The Marcos Dilemma: Political Survival and Strategic Dependence

September 2026 Monthly Political Analysis

Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG)

September 2026 marked a significant moment in Philippine politics, as domestic political maneuvering, fiscal decisions, and international strategic partnerships converged under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. These developments point to efforts to strengthen the administration’s political position ahead of the 2028 elections, alongside deeper integration into U.S.-aligned military and commercial frameworks through initiatives such as the Luzon Economic Corridor.

Coinciding with the 54th anniversary of Ferdinand Marcos Sr.’s declaration of Martial Law, the month raised questions about executive power, democratic accountability, and political succession. The administration’s efforts to preserve local political alliances and challenge the Duterte camp unfolded amid intensifying disputes over corruption, public resources, and the future distribution of political power.

Yet these political and strategic priorities are unfolding alongside economic pressures, including high public debt, persistent price increases, weak job creation, and peso depreciation. As public confidence in the presidency declines, a widening gap emerges between political positioning and citizens’ immediate needs. The central question is whether the administration can sustain its influence ahead of 2028 or whether economic hardship and growing public discontent will undermine its political ambitions.

1.   Growing Dissatisfaction: A Presidency Losing Its Political Capital

President Marcos entered office with strong public backing, recording an 80% trust rating with Pulse Asia in 2023. However, by July 2026, his trust rating had plummeted to 28% (with 51% expressing distrust), while Social Weather Stations (SWS) tracked his net satisfaction dropping from +32 in September 2024 down to -11 in September 2026.

This sharp decline highlights a profound credibility deficit rather than simple unpopularity: among those aware of his July 2026 State of the Nation Address (SONA), 37% deemed his assessment of national conditions unbelievable, compared to only 26% who found it believable.

With his non-renewable term ending in 2028, this eroding public confidence directly undermines Marcos's ability to endorse a preferred successor and prevent a political revival by the rival Duterte camp. This dynamic creates a fundamental political contradiction: as his public standing weakens, transferring political capital becomes increasingly difficult.

Consequently, the administration has relied on subnational electoral positioning, legal pressure on political rivals, and strategic maneuvering to safeguard its position ahead of the 2028 succession.

2.   Consolidating Local Domestic Political Base: BARMM Elections and the Suspension of the Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections

A foundational pillar of the administration's political strategy relies on restructuring local political machinery. Rather than focusing solely on national offices in Manila, the presidential office has taken direct

steps to control subnational political networks from the grassroots level upward.

Postponement of Local Barangay Elections

In September 2026, a highly consequential legislative measure officially postponed the statutory Barangay (village) and Sangguniang Kabataan (youth council) Elections (BSKE) from November 2, 2026, to November 13, 2028. The law also extended the terms of sitting barangay and youth officials to five years.

While framed by supporters as a necessary administrative adjustment, political analysts emphasize its direct strategic objective: pushing local elections to November 2028 places them exactly six months after the May 2028 presidential and national elections.

By keeping incumbent barangay officials in power throughout the 2028 presidential contest, national politicians ensure that existing local ward leaders remain in place to mobilize voters, manage campaign distribution, and enforce local political discipline. With over 2.8 million newly registered voters expected to participate in 2028, preserving loyal local campaign machinery across thousands of barangays provides the ruling coalition with an indispensable ground-level electoral advantage.

The First Regular BARMM Parliamentary Elections

Concurrently, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) held its inaugural regular parliamentary elections on September 14, 2026. This election represented a major political milestone, transitioning the region from the appointed Bangsamoro Transition Authority to its first fully elected regional parliament. Voter participation was exceptionally high, with 2,018,478 voters casting ballots out of 2.39 million registered voters—an 84.34% turnout rate.

The electoral outcome was politically crucial for the national government. The Bangsamoro Federalist Party (BFP) - which is directly affiliated with President Marcos's national political organization - emerged as the largest single party, winning 16 out of the 40 regional party seats.

It narrowly defeated its primary rival, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP), which secured 15 seats. The UBJP is tied to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and former Chief Minister Ahod 'Al Haj Murad' Ebrahim. Winning the largest seat share in BARMM grants Malacañang a vital political partner and a firm regional stronghold in Mindanao ahead of 2028.

However, independent election monitors from Katungod Bangsamoro urged caution, reporting that this democratic milestone was heavily compromised. Observer teams documented widespread irregularities, including armed confrontations, voter intimidation, voting center disruptions, vote-counting machine failures, and the heavy presence of security forces inside polling places. In several areas, entrenched local political clans actively blocked rival party supporters from entering voting centers. These findings demonstrate that while formal regional elections took place, deep structural coercion and clan domination persist.

By delaying local barangay elections until after the 2028 presidential vote and securing the top seat share in BARMM's new parliament, the administration has locked in crucial subnational campaign machinery across the country.

Neutralizing Rivals: Impeachment proceedings and selective justice

Financial Investigations and the Impeachment Trial

Congressional investigations and official records from the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) brought serious financial allegations against Vice President Sara Duterte into public view. AMLC records revealed about ₱4.4 billion in covered and suspicious financial transactions involving Sara Duterte and her husband, Manases Carpio, spanning the years 2007 through 2025. Additional legislative inquiries scrutinized her use of confidential and intelligence funds, questionable agency spending, and undisclosed business interests.

During these hearings, Davao City Mayor Sebastian 'Baste' Duterte - Sara's brother -was called as a witness regarding government contracts awarded to a firm declared as her business interest. While he testified that he had no personal knowledge of her direct involvement, the proceedings reinforced public focus on the family's financial dealings.

To streamline the legal process, house prosecutors dropped bribery charges to concentrate on core counts, while the Senate Impeachment Court adjusted its rules to lower the conviction threshold from 16 to 14 votes under prevailing trial conditions on September 23.

Targeted Legal Pressure on Political Rivals

To guarantee that senator-judges vote in favor of conviction, the administration has applied targeted regulatory and legal scrutiny to influential political families holding swing votes. Complaints regarding PrimeWater utility deals put pressure on the Villar family, leading Sen. Mark Villar to join the Senate majority coalition. Similarly, solar energy project inquiries were directed at Sen. Loren Legarda and her son, Representative Leandro Leviste.

Conversely, high-profile anti-corruption actions against former Marcos allies have suffered from a lack of public credibility. The arrest of former House Speaker Martin Romualdez over an alleged ₱7.4-billion flood-control kickback scheme was presented by Malacañang as proof that “no one is untouchable”. However, public opinion surveys show that citizens view these actions as political theater rather than genuine reform - a tool used to force political figures into line rather than recover stolen public funds. This impression of double standards was further reinforced by the Supreme Court's acquittal of Imelda Marcos, Marcos Jr.’s mother, in her long-standing Swiss foundation graft cases.

The 2027 National Budget: Financing Political Consolidation Ahead of 2028?

Public finance has become one of the administration's most powerful tools for enforcing political discipline. The proposed ₱7.2-trillion national budget for fiscal year 2027 illustrates how national spending priorities are being reshaped to reward political allies and prepare for the 2028 polls.

Discretionary Allocations and Political Patronage

An in-depth analysis by the People's Budget Coalition identified roughly ₱970 billion in proposed budget allocations that are highly vulnerable to political intervention and patronage. These funds are distributed across unprogrammed infrastructure allocations, flexible social assistance programs, and discretionary local government grants. Particular concern was raised over the ₱58.53-billion Local Government Support Fund (LGSF), which lawmakers warned provides Malacañang with vast discretionary power to distribute funds to favored mayors and governors ahead of the election cycle.

Cuts to Essential Public Health and Social Aid

The expansion of politically flexible funds contrasts sharply with drastic spending cuts to essential public safety nets. The Medical Assistance to Indigent and Financially Incapacitated Patients (MAIFIP) program—which provides direct medical aid to poor families in public hospitals—faces a staggering 53% budget reduction. Similarly, emergency assistance and temporary employment programs such as Assistance to Individuals in Crisis Situation (AICS) and Tulong Panghanapbuhay sa Ating Disadvantaged/Displaced Workers (TUPAD) face substantial funding cuts.

This budget structure connects directly with the postponement of the local barangay elections.

By preserving incumbent local officials through 2028 while channeling hundreds of billions of pesos into discretionary local government funds, the administration creates a powerful financial feedback loop. Local officials who align with Malacañang receive local project funding, while vulnerable citizens facing medical or economic emergencies are forced to rely on local political intermediaries for aid.

Economic Deterioration amid Grave Political Crisis

The administration's efforts to consolidate power are taking place against a backdrop of severe macroeconomic difficulty. The growing gap between official government narratives and the lived economic realities of ordinary Filipino families has created a profound crisis of public confidence.

Deteriorating Economic Indicators

Official economic data from August and September 2026 highlight mounting pressure on household livelihoods:

• Rising Unemployment: National unemployment rose to 2.77 million workers in August 2026, while millions more employed citizens reported seeking additional work hours to cope with inflation;

• Sovereign Debt Burden: Total national government debt reached a record ₱19.61 trillion by the end of August, pushing the national debt-to-GDP ratio to 66%—well above international sustainability benchmarks;

• Currency Depreciation: The Philippine peso hit a low of ₱62.147 against the US dollar on September 25, 2026, driving up the cost of imported fuel, fertilizer, and basic food staples;

• Growth Downgrades: Economic growth forecasts for 2026 were sharply downgraded due to slowing investment and persistent consumer price inflation.

Historic Collapse in Executive Approval Ratings

This economic strain has translated directly into a steep decline in public approval. Independent polling agencies recorded historic drops in executive trust ratings. Pulse Asia reported that President Marcos's trust rating dropped from an 80% peak in 2023 down to 28% in July 2026. Similarly, Social Weather Stations (SWS) documented a collapse in net satisfaction from +32 in September 2024 to -11 in September 2026. Furthermore, among citizens aware of the July 2026 State of the Nation Address (SONA), 37% stated they found the President's economic claims unbelievable, compared to only 26% who found them believable.

Expanding U.S. Influence Amid the Philippines’ Economic and Political Challenges

The Philippines’ worsening economic conditions and domestic political uncertainty are unfolding alongside a significant expansion of U.S. economic and military engagement in the country. In September, this became particularly evident through the Luzon Economic Corridor (LEC), the Pax Silica initiative, and deeper security cooperation with the United States and its regional partners. In tandem with domestic consolidation, the Marcos administration has pursued an explicit realignment of Philippine foreign policy, anchoring the country deeply within United States economic, technological, and defense frameworks in the Indo-Pacific amid intensifying competition with China.

The Luzon Economic Corridor and Pax Silica

On September 10–11, 2026, the United States, Japan, and the Philippines held the inaugural investment forum for the Luzon Economic Corridor (LEC). During the forum, the U.S. signed a $60-million Millennium Challenge Corporation grant focused on Philippine energy governance.

Concurrently, officials highlighted the 'Pax Silica' initiative - a proposed high-tech hub in New Clark City intended for semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing.

However, independent investigations by Rappler revealed a significant gap between official promotion and actual investment plans. The pipeline is heavily dominated by transport logistics, road construction, and energy projects, with minimal allocation for high-value domestic manufacturing. Furthermore, local resistance has mounted rapidly. Indigenous Aeta communities in Capas, Tarlac, expressed deep alarm over ancestral domain land loss.

Environmental groups pointed out that as of August 2026, no environmental impact assessment had been conducted despite massive water and electricity demands. Serious concerns regarding sovereignty and local capacity were also raised by the Catholic Church, the Makati Business Club, and the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI).

On September 10–11, the United States, Japan, and the Philippines advanced the Luzon Economic Corridor through an inaugural investment forum focused on infrastructure, energy, digital technology, and advanced manufacturing. During the forum, the United States and the Philippines signed a $60-million Millennium Challenge Corporation grant intended to improve energy-sector governance, electricity reliability, and the investment environment.

Meanwhile, the Pax Silica initiative envisions a high-tech industrial hub in New Clark City focused on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and advanced manufacturing. These initiatives could bring investment, technology, and employment opportunities to the Philippines. However, they also deepen the country’s integration into U.S.-led supply-chain strategies and create opportunities for American firms to expand their commercial presence in strategic sectors. The government must therefore ensure that these arrangements produce broad-based domestic benefits, rather than primarily serving external strategic and commercial interests. 

The strategic dimension is equally pronounced in defense and maritime security. In September, an 11-ship maritime activity under the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus framework further demonstrated regional defense coordination, while the Pentagon announced a $39-million contract for surveillance systems on three King Air aircraft intended for transfer to the Philippine Coast Guard. On September 27, the U.S. Embassy also condemned Chinese vessels’ dangerous maneuvers that disrupted a Philippine resupply mission to Ayungin Shoal. Together with ongoing U.S.-Philippines-Japan-Australia cooperation, these developments strengthen Philippine maritime awareness and deterrence while embedding the country more deeply in a regional security framework aligned with Washington’s strategic objectives. While these initiatives serve legitimate Philippine maritime security interests, critics cannot overlook their broader strategic implications. They may also advance Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy of counterbalancing China, embedding the Philippines more deeply within a U.S.-led regional security framework under the First Island Chain Strategy.

Foreign Policy: Strategic Balancing and the Limits of Economic Sovereignty

September 2026 underlined the Marcos administration’s efforts to expand the Philippines’ international partnerships amid intensifying geopolitical competition and domestic economic pressures. Marcos, in his capacity representing the Philippines as the ASEAN Chair, attended

the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, while negotiations for the Philippines–European Union

Free Trade Agreement reached substantial conclusion and ASEAN economic diplomacy

intensified. These initiatives could diversify markets and attract investment, but agreements alone do not guarantee inclusive growth. Without safeguards for Filipino workers, farmers, and local industries, the benefits may remain concentrated among large corporations and foreign investors.

Deepening Defense and Maritime Alignment

In defense policy, Manila strengthened its military coordination with Washington and regional allies. Highlights in September included an 11-ship maritime activity under the ASEAN Defense

Ministers' Meeting-Plus framework, a $39-million U.S. Pentagon contract for three surveillance aircraft for the Philippine Coast Guard, and strong U.S. diplomatic backing following Chinese

vessel disruptions at Ayungin Shoal.

Diplomatic Balancing and Foreign Policy Limits

President Marcos attempted diplomatic balancing by attending the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, completing negotiations for the Philippines–EU Free Trade Agreement, while being silent on the country’s UN delegation walkout during Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s address on September 24. While these moves signaled diplomatic nuance, analysts emphasize that trade agreements and security partnerships only benefit the nation if they develop local industrial capacity, safeguard indigenous rights, and improve the living standards of Filipinos.

People’s Movement: Economic Grievances and the Demand for Reform

September likewise saw public mobilization against worsening economic conditions, foreign-led development initiatives, and entrenched political power. On September 10, activists protested outside the Luzon Economic Corridor Investment Forum in Taguig, opposing the U.S.-backed Pax Silica initiative and raising concerns over ancestral land, displacement, environmental damage, and whether foreign investments would meaningfully benefit Filipinos. Clashes with police reportedly left protesters and officers injured, with five people arrested. These protests challenge the administration’s portrayal of foreign investment as an unqualified path to development, demanding that local communities, environmental protection, and Philippine industrial capacity take priority.

On September 21, demonstrators commemorated the 54th anniversary of the declaration of Martial Law while renewing calls for accountability over corruption in government flood-control projects. The convergence of historical remembrance and anti-corruption protests carried particular significance under the Marcos administration, given the legacy of the Marcos dictatorship and current public anger over alleged misuse of public funds. Although the demonstrations were generally peaceful, their message extended beyond remembrance: democratic institutions must prevent abuses of power and hold public officials accountable. 

Economic grievances also fueled transport strikes led by Manibela on September 14–15 and PISTON on September 29–30, as drivers protested rising fuel costs and demanded government intervention. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court’s ruling on Congress’s prolonged failure to enact an anti-political dynasty law and the Dapat Isa Lang People’s Initiative intensified demands for structural political reform. Together, these actions expose a widening gap between official priorities and public demands for economic relief, community protection, and accountable governance. From transport workers and communities opposing foreign-backed projects to citizens challenging corruption and political dynasties, the common question is who benefits from the country’s economic and political arrangements—and who is left to bear their costs.

Conclusion: The Post-2028 Succession Strategy and Its Risks

The political, fiscal, economic, and geopolitical events of September 2026 demonstrate an administration actively working to control its political future. By pushing local elections to late 2028, securing a major foothold in Muslim Mindanao, channeling budget funds into flexible local grants, and pursuing the impeachment of Vice President Sara Duterte, Malacañang has assembled a powerful network of political control.

Yet, this political machinery rests on an increasingly fragile foundation. Soaring national debt (₱19.61 trillion), a depreciating peso (₱62.15/USD), rising unemployment, and steep drops in public trust (down to 28%) expose a fundamental vulnerability. As transport strikes, anti-corruption rallies, and citizen petitions gain momentum, the administration faces a growing challenge: top-down political consolidation cannot replace actual economic relief for everyday citizens. Without addressing these core socioeconomic pressures, Malacañang's effort to lock in the 2028 succession risks worsening public instability across the country. #