Left
to fend for themselves
Like
their counterparts in land-based employment across the globe, Filipino
seafarers are generally left to suffer alone industry exploitation,
oppression, and other vagaries with no adequate union protection
let alone government support whatsoever.
Labor
laws. Philippine labor laws are generally designed for
land-based workers while existing laws are applied selectively to
seafarers – despite the Filipino seafarers’ contribution
to the GDP. The development of labor law and industrial relations
in the Philippines has been defined by the “uneven accumulation
and industrialization…to encourage foreign investment and
develop export-oriented industries, and an open economy.”(9)
In effect, the country’s labor laws and regulations are subordinated
to the demands of the global maritime labor market. This has become
more evident in the era of capitalist, free trade-driven globalization.
And, despite the Philippines’ being a signatory to the ILO,
International Maritime Organization (IMO), and a few other international
labor conventions, application is followed more in breach –
while international labor bodies have no enforcement powers on shipping
firms.
Unionism
and tripartism. The Philippine Labor Code declares as state
policy “to ensure the participation of workers in decision
and policy-making processes affecting their rights, duties, and
welfare” and “to promote free trade unionism as an instrument
for the enhancement of democracy and the promotion of social justice
and development.” This is a fiction particularly in the international
waters: union stewards on board ships are rare and there is hardly
any election of union officers.(10)
Concerted action through strikes is extremely hazardous. Unionism
in the seafarers’ sector is said to be dominated by AMOSUP,
first formed in 1960, which is also a big placement office deploying
union members to shipping and manning agencies. In this case, the
union becomes an agent of the employer – a “conflict
of interest.” As previously mentioned, AMOSUP is represented
in various policy-making bodies with government and industry and
in seafarer-related conferences of the ILO and IMO.
Legislation.
On account of red tapes, overlapping functions and powers, turf
infighting, and corruption in the muzzy web of government regulatory
bodies(11) that supervise
the seafaring sector and maritime industry including maritime schools,
training schools, and manning services, a number of bills have been
introduced in Congress. Filed since the previous congresses, these
bills – which include streamlining and rationalization, the
establishment of a Department of Maritime Affairs, a Maritime Code,
and stricter regulations to ensure maritime safety – remain
in the backburner.
In
Congress’ lower House, with nearly 80 percent of its regular
members coming from political dynasties including shipping and maritime
interests, legislations to promote labor rights – let alone
the rights of seafarers - are virtually unheard of. Party-list groups
led by the progressive Party-list bloc are a minority in the House
and legislations that have been filed on behalf of workers are also
restricted.
Filipino
seafarers – the whole nation for that matter – need
to face the reality of a Congress with no effective legislative
work, despite its billions of yearly budget. In the last 13th Congress
out of some 6,000 bills filed only 200 were enacted into law –
and out of these only 5 have “national significance.”(12)
Here’s how a House member describes it: “Congress is
no longer a marketplace for ideas but a marketplace in haggling
for funds for our respective districts.” Another member laments:
“I’m not even sure if Congress has priorities.”
II.
Philippine International and Inter-Island Shipping Industry: A Brief
Overview
Filipino
seafarers “sink or swim in the rough seas of the highly-globalized
maritime industry.” This description also fits into the country’s
shipping industry.
International
shipping. Of 92,000 ships engaged in the global trade of goods and
passengers, only 349 are from the Philippines. The number of companies
engaged in global trade across the seas has been on the decline:
from 166 companies in 1991 to 152 in 1998, and from 439 vessels
in 1991 to 349 in 1996.
Inter-island
shipping. Despite its being an archipelagic country and with a history
of boat making, the country’s domestic shipping is burdened
with old and ageing vessels (poor passenger and cargo service standards)
and inefficient operations ending up in sea tragedies; high domestic
shipping costs due to deregulation (high fuel cost, high insurance
premium); port inefficiency; and lack of government financial subsidy.
The
number of domestic ship passengers has been on the rise, from 33.7
million (1992) to 41.38 million (1997), while domestic cargo has
increased from 56.82 million metric tons to 74.04 MMT in the same
period.(13)
Deregulation
and liberalization
Of
the three sectors in the shipping industry, only liner shipping
(the operation of domestic water transportation for the public,
with regular port calls and sailing schedules) is regulated by the
government.(14) The
other two sectors, tramp shipping (freight vessels without any regular
route) and industrial carriage (shipping operations of companies)
are deregulated and liberalized.
Government
deregulation policies began in 1989, starting with then President
Corazon C. Aquino’s Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 46, allowing
operators to determine the rates they charge for their services.
Similarly in 1992, the liberalization of shipping routes was introduced.
The deregulation and liberalization of the domestic shipping industry
has allowed the entry of new giant players and mergers, leading
to the domination of domestic shipping by only five companies. In
the passenger service, the five companies are: Negros Navigation
Company; WG&A (a merger of William Lines, Inc., Carlos A. Gothong
Lines, Inc. and Aboitiz Shipping Corp.); Sulpicio Lines; Philippine
Fast Ferry Corporation (a merger of Universal Aboitiz and Sea Angels
Ferry Corp., a subsidiary of Negros Navigation); and Cebu Ferries
Corporation, a subsidiary of WG&A.
Government’s
deregulation and liberalization policies have been fatal to the
small and traditional players in the industry. In just 10 years
after the policies were adopted, only 37 (49 percent) of the pre-reform
76 shipping companies were left operating.
Globalization-driven
foreign domination
Under
its Domestic Shipping Modernization Program, the Philippine government
is opening the shipping industry to foreign investment and participation.
There is a move to abrogate the Cabotage Law to allow foreign shipping
lines to ply the country’s inter-island routes. At the moment,
foreign investors such as South Korea’s Hanjin Heavy Industries
and Construction (HHIC) are operating at the SBMA’s Freeport
and shipyard while the U.S. Merchant Academy based in Kings Point,
New York plans to put up a Global Maritime and Transportation School,
also at SBMA. Investors from Norway, Japan, and The Netherlands
have also entered the maritime school industry. Shipbuilding and
repair sector is actually dominated by at least two transnational
companies: Keppel Corp. of Singapore and the Tsuneishi Shipbuilding
Co. of Japan. By 1998, five TNCs in the shipping industry landed
in the country’s top corporations.
Foreign
investment in the country’s shipping industry is covered by
tax credits, duty exemptions, E-VAT exemptions, and other non-fiscal
incentives which in many respects the small Filipino-owned shipyards
and domestic shipping firms do not enjoy.
JPEPA.
At this point, it is imperative to scrutinize the provisions of
the Japan Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) that
are specific to the maritime and seafaring industries. The agreement,
signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo last month, further
liberalizes the Maritime Transport Services in favor of Japanese
TNCs in terms of trade and investments, ownership, control, and
administration. Some of the areas that give national or preferential
treatment to Japanese TNCs are maritime public utilities; shipbuilding
and repair; maritime engineers, consultants, and other professionals;
port calls; as well as maritime educational institutions.
Conclusion
It
is in the interest of the Philippines’ seafaring force to
come together and form a national organization that solidly fights
for their rights. They cannot count on seafarers’ organizations
that have conflicts of interest or with the government that uses
its authority to sacrifice the future of hundreds of thousands of
seafarers and their families, by promoting the interests of foreign
shipping companies, and their profit-driven partners at home.
The
vision for a national industrialization – alongside the struggle
for freedom and democracy – should integrate the program toward
developing a shipping industry and related services. Not only will
a modern, Filipino-oriented shipping industry boost an independent
economy in terms of facilitating trade and public transport but
will in the long haul ensure employment to the country’s seafarers
thus ending the abusive policy of sending them to international
waters where they face modern slavery, discrimination, low pay,
and labor repression.
_____________________________________________
End
notes
(1) Prof. Bobby Tuazon is presently the Director of Policy
Study, Center for People Empowerment in Governance (www.cenpeg.org)
and former head of the Political Science Program of the University
of the Philippines (UP) in Manila. He is a co-author and editor
of nine books dealing with political parties and electoral reform,
governance and corruption, human rights, U.S. foreign policy, and
the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination.
(2) Bobby Tuazon, “World and Philippine maritime
industry”, May 24, 2007 (unpublished).
(3) Maragtas S. Amante, “Industrial
democracy in the rough seas: The case of Philippine seafarers,”
Cardiff University and University of the Philippines, Industrial
Relations Research Association Proceedings, 2004.
(4) The amount of remittances
estimated by the government does not, however, include money sent
door-to-door or brought home directly by returning migrant workers.
Thus the total remittances pumped into the Philippine economy could
be bigger.
(5)
The country’s 76 CHEd-accredited maritime schools produce
25,000 (out of 60,000 enrollees).
(6)
Amante, ibid.
(7)
Returning seafarers are required to undergo re-training but the
courses are mostly redundant and months of retraining eat up their
savings. (Author’s interview with Filipino seafarers in Amsterdam,
April 2007)
(8)
Cited by the International Commission on Shipping (ICONS, 2000).
(9)
Froilan Bacungan and Rene Ofreneo, “The development of labor
law and labor market policy in the Philippines,” in Law and
Labor Market Regulation in East Asia, ed. Sean Cooney, Tim Lindsey,
Richard Mitchell, and Ying Zhu. London: Routledge, pp. 91-121.
(10)
Amante, “Industrial democracy…”
(11)
The government’s current maritime administration functions
are thinly spread among 14 bureaus and agencies under several agencies.
Aside from MARINA, these bodies include the Maritime Training Council
(MTC), DoLE, DoTC, NTC, POEA, PPA, PCG, CHEd, and other agencies.
(12)
These are: the Human Security Act (RA 9372), Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law (RA 9337), Biofuels Act of 2006 (RA 9367), Amending the
Election Modernization Act (RA 9369), and the Death Penalty Abolition
(RA 9346).
(13)
Available data shows that in 1995 there were 5,020 domestic operating
merchant vessels: 1,006 for passenger ferry, 2,145 general cargo,
and 173 tankers.
(14)
Myrna S. Austria, “Philippine domestic shipping industry:
State of competition and market structure,” Philippine APEC
Study Center Network Discussion Paper No. 2002-04.
