The
Election, Economy, War, and Peace
By Noam Chomsky
The
Election
The
word that immediately rolled off of every tongue after the presidential
election was "historic." And rightly so. A Black family
in the White House is truly a momentous event.
There
were some surprises. One was that the election was not over after
the Democratic convention. By usual indicators, the opposition party
should have had a landslide victory during a severe economic crisis,
after eight years of disastrous policies on all fronts including
the worst record on job growth of any post-war president and a rare
decline in median wealth, an incumbent so unpopular that his own
party had to disavow him, and a dramatic collapse in US standing
in world opinion. The Democrats did win, barely. If the financial
crisis had been slightly delayed, they might not have.
A
good question is why the margin of victory for the opposition party
was so small, given the circumstances. One possibility is that neither
party reflected public opinion at a time when 80% think the country
is going in the wrong direction and that the government is run by
"a few big interests looking out for themselves," not
for the people, and a stunning 94% object that government does not
attend to public opinion. As many studies show, both parties are
well to the right of the population on many major issues, domestic
and international.
It
could be argued that no party speaking for the public would be viable
in a society that is business-run to an unusual extent. Evidence
for that is substantial. At a very general level, evidence is provided
by the predictive success of political economist Thomas Ferguson's
"investment theory" of politics, which holds that policies
tend to reflect the wishes of the powerful blocs that invest every
four years to control the state. More specific illustrations are
numerous. To mention just one, for 60 years the US has failed to
ratify the core principle of international labor law, which guarantees
freedom of association. Legal analysts call it "the untouchable
treaty in American politics," and observe that there has never
even been any debate about the matter. And many have noted Washington's
dismissal of conventions of the International Labor Organization
as contrasted with the intense dedication to enforcement of monopoly
pricing rights for corporations ("intellectual property rights").
There is much to explore here, but this is not the place.
The
two candidates in the Democratic primary were a woman and an African-American.
That too was historic. It would have been unimaginable forty years
ago. The fact that the country has become civilized enough to accept
this outcome is a considerable tribute to the activism of the 1960s
and its aftermath.
In
some ways the election followed familiar patterns. The McCain campaign
was honest enough to announce clearly that the election wouldn't
be about issues. Sarah Palin's hairdresser received twice the salary
of McCain's foreign policy adviser, the Financial Times reported,
probably an accurate reflection of significance for the campaign.
Obama's message of "hope" and "change" offered
a blank slate on which supporters could write their wishes. One
could search websites for position papers, but correlation of these
to policies is hardly spectacular, and in any event, what enters
into voters' choices is what the campaign places front and center,
as party managers know well.
The
Obama campaign greatly impressed the public relations industry,
which named Obama "Advertising Age's marketer of the year for
2008," easily beating out Apple. The industry's prime task
is to ensure that uninformed consumers make irrational choices,
thus undermining market theories. And it recognizes the benefits
of undermining democracy the same way.
The
Center for Responsive Politics reports that once again elections
were bought: "The best-funded candidates won nine out of 10
contests, and all but a few members of Congress will be returning
to Washington." Before the conventions, the viable candidates
with most funding from financial institutions were Obama and McCain,
with 36% each. Preliminary results indicate that by the end, Obama's
campaign contributions, by industry, were concentrated among Law
Firms (including lobbyists) and financial institutions. The investment
theory of politics suggests some conclusions about the guiding policies
of the new administration.
The
power of financial institutions reflects the increasing shift of
the economy from production to finance since the liberalization
of finance in the 1970s, a root cause of the current economic malaise:
the financial crisis, recession in the real economy, and the miserable
performance of the economy for the large majority, whose real wages
stagnated for 30 years, while benefits declined. The steward of
this impressive record, Alan Greenspan, attributed his success to
"growing worker insecurity," which led to "atypical
restraint on compensation increases" - and corresponding increases
into the pockets of those who matter. His failure even to perceive
the dramatic housing bubble, following the collapse of the earlier
tech bubble that he oversaw, was the immediate cause of the current
financial crisis, as he ruefully conceded.
Reactions
to the election from across the spectrum commonly adopted the "soaring
rhetoric" that was the hallmark of the Obama campaign. Veteran
correspondent John Hughes wrote that "America has just shown
the world an extraordinary example of democracy at work," while
to British historian-journalist Tristram Hunt, the election showed
that America is a land "where miracles happen," such as
"the glorious epic of Barack Obama" (leftist French journalist
Jean Daniel). "In no other country in the world is such an
election possible," said Catherine Durandin of the Institute
for International and Strategic Relations in Paris. Many others
were no less rapturous.
The
rhetoric has some justification if we keep to the West, but elsewhere
matters are different. Consider the world's largest democracy, India.
The chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, which is larger than all but
a few countries of the world and is notorious for horrifying treatment
of women, is not only a woman, but a Dalit ("untouchable"),
at the lowest rung of India's disgraceful caste system.
Turning
to the Western hemisphere, consider its two poorest countries: Haiti
and Bolivia. In Haiti's first democratic election in 1990, grass-roots
movements organized in the slums and hills, and though without resources,
elected their own candidate, the populist priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
The results astonished observers who expected an easy victory for
the candidate of the elite and the US, a former World Bank official.
True,
the victory for democracy was soon overturned by a military coup,
followed by years of terror and suffering to the present, with crucial
participation of the two traditional torturers of Haiti, France
and the US (contrary to self-serving illusions). But the victory
itself was a far more "extraordinary example of democracy at
work" than the miracle of 2008.
The
same is true of the 2005 election in Bolivia. The indigenous majority,
the most oppressed population in the hemisphere (those who survived),
elected a candidate from their own ranks, a poor peasant, Evo Morales.
The electoral victory was not based on soaring rhetoric about hope
and change, or body language and fluttering of eyelashes, but on
crucial issues, very well known to the voters: control over resources,
cultural rights, and so on. Furthermore, the election went far beyond
pushing a lever or even efforts to get out the vote. It was a stage
in long and intense popular struggles in the face of severe repression,
which had won major victories, such as defeating the efforts to
deprive poor people of water through privatization.
These
popular movements did not simply take instructions from party leaders.
Rather, they formulated the policies that their candidates were
chosen to implement. That is quite different from the Western model
of democracy, as we see clearly in the reactions to Obama's victory.
In
the liberal Boston Globe, the headline of the lead story observed
that Obama's "grass-roots strategy leaves few debts to interest
groups": labor unions, women, minorities, or other "traditional
Democratic constituencies." That is only partially right, because
massive funding by concentrated sectors of capital is ignored. But
leaving that detail aside, the report is correct in saying that
Obama's hands are not tied, because his only debt is to "a
grass-roots army of millions" - who took instructions, but
contributed essentially nothing to formulating his program.
At
the other end of the doctrinal spectrum, a headline in the Wall
Street Journal reads "Grass-Roots Army Is Still at the Ready"
- namely, ready to follow instructions to "push his agenda,"
whatever it may be.
Obama's
organizers regard the network they constructed "as a mass movement
with unprecedented potential to influence voters," the Los
Angeles Times reported. The movement, organized around the "Obama
brand" can pressure Congress to "hew to the Obama agenda."
But they are not to develop ideas and programs and call on their
representatives to implement them. These would be among the "old
ways of doing politics" from which the new "idealists"
are "breaking free."
It
is instructive to compare this picture to the workings of a functioning
democracy such as Bolivia. The popular movements of the third world
do not conform to the favored Western doctrine that the "function"
of the "ignorant and meddlesome outsiders" - the population
-- is to be "spectators of action" but not "participants"
(Walter Lippmann, articulating a standard progressive view).
Perhaps
there might even be some substance to fashionable slogans about
"clash of civilizations."
In
earlier periods of American history, the public refused to keep
to its assigned "function." Popular activism has repeatedly
been the force that led to substantial gains for freedom and justice.
The authentic hope of the Obama campaign is that the "grass
roots army" organized to take instructions from the leader
might "break free" and return to "old ways of doing
politics," by direct participation in action.
Latin
America
In
Bolivia, as in Haiti, efforts to promote democracy, social justice,
and cultural rights, and to bring about desperately needed structural
and institutional changes are, naturally, bitterly opposed by the
traditional rulers, the Europeanized mostly white elite in the Eastern
provinces, the site of most of the natural resources currently desired
by the West. Also naturally, their quasi-secessionist movement is
supported by Washington, which once again scarcely conceals its
distaste for democracy when it does not conform to strategic and
economic interests. The generalization is a staple of serious scholarship,
but does not make its way to commentary about the revered "freedom
agenda."
To
punish Bolivians for showing "the world an extraordinary example
of democracy at work," the Bush administration cancelled trade
preferences, threatening tens of thousands of jobs, on the pretext
that Bolivia was not cooperating with US counter-narcotic efforts.
In the real world, the UN estimates that Bolivia's coca crop increased
5 percent in 2007, as compared with a 26 percent increase in Colombia,
the terror state that is Washington's closest regional ally and
the recipient of enormous military aid. AP reports that "Cocaine
seizures by Bolivian police working with DEA agents had also increased
dramatically during the Morales administration."
"Drug
wars" have regularly been used as a pretext for repression,
violence, and state crimes, at home as well.
After
Morales's victory in a recall referendum in August 2008, with a
sharp increase in support over his 2005 success, rightist opposition
turned violent, leading to assassination of many peasants supporting
the government. After the massacre, a summit meeting of UNASUR,
the newly-formed Union of South American Republics, was convened
in Santiago Chile. The summit issued a strong statement of support
for the elected Morales government, read by Chilean President Michelle
Bachelet. The statement declared "their full and firm support
for the constitutional government of President Evo Morales, whose
mandate was ratified by a big majority" -- referring to his
overwhelming victory in the referendum a month earlier. Morales
thanked UNASUR for its support, observing that "For the first
time in South America's history, the countries of our region are
deciding how to resolve our problems, without the presence of the
United States."
A
matter of no slight significance, not reported in the US.
The
Administration
Turning
to the future, what can we realistically expect of an Obama administration?
We have two sources of information: actions and rhetoric.
The
most important actions to date are selection of staff. The first
selection was for vice-President: Joe Biden, one of the strongest
supporters of the Iraq invasion among Senate Democrats, a long-time
Washington insider, who consistently votes with his fellow Democrats
but not always, as when he supported a measure to make it harder
for individuals to erase debt by declaring bankruptcy.
The
first post-election appointment was for the crucial position of
chief of staff: Rahm Emanuel, one of the strongest supporters of
the Iraq invasion among House Democrats and like Biden, a long-term
Washington insider. Emanuel is also one of the biggest recipients
of Wall Street campaign contributions, the Center for Responsive
Politics reports. He "was the top House recipient in the 2008
election cycle of contributions from hedge funds, private equity
firms and the larger securities/investment industry." Since
being elected to Congress in 2002, he "has received more money
from individuals and PACs in the securities and investment business
than any other industry"; these are also among Obama's top
donors. His task is to oversee Obama's approach to the worst financial
crisis since the 1930s, for which his and Obama's funders share
ample responsibility.
In
an interview with an editor of the Wall Street Journal, Emanuel
was asked what the Obama administration would do about "the
Democratic congressional leadership, which is brimming with left-wing
barons who have their own agenda," such as slashing defense
spending (in accord with the will of the majority of the population)
and "angling for steep energy taxes to combat global warming,"
not to speak of the outright lunatics in Congress who toy with slavery
reparations and even sympathize with Europeans who want to indict
Bush administration war criminals for war crimes. "Barack Obama
can stand up to them," Emanuel assured the editor. The administration
will be "pragmatic," fending off left extremists.
Obama's
transition team is headed by John Podesta, Clinton's chief of staff.
The leading figures in his economic team are Robert Rubin and Lawrence
Summers, both enthusiasts for the deregulation that was a major
factor in the current financial crisis. As Treasury Secretary, Rubin
worked hard to abolish the Glass-Steagall act, which had separated
commercial banks from financial institutions that incur high risks.
Economist Tim Canova comments that Rubin had "a personal interest
in the demise of Glass-Steagall." Soon after leaving his position
as Treasury Secretary, he became "chair of Citigroup, a financial-services
conglomerate that was facing the possibility of having to sell off
its insurance underwriting subsidiary... the Clinton administration
never brought charges against him for his obvious violations of
the Ethics in Government Act."
Rubin
was replaced as Treasury Secretary by Summers, who presided over
legislation barring federal regulation of derivatives, the "weapons
of mass destruction" (Warren Buffett) that helped plunge financial
markets to disaster. He ranks as "one of the main villains
in the current economic crisis," according to Dean Baker, one
of the few economists to have warned accurately of the impending
crisis. Placing financial policy in the hands of Rubin and Summers
is "a bit like turning to Osama Bin Laden for aid in the war
on terrorism," Baker adds.
The
business press reviewed the records of Obama's Transition Economic
Advisory Board, which met on November 7 to determine how to deal
with the financial crisis. In Bloomberg News, Jonathan Weil concluded
that "Many of them should be getting subpoenas as material
witnesses right about now, not places in Obama's inner circle."
About half "have held fiduciary positions at companies that,
to one degree or another, either fried their financial statements,
helped send the world into an economic tailspin, or both."
Is it really plausible that "they won't mistake the nation's
needs for their own corporate interests?" He also pointed out
that chief of staff Emanuel "was a director at Freddie Mac
in 2000 and 2001 while it was committing accounting fraud."
Those
are the actions, at the time of writing. The rhetoric is "change"
and "hope."
Health
Care
The
primary concern for the administration will be to arrest the financial
crisis and the simultaneous recession in the real economy. But there
is also a monster in the closet: the notoriously inefficient privatized
health care system, which threatens to overwhelm the federal budget
if current tendencies persist. A majority of the public has long
favored a national health care system, which should be far less
expensive and more effective, comparative evidence indicates (along
with many studies). As recently as 2004, any government intervention
in the health care system was described in the press as "politically
impossible" and "lacking political support" - meaning:
opposed by the insurance industry, pharmaceutical corporations,
and others who count. In 2008, however, first Edwards, then Obama
and Clinton, advanced proposals that approach what the public has
long preferred. These ideas now have "political support."
What has changed? Not public opinion, which remains much as before.
But by 2008, major sectors of power, primarily manufacturing industry,
had come to recognize that they are being severely damaged by the
privatized health care system. Hence the public will is coming to
have "political support." There is a long way to go, but
the shift tells us something about dysfunctional democracy.
International
Relations
Internationally,
there is not much of substance on the largely blank slate. What
there is gives little reason to expect much a change from Bush's
second term, which stepped back from the radical ultranationalism
and aggressive posture of the first term, also discarding some of
the extreme hawks and opponents of democracy (in action, that is,
not soothing words), like Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz.
Israel-Palestine
The
immediate issues have to do mostly with the Middle East. On Israel-Palestine,
rumors are circulating that Obama might depart from the US rejectionism
that has blocked a political settlement for over 30 years, with
rare exceptions, notably for a few days in January 2001 before promising
negotiations were called off prematurely by Israel. The record,
however, provides no basis for taking the rumors seriously. I have
reviewed Obama's formal positions elsewhere (Perilous Power), and
will put the matter aside here.
After
the election, Israeli president Shimon Peres informed the press
that on his July trip to Israel, Obama had told him that he was
"very impressed" with the Arab League peace proposal,
calling for full normalization of relations with Israel along with
Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories - basically, the
long-standing international consensus that the US-Israel have unilaterally
blocked (and that Peres has never accepted - in fact, in his last
days as Prime Minister in 1996 he held that a Palestinian state
can never come into existence). That might suggest a significant
change of heart, except that the right-wing Israeli leader Binyamin
Netanyahu said that on the same trip, Obama had told him that he
was "very impressed" with Netanyahu's plan, which calls
for indefinite Israeli control of the occupied territories.
The
paradox is plausibly resolved by Israeli political analyst Aluf
Ben, who points out that Obama's "main goal was not to screw
up or ire anyone. Presumably he was polite, and told his hosts their
proposals were `very interesting' - they leave satisfied and he
hasn't promised a thing." Understandable, but it leaves us
with nothing except his fervent professions of love for Israel and
dismissal of Palestinian concerns.
Iraq
On
Iraq, Obama has frequently been praised for his "principled
opposition" to the war. In reality, as he has made clear, his
opposition has been entirely unprincipled throughout. The war, he
said, is a "strategic blunder." When Kremlin critics of
the invasion of Afghanistan called it a strategic blunder, we did
not say that they were taking a principled stand.
By
the time of writing, the government of Iraq seems close to accepting
a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Washington on the US military
presence in Iraq - with reservations, according to Prime Minister
Maliki, who said that this is the best Iraq could get and it was
at least "a strong beginning." The talks dragged on, the
Washington Post reports, because Iraq insisted on "some major
concessions, including the establishment of the 2011 withdrawal
date instead of vaguer language favored by the Bush administration
[and] also rejected long-term U.S. military bases on its soil."
Iraqi leaders "consider the firm deadline for withdrawal to
be a negotiating victory," Reuters reports: Washington "long
opposed setting any timetable for its troops to withdraw, but relented
in recent months," unable to overcome Iraqi resistance.
Throughout
the negotiations, the press regularly dismissed the obstinate stance
of the Maliki government as regrettable pandering to public opinion.
US-run polls continue to report that a large majority of Iraqis
oppose any US military presence, and believe that US forces make
the situation worse, including the "surge." That judgment
is supported, among others, by Middle East specialist and security
analyst Steven Simon, who writes in Foreign Affairs that the Petraeus
counterinsurgency strategy is "stoking the three forces that
have traditionally threatened the stability of Middle Eastern states:
tribalism, warlordism, and sectarianism. States that have failed
to control these forces have ultimately become ungovernable, and
this is the fate for which the surge is preparing Iraq. A strategy
intended to reduce casualties in the short term will ineluctably
weaken the prospects for Iraq's cohesion over the long run."
It may lead to "a strong, centralized state ruled by a military
junta that would resemble the Baathist regime Washington overthrew
in 2003," or "something very much like the imperial protectorates
in the Middle East of the first half of the twentieth century"
in which the "club of patrons" in the capital would ‘dole
out goods to tribes through favored conduits." In the Petraeus
system, "the U.S. military is performing the role of the patrons
-- creating an unhealthy dependency and driving a dangerous wedge
between the tribes and the state," undermining prospects for
a "stable, unitary Iraq."
The
latest Iraqi success culminates a long process of resistance to
demands of the US invaders. Washington fought tooth and nail to
prevent elections, but was finally forced to back down in the face
of popular demands for democracy, symbolized by the Ayatollah Sistani.
The Bush administration then managed to install their own choice
as Prime Minister, and sought to control the government in various
ways, meanwhile also building huge military bases around the country
and an "embassy" that is a virtual city within Baghdad
- all funded by congressional Democrats. If the invaders do live
up to the SOFA that they have been compelled to accept, it would
constitute a significant triumph of nonviolent resistance. Insurgents
can be killed, but mass nonviolent resistance is much harder to
quell.
Within
the political class and the media it is reflexively assumed that
Washington has the right to demand terms for the SOFA. No such right
was accorded to Russian invaders of Afghanistan, or indeed to anyone
except the US and its clients. For others, we rightly adopt the
principle that invaders have no rights, only responsibilities, including
the responsibility to attend to the will of the victims, and to
pay massive reparations for their crimes. In this case, the crimes
include strong support for Saddam Hussein through his worst atrocities
on Reagan's watch, then on to Saddam's massacre of Shiites under
the eyes of the US military after the first Gulf War; the Clinton
sanctions that were termed "genocidal" by the distinguished
international diplomats who administered them and resigned in protest,
and that also helped Saddam escape the fate of other gangsters whom
the US and Britain supported to the very end of their bloody rule;
and the war and its hideous aftermath. No such thoughts can be voiced
in polite society.
The
Iraqi government spokesman said that the tentative SOFA "matches
the vision of U.S. President-elect Barack Obama." Obama's vision
was in fact left somewhat vague, but presumably he would go along
in some fashion with the demands of the Iraqi government. If so,
that would require modification of US plans to ensure control over
Iraq's enormous oil resources while reinforcing its dominance over
the world's major energy producing region.
Afghanistan,
Pakistan...
Obama's
announced "vision" was to shift forces from Iraq to Afghanistan.
That stand evoked a lesson from the editors of the Washington Post:
"While the United States has an interest in preventing the
resurgence of the Afghan Taliban, the country's strategic importance
pales beside that of Iraq, which lies at the geopolitical center
of the Middle East and contains some of the world's largest oil
reserves." Increasingly, as Washington has been compelled to
accede to Iraqi demands, tales about "democracy promotion"
and other self-congratulatory fables have been shelved in favor
of recognition of what had been obvious throughout to all but the
most doctrinaire ideologists: that the US would not have invaded
if Iraq's exports were asparagus and tomatoes and the world's major
energy resources were in the South Pacific.
The
NATO command is also coming to recognize reality publicly. In June
2007, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer informed a meeting
of NATO members that "NATO troops have to guard pipelines that
transport oil and gas that is directed for the West," and more
generally to protect sea routes used by tankers and other "crucial
infrastructure" of the energy system. That is the true meaning
of the fabled "responsibility to protect." Presumably
the task includes the projected $7.6-billion TAPI pipeline that
would deliver natural gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India,
running through Afghan's Kandahar province, where Canadian troops
are deployed. The goal is "to block a competing pipeline that
would bring gas to Pakistan and India from Iran" and to "diminish
Russia's dominance of Central Asian energy exports," the Toronto
Globe and Mail reported, plausibly outlining some of the contours
of the new "Great Game."
Obama
strongly endorsed the then-secret Bush administration policy of
attacking suspected al-Qaeda leaders in countries that Washington
has not (yet) invaded, disclosed by the New York Times shortly after
the election. The doctrine was illustrated again on October 26,
when US forces based in Iraq raided Syria, killing 8 civilians,
allegedly to capture an al-Qaeda leader. Washington did not notify
Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki or President Talabani, both of whom
have relatively amicable relations with Syria, which has accepted
1.5 million Iraqi refugees and is bitterly opposed to al-Qaeda.
Syria protested, claiming, credibly, that if notified they would
have eagerly apprehended this enemy. According to Asia Times, Iraqi
leaders were furious, and hardened their stance in the SOFA negotiations,
insisting on provisions to bar the use of Iraqi territory to attack
neighbors.
The
Syria raid elicited a harsh reaction in the Arab world. In pro-government
newspapers, the Bush administration was denounced for lengthening
its "loathsome legacy" (Lebanon), while Syria was urged
to "march forward in your reconciliatory path" and America
to "keep going backwards with your language of hatred, arrogance
and the murder of innocents" (Kuwait). For the region generally,
it was another illustration of what the government-controlled Saudi
press condemned as "not diplomacy in search of peace, but madness
in search of war."
Obama
was silent. So were other Democrats. Political scientist Stephen
Zunes contacted the offices of every Democrat on the House and Senate
Foreign Relations Committees, but was unable to find any critical
word on the US raid on Syria from occupied Iraq.
Presumably,
Obama also accepts the more expansive Bush doctrine that the US
not only has the right to invade countries as it chooses (unless
it is a "blunder," too costly to us), but also to attack
others that Washington claims are supporting resistance to its aggression.
In particular, Obama has, it seems, not criticized the raids by
Predator drones that have killed many civilians in Pakistan.
These
raids of course have consequences: people have the odd characteristic
of objecting to slaughter of family members and friends. Right now
there is a vicious mini-war being waged in the tribal area of Bajaur
in Pakistan, adjacent to Afghanistan. BBC describes widespread destruction
from intense combat, reporting further that "Many in Bajaur
trace the roots of the uprising to a suspected US missile strike
on an Islamic seminary, or madrassa, in November 2006, which killed
around 80 people." The attack on the school, killing 80-85
people, was reported in the mainstream Pakistani press by the highly
respected dissident physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy, but ignored in the
US as insignificant. Events often look different at the other end
of the club.
Hoodbhoy
observed that the usual outcome of such attacks "has been flattened
houses, dead and maimed children, and a growing local population
that seeks revenge against Pakistan and the US." Bajaur today
may be an illustration of the familiar pattern.
On
November 3, General Petraeus, the newly appointed head of the US
Central Command that covers the Middle East region, had his first
meeting with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, army chief General
Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and other high officials. Their primary concern
was US missile attacks on Pakistani territory, which had increased
sharply in previous weeks. "Continuing drone attacks on our
territory, which result in loss of precious lives and property,
are counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically
elected government," Zardari informed Petraeus. His government,
he said, is "under pressure to react more aggressively"
to the strikes. These could lead to "a backlash against the
US," which is already deeply unpopular in Pakistan.
Petraeus
said that he had heard the message, and "we would have to take
[Pakistani opinions] on board" when attacking the country.
A practical necessity, no doubt, when over 80% of the supplies for
the US-NATO war in Afghanistan pass through Pakistan.
Pakistan
developed nuclear weapons, outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), thanks in no small measure to Ronald Reagan, who pretended
not to see what his ally was doing. This was one element of Reagan's
"unstinting support" for the "ruthless and vindictive"
dictator Zia ul-Haq, whose rule had "the most long-lasting
and damaging effect on Pakistani society, one still prevalent today,"
the highly respected analyst Ahmed Rashid observes. With Reagan's
firm backing, Zia moved to impose "an ideological Islamic state
upon the population." These are the immediate roots of many
of "today's problems - the militancy of the religious parties,
the mushrooming of madrassas and extremist groups, the spread of
drug and Kalashnikov culture, and the increase in sectarian violence."
The
Reaganites also "built up the [Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate, ISI] into a formidable intelligence agency that ran
the political process inside Pakistan while promoting Islamic insurgencies
in Kashmir and Central Asia," Rashid continues. "This
global jihad launched by Zia and Reagan was to sow the seeds of
al Qaeda and turn Pakistan into the world center of jihadism for
the next two decades." Meanwhile Reagan's immediate successors
left Afghanistan in the hands of the most vicious jihadis, later
abandoning it to warlord rule under Rumsfeld's direction. The fearsome
ISI continues to play both sides of the street, supporting the resurgent
Taliban and simultaneously acceding to some US demands.
The
US and Pakistan are reported to have reached "tacit agreement
in September [2008] on a don't-ask-don't-tell policy that allows
unmanned Predator aircraft to attack suspected terrorist targets"
in Pakistan, according to unidentified senior officials in both
countries. "The officials described the deal as one in which
the U.S. government refuses to publicly acknowledge the attacks
while Pakistan's government continues to complain noisily about
the politically sensitive strikes."
Once
again problems are caused by the "ignorant and meddlesome outsiders"
who dislike being bombed by an increasingly hated enemy from the
other side of the world.
The
day before this report on the "tacit agreement" appeared,
a suicide bombing in the conflicted tribal areas killed eight Pakistani
soldiers, retaliation for an attack by a US Predator drone that
killed 20 people, including two Taliban leaders. The Pakistani parliament
called for dialogue with the Taliban. Echoing the resolution, Pakistani
foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said "There is an increasing
realization that the use of force alone cannot yield the desired
results."
Afghan
President Hamid Karzai's first message to president-elect Obama
was much like that delivered to General Petraeus by Pakistani leaders:
"end US airstrikes that risk civilian casualties." His
message was sent shortly after coalition troops bombed a wedding
party in Kandahar province, reportedly killing 40 people. There
is no indication that his opinion was "taken on board."
The
British command has warned that there is no military solution to
the conflict in Afghanistan and that there will have to be negotiations
with the Taliban, risking a rift with the US, the Financial Times
reports. Correspondent Jason Burke, who has long experience in the
region, reports that "the Taliban have been engaged in secret
talks about ending the conflict in Afghanistan in a wide-ranging
'peace process' sponsored by Saudi Arabia and supported by Britain."
Some
Afghan peace activists have reservations about this approach, preferring
a solution without foreign interference. A growing network of activists
is calling for negotiations and reconciliation with the Taliban
in a National Peace Jirga, a grand assembly of Afghans, formed in
May 2008. At a meeting in support of the Jirga, 3,000 Afghan political
and intellectuals, mainly Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group, criticized
"the international military campaign against Islamic militants
in Afghanistan and called for dialogue to end the fighting,"
AFP reported.
The
interim chairman of the National Peace Jirga, Bakhtar Aminzai, "told
the opening gathering that the current conflict could not be resolved
by military means and that only talks could bring a solution. He
called on the government to step up its negotiations with the Taliban
and Hizb-i-Islami groups." The latter is the party of the extremist
radical Islamist warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Reagan favorite
responsible for many terrible atrocities, now reported to provide
core parliamentary support for the Karzai government and to be pressing
it towards a form of re-Talibanization.
Aminzai
said further that "We need to pressure the Afghan government
and the international community to find a solution without using
guns." A spokeswoman added that "We are against Western
policy in Afghanistan. They should bury their guns in a grave and
focus on diplomacy and economic development." A leader of Awakened
Youth of Afghanistan, a prominent antiwar group, says that we must
end "Afghanicide -- the killing of Afghanistan." In a
joint declaration with German peace organizations, the National
Peace Jirga claimed to represent "a wide majority of Afghan
people who are tired of war," calling for an end to escalation
and initiation of a peace process.
The
deputy director of the umbrella organization of NGOs in the country
says that of roughly 1,400 registered NGOs, nearly 1,100 are purely
Afghan operations: women's groups, youth groups and others, many
of them advocates of the Peace Jirga.
Though
polling in war-torn Afghanistan is a difficult process, there are
some suggestive results. A Canadian-run poll found that Afghans
favor the presence of Canadian and other foreign troops, the result
that made the headlines in Canada. Other findings suggest some qualifications.
Only 20% "think the Taliban will prevail once foreign troops
leave." Three-fourths support negotiations between the Karzai
government and the Taliban, and more than half favor a coalition
government. The great majority therefore strongly disagree with
the US-NATO focus on further militarization of the conflict, and
appear to believe that peace is possible with a turn towards peaceful
means. Though the question was not asked, it is reasonable to surmise
that the foreign presence is favored for aid and reconstruction.
A
study of Taliban foot soldiers carried out by the Toronto Globe
& Mail, though not a scientific survey as they point out, nevertheless
yields considerable insight. All were Afghan Pashtuns, from the
Kandahar area. They described themselves as Mujahadeen, following
the ancient tradition of driving out foreign invaders. Almost a
third reported that at least one family member had died in aerial
bombings in recent years. Many said that they were fighting to defend
Afghan villagers from air strikes by foreign troops. Few claimed
to be fighting a global Jihad, or had allegiance to Taliban leader
Mullah Omar. Most saw themselves as fighting for principles - an
Islamic government -- not a leader. Again, the results suggest possibilities
for a negotiated peaceful settlement, without foreign interference.
A
valuable perspective on such prospects is provided by Sir Rodric
Braithwaite, a specialist on Afghanistan who was UK ambassador to
Moscow during the crucial 1988-92 period when the Russians withdrew
(and the USSR collapsed), then becoming chair of the British Joint
Intelligence Committee. On a recent visit, Braithwaite spoke to
Afghan journalists, former Mujahideen, professionals, people working
for the US-based "coalition" - in general, to "natural
supporters for its claims to bring peace and reconstruction."
In the Financial Times, he reports that they were "contemptuous
of President Hamid Karzai," regarding him as another one of
the puppets installed by foreign force. Their favorite was "Mohammad
Najibullah, the last communist president, who attempted to reconcile
the nation within an Islamic state, and was butchered by the Taliban
in 1996: DVDs of his speeches are being sold on the streets. Things
were, they said, better under the Soviets. Kabul was secure, women
were employed, the Soviets built factories, roads, schools and hospitals,
Russian children played safely in the streets. The Russian soldiers
fought bravely on the ground like real warriors, instead of killing
women and children from the air. Even the Taliban were not so bad:
they were good Muslims, kept order, and respected women in their
own way. These myths may not reflect historical reality, but they
do measure a deep disillusionment with the `coalition' and its policies."
Specialists
on the region urge that US strategy should shift from more troops
and attacks in Pakistan to a "diplomatic grand bargain -- forging
compromise with insurgents while addressing an array of regional
rivalries and insecurities" (Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid
in Foreign Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 2008). They warn that the current
military focus "and the attendant terrorism" might lead
to the collapse of nuclear-armed Pakistan, with grim consequences.
They urge the incoming US administration "to put an end to
the increasingly destructive dynamics of the Great Game in the region"
through negotiations that recognize the interests of the concerned
parties within Afghanistan as well as Pakistan and Iran, but also
India, China and Russia, who "have reservations about a NATO
base within their spheres of influence" and concerns about
the threats "posed by the United States and NATO" as well
as by al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The immediate goal should be "Lowering
the level of violence in the region and moving the global community
toward genuine agreement on the long-term goals," thus allowing
Afghans to confront their internal problems peacefully. The incoming
US president must put an end to "Washington's keenness for
`victory' as the solution to all problems, and the United States'
reluctance to involve competitors, opponents, or enemies in diplomacy."
It
appears that there are feasible alternatives to escalation of the
cycle of violence, but there is little hint of it in the electoral
campaign or political commentary. Afghanistan and Pakistan do not
appear among foreign policy issues on the Obama campaign's website.
Iran
Iran,
in contrast, figures prominently -- though not of course as compared
with effusive support for Israel; Palestinians remain unmentioned,
apart from a vague reference to a two-state settlement of some unspecified
kind. For Iran, Obama supports tough direct diplomacy "without
preconditions" in order "to pressure Iran directly to
change their troubling behavior," namely pursuing a nuclear
program and supporting terrorism (presumably referring to support
for Hamas and Hezbollah). If Iran abandons its troubling behavior,
the US might move towards normal diplomatic and economic relations.
"If Iran continues its troubling behavior, we will step up
our economic pressure and political isolation." And as Obama
informed the Israeli Lobby (AIPAC), "I will do everything in
my power to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon" -
up to nuclear war, if he meant what he said.
Furthermore
Obama will strengthen the NPT "so that countries like North
Korea and Iran that break the rules will automatically face strong
international sanctions." There is no mention of the conclusion
of US intelligence with "high confidence" that Iran has
not had a weapons program for 5 years, unlike US allies Israel,
Pakistan, India, which maintain extensive nuclear weapons programs
in violation of the NPT with direct US support, all unmentioned
here as well.
The
final mention of Iran is in the context of Obama's strong support
for Israel's "Right to Self Defense" and its "right
to protect its citizens." This commitment is demonstrated by
Obama's co-sponsorship of "a Senate resolution against Iran
and Syria's involvement in the war, and insisting that Israel should
not be pressured into a ceasefire that did not deal with the threat
of Hezbollah missiles." The reference is to Israel's US-backed
invasion of Lebanon in 2006, with pretexts that are hardly credible
in light of Israel's regular practices. This invasion, Israel's
fifth, killed over 1000 Lebanese and once again destroyed much of
southern Lebanon as well as parts of Beirut.
This
is the sole mention of Lebanon among foreign policy issues on Obama's
website. Evidently, Lebanon has no right of self defense. In fact
who could possibly have a right of self defense against the US or
its clients?
Nor
does Iran have such rights. Among specialists, even rational hawks,
it is well understood that if Iran is pursuing a weapons program,
it is for deterrence. In the conservative National Interest, former
CIA weapons inspector David Kay speculates that Iran might be moving
towards "nuclear weapons capability," with the "strategic
goal" of countering a US threat that "is real in Teheran's
eyes," for good reasons that he reviews. He notes further that
"Perhaps the biggest agitator of all in this is the United
States, with its abbreviated historical memory and diplomatic ADD."
Wayne White, formerly deputy director for the Near East and South
Asia in State Department intelligence, dismisses the possibility
that Supreme Leader Khamenei and the clerical elite, who hold power
in Iran, would throw away the "vast amounts of money"
and "huge economic empires" they have created for themselves
"in some quixotic attack against Israel with a nuclear weapon,"
if they had one. The probability of that is virtually undetectable,
he points out.
White
agrees that Iran might seek weapons capability (which is not the
same as weapons) for deterrence. He goes on to suggest Iran might
also recall that Saddam Hussein had no nuclear weapons program when
Israel bombed its Osiraq reactor in 1981, and that the attack led
him to initiate a program using nuclear materials it had on hand
as a result of the bombing. At the time, White was Iraq analyst
for State Department intelligence, with access to a rich body of
evidence. His testimony adds internal US intelligence confirmation
to the very credible evidence available at once, later strengthened
by reports of Iraqi defectors, that the Israeli bombing did not
terminate, but rather initiated, Saddam's pursuit of nuclear weapons.
US or Israeli bombing of Iranian facilities, White and other specialists
observe, might have the same effect. Violence consistently elicits
more violence in response.
These
matters are well understood by informed hardliners. The leading
neoconservative expert on Iran, Reuel Marc Gerecht, formerly in
the CIA Middle East division, wrote in 2000 that:
Tehran
certainly wants nuclear weapons; and its reasoning is not illogical.
Iran was gassed into surrender in the first Persian Gulf War; Pakistan,
Iran's ever more radicalized Sunni neighbor to the southeast, has
nuclear weapons; Saddam Hussein, with his Scuds and his weapons-of-mass-destruction
ambitions, is next door; Saudi Arabia, Iran's most ardent and reviled
religious rival, has long-range missiles; Russia, historically one
of Iran's most feared neighbors, is once again trying to reassert
its dominion in the neighboring Caucasus; and Israel could, of course
blow the Islamic Republic to bits. Having been vanquished by a technologically
superior Iraq at a cost of at least a half-million men, Iran knows
very well the consequences of having insufficient deterrence. And
the Iranians possess the essential factor to make deterrence work:
sanity. Tehran or Isfahan in ashes would destroy the Persian soul,
about which even the most hard-line cleric cares deeply. As long
as the Iranians believe that either the U.S. or Israel or somebody
else in the region might retaliate with nuclear weapons, they won't
do something stupid.
Gerecht
also understands very well the real "security problem"
posed by Iranian nuclear weapons, should it acquire them:
A
nuclear-armed Islamic Republic would of course check, if not checkmate,
the United States' maneuvering room in the Persian Gulf. We would
no doubt think several times about responding to Iranian terrorism
or military action if Tehran had the bomb and a missile to deliver
it. During the lead-up to the second Gulf War, ruling clerical circles
in Tehran and Qom were abuzz with the debate about nuclear weapons.
The mullahs...agreed: if Saddam Hussein had had nuclear weapons,
the Americans would not have challenged him. For the "left"
and the "right," this weaponry is the ultimate guarantee
of Iran's defense, its revolution, and its independence as a regional
great power.
With
appropriate translations for the doctrinal term "Iranian terrorism,"
Gerecht's concerns capture realistically the threat posed by an
Iran with a deterrent capacity (Iranian military action is quite
a remote contingency).
While
as usual ignored as irrelevant to policy formation, American public
opinion is close to that of serious analysts and also to world opinion.
Large majorities oppose threats against Iran, thus rejecting the
Bush-Obama position that the US must be an outlaw state, violating
the UN Charter, which bars the threat of force. The public also
joins the majority of the world's states in endorsing Iran's right,
as a signer of the NPT, to enrich uranium for nuclear energy (the
position endorsed also by Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Kissinger
and others when Iran was ruled by the tyrant imposed by US-UK subversion).
Most important, the public favors establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free
zone in the Middle East, which would mitigate and perhaps eliminate
this highly threatening issue.
Popular
Influence
These
observations suggest an interesting thought experiment. What would
be the content of the "Obama brand" if the public were
to become "participants" rather than mere "spectators
in action"? It is an experiment well worth undertaking, and
there is good reason to suppose that the results might point the
way to a saner and more decent world.
View
online here: http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/19749
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