CALM BEFORE THE STORM

THORNS OVER THE TAIWAN ISSUE: China, U.S. and Japan

ISSUE ANALYSIS No. 17 Bobby M. Tuazon Director for Political Studies Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG)

03 November 2026

China, over the last few years, has taken tougher moves for the reunification with its island province, Taiwan. The province “separated” from the mainland when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang forces lost in the civil war in 1949.

Communist Party of China (CPC) chairman, Mao Zedong, proclaimed China’s independence at the Great Hall of the People on Oct. 1, 1949.

Declaring China’s independence, Chairman Mao said, “The Chinese people have stood up.”

The defeated KMT government, military, and around two million refugees led by Chang Kai-shek, retreated to Taiwan in December 1949, where they maintained the Republic of China (ROC) government in exile.

Today, 77 years later, peaceful reunification is Beijing’s approach, through official talks with Taiwan’s opposition otherwise, even with U.S. intervention Taiwan will be taken over by force.

In Taiwan, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), chaired by Cheng Li-wun (since 2025), sits in the opposition and held a meeting with President Xi in April this year. The ruling party is the U.S.-backed Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), with Lai Ching-te (William Lai) as president.

Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) advocates for the following core positions: Taiwan is already independent, sovereign nation that is not subordinate to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As a ruling party, it maintains the cross-strait status quo rather than aggressively declaring immediate de jure independence; the party promotes self-determination and rejects Beijing's and opposition Kuomintang's (KMT) demand for reunification.

The Beijing government had warned Taiwan against declaring de facto independence.

The Chinese Civil War was a long-running power struggle between the ruling Nationalist party (ROC) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) that boiled over after World War II. The war was fought intermittently from 1927 to 1949. From 1937-1945, both sides paused their civil conflict to form an uneasy alliance against the invading Japanese imperial forces during World War II.

The full-scale civil war resumed in 1945 until 1949 when the CCP, led by Chairman Mao Zedong, won decisive victories.

Then, Mao proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, and the KMT government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, retreated to Taiwan by December the same year.

The KMT remnants used Taiwan as a base of operations and a last stronghold, intending to eventually retake the mainland.

The Beijing government views the island as a breakaway province under its "one-China" principle.

Today, the Taiwan issue centers on the disputed political status of Taiwan (the Republic of China, or ROC), which is China’s inalienable province, while the island operates as a self-governing democracy.

The Philippine government’s core positions

The Philippine government maintains an ambiguous dual policy on China. It established diplomatic relations with China in a joint communique in 1975, signed by Premier Zhou En-lai and then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Sr.

While maintaining an official One-China policy, the Philippine government also deepens practical, economic, and security ties with Taiwan.

Still, the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) affirms that the country formally recognizes the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government of China, based on the 1975 Joint Communiqué.

At the same time, the Manila government asserts that its One-China policy does not prevent it from pursuing economic, cultural, and functional cooperation with Taiwan, such as trade, labor exchanges, and representative offices (including Taiwan's office in Cebu City).

Progressive groups in the Philippines protested the government move as a virtual recognition of Taiwan.

In August 2026, Philippine merchandise exports to Taipei (Taiwan) reached US$516.01 million or ₱32.9 billion based on recent exchange rates, marking a 76.5% increase compared to August of the previous year.

Comparatively, the total monthly trade volume between the Philippines and China was $4.48 billion or ₱259 billion for September 2026 alone.

China hosts 20,000 documented Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). In contrast, Taiwan hosts 180,000 OFWs across various labor and office tracking reports.

As a policy, President Marcos Jr. has stated that the Philippines will not act as a belligerent or combatant in China-Taiwan tensions, focusing instead on strict territorial defense and regional peace. He also confirmed that no attacks or offensive actions will be launched from Philippine territory or EDCA bases by the United States during a Taiwan contingency.

However, because of the Philippines' proximity to Taiwan particularly through the northern island province of Batanes any conflict over Taiwan would directly affect Philippine waters and airspace.

Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro has noted that Philippine defense planning includes a potential Taiwan contingency, such as increasing air and sea access and deploying multi-domain assets to Batanes.

China’s position and actions

Under the One-China Policy, China’s current stand on the Taiwan issue underscores asserting absolute sovereignty and territorial integrity. Beijing maintains that China is the sole legal government representing all of China, and considers Taiwan an inalienable, breakaway province.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has firmly integrated Taiwan’s "reunification" into his broader timeline for national rejuvenation, targeting completion by the centenary milestone of 2049 or 23 years from today.

While Beijing officially champions "peaceful reunification" under a firm interpretation of the "One Country, Two Systems" framework, its strategic calculus has shifted decisively toward “absorptive control” and “phased subjugation”.

The terms describe a decisive shift in Beijing's long-term strategic thinking, moving away from a paradigm of "peaceful accommodation" (where Taiwan would retain a high degree of autonomy under a "One Country, Two Systems" framework) toward a strategy aimed at the complete eradication of Taiwan's separate political identity and its total integration into mainland China's socialist system.

Current academic and policy blueprints from Beijing outline a post-annexation governance plan that includes a 3-to-5-year period of "quasi-military governance," the full dissolution of Taiwan’s military, and deep institutional restructuring.

Accordingly, China relies heavily on the domestic legal framework of its Anti-Secession Law and a newly overhauled National Defense Mobilization Law to justify actions countering separatism or foreign interference.

It refuses to rule out the use of force as a last resort.

Diplomatically, it enforces the absolute isolation of Taipei, recently demonstrated when regional neighbors like Pakistan briefly restricted airspace access to Taiwanese airlines citing the One-China policy.

Rather than an imminent full-scale amphibious invasion China is utilizing constant, highly coordinated "gray-zone" military tactics to erode Taiwan's defensive red lines.

For instance, China’s People’s Liberation Air Force (PLAA) has effectively normalized the crossing of the Taiwan Strait median line, an unofficial buffer zone that historically kept the peace.

Sorties involving advanced fighter jets, H-6 bombers, and uncrewed reconnaissance drones (Unmanned Surveillance and Reconnaissance Aerial Vehicle or ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance UAV) frequently breach Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). In late October 2026, single-day operations tracked multi-aircraft formations pushing deep into Taiwan’s southwestern and eastern ADIZ airspace.

These continuous flights are designed to exhaust Taiwanese fighter pilots, test radar response times, and establish a permanent air dominance footprint.

Likewise, the PLA Navy maintains a daily presence of warships - destroyers and frigates - ringing the island. The Liaoning aircraft carrier strike group has expanded its reach past the "First Island Chain". The carrier group, escorted by Type 055 guided-missile destroyers, completed an unconventional, highly publicized multi-theater command exercise. It transited through the Miyako Strait, operated in the Philippine Sea east of Taiwan, and cut through the western seaboard of the Philippines.

These naval tracks are specific practice runs to cut off Taiwan’s eastern shelter ports, deny access to U.S. or allied reinforcement fleets, and rehearse a total maritime blockade.

Meantime, the China Coast Guard (CCG) works alongside the navy to aggressively project law enforcement power. CCG vessels have increasingly patrolled Taiwan's critical eastern maritime supply routes. They issue radio harassment warnings to civilian shipping vessels to manufacture legal jurisdiction over waters they do not control.

Chinese maritime forces have heavily pressured Taiwan-controlled outer territories, such as the Pratas Islands in the South China Sea, requiring the Taiwanese Coast Guard to execute over a dozen expulsion operations to drive away encroaching mainland vessels.

Philippine vs U.S. Position on Taiwan

Following the U.S. model, the Philippines officially adheres to the One China Policy, recognizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legitimate government of China while maintaining “unofficial ties” with Taiwan through representative offices.

While the U.S. maintains a policy of "strategic ambiguity" regarding whether it would directly defend Taiwan militarily - though heavily arming and deterring Beijing - the Philippine government emphasizes “neutrality and territorial defense”.

Marcos Jr. has explicitly stated that the Philippines has no desire to become a belligerent nation and will not permit Philippine military bases (including Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA, sites) to be used to launch offensive military attacks against China.

Unlike the U.S., the Philippines' proximity to Taiwan (Mavulis Island is just 88 miles /142kms away) and the presence of nearly 200,000 overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) in Taiwan mean Manila cannot remain insulated from a conflict.

While the Philippines is a treaty ally of the U.S. and hosts U.S. assets that bolster deterrence against China, Marcos maintains that Philippine involvement would be driven by self-defense, protecting overseas citizens, and national survival rather than direct offensive intervention.

President Marcos Jr. has repeatedly warned that a war over Taiwan would inevitably drag the Philippines in "kicking and screaming" due to geographic reality and the welfare of overseas Filipinos. He noted that it is "very hard to imagine a scenario where the Philippines will not somehow get involved".

Marcos has walked a thin line that critics and Beijing interpret as shifting, yet his baseline policy has stayed steady: He expanded U.S. access to EDCA bases (some facing north toward Taiwan) to strengthen the Philippines' own defense posture; he repeatedly reassures Beijing and domestic audiences that Manila maintains its One China Policy, will not interfere in internal Chinese-Taiwan affairs, and will not allow U.S. forces to use Philippine soil as a launchpad for offensive strikes.

When the Chinese foreign ministry accused Manila of "playing with fire", Marcos pushed back by framing his remarks not as a provocation, but as a realistic assessment that "hope is not a plan" for national security

Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway province and its most sensitive territorial "red line" under the "One-China principle". It prefers "peaceful reunification" (via frameworks like "one country, two systems") but explicitly refuses to renounce the use of military force. Beijing uses economic coercion, gray-zone military intimidation, and coast guard patrols around the island and regional sea lanes.

Japan’s pro-Taiwan stance

Meantime, Japan's perspective on the China-Taiwan issue, has hardened amid its geographic proximity (with Japanese islands like Yonaguni located just ~60 miles from Taiwan) and heavy reliance on regional sea lanes.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has increasingly signaled that a Chinese armed contingency against Taiwan could constitute a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan.

This classification provides the legal rationale for Japan to potentially exercise collective self-defense and deepen security coordination with the U.S. and regional partners like the Philippines, despite facing economic pushback and warnings from Beijing.

Historically, the Japanese imperial army lost to China during World War II in a brutal war and several fronts culminating in Japan's formal surrender in August and September 1945. (Japan was on the verge of capitulation but the Americans still dropped atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.)

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed 246,000 people by the end of 1945, with totals continuing to rise in the following years due to radiation sickness and long-term illnesses

Timeline and Goals of the Chinese Government

Chinese President Xi Jinping has instructed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be prepared to seize control of Taiwan by 2027 (the centennial of the PLA’s founding).

Beijing links the complete "rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" and the resolution of the Taiwan question to its Second Centenary Goal -transforming China into a leading global superpower by 2049.

By that time, China’s “Century of Humiliation” would have ended with a resounding victory! #