is caught in geoeconomic competition: China remains a massive trade partner and a major source of economic gravity in Asia including the Philippines. This runs counter to the policy of the United States as well as Japan and the EU who prioritize crucial security guarantees and high-tech/supply-chain integration (such as initiatives tied to critical minerals and semiconductors).

As a country transitioning toward upper-middle-income status, the Philippines remains exposed to global trade fragmentation, commodity and oil price volatility (intensified by Middle East or shipping lane disruptions), and inflation pressures.

Economic challenges - including sluggish public infrastructure rollout, internal political noise, and fluctuating foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows - weaken the country's internal foundation. Economists emphasize a core reality: To be strong diplomatically and militarily, the Philippines must first build real domestic economic strength rather than letting external powers dictate its economic life.

Some pundits aver that building a strong economy and maintaining defense alliances are not mutually exclusive; rather, national security and economic stability reinforce each other in the face of regional pressures.

In the first place, the Philippines cannot stand alone without trading with China. China remains one of the Philippines' major trading partners for agricultural goods, minerals, and electronics. Severing economic ties is neither practical nor beneficial.

The multipolar world

The transition toward a multipolar world unfolded from the late 2000s through the 2020s, following the end of the US "unipolar moment" (roughly 1991–2008). The multipolar world is an international system where power is distributed among several major nations or blocs, rather than concentrated in a single superpower (unipolar) or two competing superpowers (bipolar). Influence is shared among several leading economies and militaries, typically including the US, China, the European Union, India, and Russia.

From the complex geopolitical perspective, the Marcos Jr. administration is trying to position the Philippines in today's multipolar world through a dual-track policy that combines hard security deterrence with the US and its regional allies while attempting to keep economic and diplomatic channels open with China.

The administration has pivoted firmly back toward Washington, expanding the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) to include nine agreed military locations across the country. Manila has forged security frameworks beyond just the US, joining the "Squad" (US, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines) to push back against assertive maritime postures in the SCS/WPS.

Marcos has moved away from the Duterte administration's pivot to Beijing, asserting sovereign rights under the 2016 arbitral ruling while protesting Chinese Coast Guard harassment. Guided, however, by pragmatism and diversification – despite territorial rows and a wide trade deficit – Manila relies on China as a primary trading partner for Philippine exports and electronics, meaning a complete economic break is not pursued.

However, to handle the risk of economic coercion or overreliance, Manila is actively widening its economic, infrastructure, and supply-chain partnerships with alternative markets like the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the European Union.

The current consensus among Marcos policymakers is to protect commercial and trade relations with Beijing while refusing to trade away sovereign rights in the West Philippine Sea.

This is the Marcos administration’s dilemma, however:

They believe that ending or scaling back defense alliances (such as the MDT and growing ties with Japan, Australia, and India) leaves the country more exposed to maritime coercion rather than securing peace. Thus, rather than merely relying on a single superpower, Manila is widening its security network through partnerships with Japan (radar and defense support), Australia (joint patrols), and India to raise the diplomatic and strategic cost of unilateral aggression.

Geopolitical analysts say that the strategic wisdom for Manila is to invest in asymmetric capabilities - such as coastal defense, maritime domain awareness, and local economic resilience - rather than trying to match larger naval fleets dollar-for-dollar.

But even this minimum requirement is costly for the national economy.

This paper has argued consistently: Only a strong and stable economy resulting in a stronger security system will cut down if not totally break away from the US defense alliance.

How this will be achieved, nobody in government is prepared to answer. And nobody either is showing Marcos Jr. the uncharted but promising path, which will take generations to take. #