
Issue
Analysis No. 10
September 12, 2005
PEOPLE POWER and the MILITARY
Now
an administration voice in the Senate, having bolted the opposition
a month or so ago, former Marcos Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile
last week said over national television that former President Corazon
Aquino should disabuse herself of the thought that she can help
oust Gloria Macapagal Arroyo from the Presidency.
It’s
the military that put Aquino in power in 1986, said Enrile, and
the military too that put Arroyo in Malacanang in 2001. Ergo, it’s
the military, not Aquino, not civil society, and not the citizenry,
that will resolve the present crisis, and it just so happens that
the military and police—at least the generals closest to her
heart and purse strings—are supporting Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
This is the myth Enrile and such like-minded bureaucrats like Angelo
Reyes would like to foster. But it is exactly that, a myth.
Both Enrile’s premise and his conclusion are wrong. Enrile
was with then Constabulary Chief Fidel Ramos when some two million
Filipinos braved Marcos’ guns at EDSA during the February
22-25 People Power revolt to save his and Ramos’ hides..
The facts of the matter are simple enough even for simpletons to
remember. Enrile and Ramos were involved in a coup plot against
Marcos, and out of their and their bully boys’ ineptness were
discovered by Marcos and his cousin, General Fabian Ver. Afraid
of being arrested, both, with their retinue of bodyguards headed
by one Gregorio Honasan, withdrew to Camps Aguinaldo and Crame.
Called out by Jaime Cardinal Sin, millions of Filipinos rushed to
EDSA to surround the camps into which the former Marcos henchmen
had crawled like cornered rats, thus protecting them from the tender
mercies of their former boss and patron.
The factions of the military loyal to Ramos and Enrile did not protect
the citizens; the citizens protected them, Enrile, and Ramos. Then
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fabian Ver could have easily bombed
Camps Crame and Aguinaldo into oblivion, and Ramos, Enrile and Honasan
with them. What prevented Marcos from ordering such a strike was
the presence of those millions of Filipinos on EDSA.
In destroying Ramos and Enrile and their motley military company,
he would have also killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of civilians
in the process. Internationally that would have been a public relations
disaster, and Marcos, who never lost his fear of world opinion,
especially the displeasure of his US patrons, knew it.
In 1986 Enrile himself knew a good thing when he saw it. Given Corazon
Aquino’s massive support among the population, he and Ramos
acknowledged her as the legally elected president of the Philippines.
Neither he nor Ramos nor their military cohorts “made”
Aquino President—the people did.
Though he did not enrich them as much as Marcos did, Joseph Estrada
too enjoyed the support of most of the generals of the military
and the police—until these worthies saw the people massed
at EDSA, and forthwith withdrew their support from
Estrada. In fact that was their condition for supporting EDSA II
in 2001: that there be at least a million people demanding the ouster
of Estrada.
There is no revising history. Enrile and those who now imagine that
something else other than the people’s rising against Marcos
and Estrada in 1986 and 2001 put Aquino and Arroyo in Malacanang
will have the hard facts to contend with. And the hard facts in
1986 as well as in 2001 are too clear for even those who want to
muddy it to obscure.
The people in their millions wanted two presidents out of Malacanang
in 1986 and 2001. In 1986 they supported the military mutineers
led by Enrile and Ramos; in 2001 the military shifted its allegiance
from Estrada the minute they saw the millions massed at EDSA.
In 1986 the Enrile-Ramos military clique embraced Aquino because
she had massive citizen support; in 2001, Angelo Reyes and company
changed allegiances the minute they saw the millions massed at EDSA.
The Philippine military—and one may throw the police in with
it—is the most unreliable of allies. One can only rely on
the principled. But as the entire country has seen in recent years,
that is a trait from which the military leadership has been exempt
since the Armed Forces were established by the United States at
the turn of the century to hunt down the remnants of the Katipunan.
What this means is that Enrile’s current patron Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo may have the declared support of the military and the police
now, but that support is hollow because premised on her remaining
firmly in control, and capable of providing them the worldly goods
they covet.
Military and police support can—is in fact certain to-- melt
away once a million Filipinos mass at EDSA or elsewhere in the country,
quite simply because, even more than among the putrid traditional
politicians in Congress and in the provincial capitols and municipal
halls all over the country Mrs. Arroyo counts among her allies,
opportunism is the one trait these institutions share by tradition,
training, habit, and ideology.
The leaders of these institutions have in fact raised lack of principle
and looking out for themselves to the level of a fine art. One has
only to recall the 1986 image of a sweating General Prospero Olivas,
then chief of the brutal Metropolitan Command of the thankfully
defunct Philippine Constabulary, referring to Corazon Aquino as
“my President” once he realized that the Marcos he had
served so well for 14 years was losing his grip on power. Or, for
that matter, that of Angelo Reyes in 2001 saluting Estrada one day
and then declaring his withdrawal of support the next.
The instinct for nothing else than survival and self-aggrandizement
is in fact what unites the generals of the military and police with
the alleged, current president of the Republic. That makes for the
worst possible alliance of all, in which one can easily abandon
the other for no other reason than convenience and gain. If Enrile
and company think that military support is that crucial to Arroyo’s
survival, they need to study recent history—but they need
to study it without those revisions that they may find comforting
though false.

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